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The conflict in the Middle East is a turbulent situation o f  �reat signi­
ficance to the entire world. This study examines the internal political scene 
of Israel and its affect on the overall Middle East situation . It focuses on 
ideology, structure , and policy within Israel as components o f  that scene . 
The ideology o f  Zionism provided the ,iustification for the creation of  
Israel and continues to form the basis for governmental decision making there. 
An analysis of the . principles of Zionism and o f  the statements , writings, and 
actions o f  Zionist leaders showed that the ideology could reasonably be inter­
preted as racist and expansionist.  
More important than the ideas o f  Zionism is the actual implementat ion o f  
those ideas through government policy. Israeli policy in regard to cit izen­
ship, immigration , security, economics , labor, land, and political represen­
tation is examine d .  Important characteristics o f  Israe l ' s  economy are its 
dependence on foreign capital and assistance and its continuing attempts to 
attain self-sufficiency. The study shows clearly that discrimination against 
Arabs and Jews of Asian and African descent living in I�rael is widespread 
and that the righ ts ,  bene fits , and opportunities for these groups are not 
equal to those of European and American Jewish immigrants . More significantly , 
it is indicates that government policy is partly respons ible for these in­
equalities . and has worked to place Western Jews in a superior position in 
Israeli society. 
Another part of  Israe l ' s  implementation of  Zionism has been its action 
concerning Jewish control of land. From the time of early Jewish immigration 
to the presen t ,  Zionists have attempted to increase the territory inhab ited 
and controlled by Jews . The methods used to accomplish this have included 
purchase, acquisition of abandoned land, expropriation of inhab ited land 
through expropriation and force , and mili tary invasion o f  other nations . 
Israeli expansionism is related to the Zionist principles that Jews should 
establish a state with boundaries similar to those of  ancient Israel and 
that all Jews should be gathered into that state . Adherence to these ideas 
requires territorial expansion and Israeli policy has clearly shown expansion­
ist tendencies . 
One of the most significant determinan ts o f  policy in any country is po­
litical structure. In Israel, s t ructure is dominated by political parties. 
Israel is a multi-party, parliamentary system in which no party has ever gained 
a majority in the legislature. Rule by coalition has meant that major policy 
changes have been difficult to achieve . The Labor Party and its views domin­
ated Israel for thirty years , tempered by the need for negotiations with and 
concessions to the other parties. In Israe l ' s  centralized structure , local 
government, interest groups, and public opinion are relatively insignifican t .  
In a system with these characteristics and Israe l ' s  strong ideological commit­
ment ,  it could be anticipated that a h igh degree o f  policy consistency would 
exis t .  This has proven to be true in Israe l .  Although Begin ' s  Likud govern­
ment has a different public position on major issues and uses stronger rhetoric, 
the substance of its actions are similar. It has returned the same land Labor 
was willing to return and has generally followed Labor ' s  p�ans for establishing 
settlements in the occupied territories. Israe l ' s  system of  multiple parties , 
parliamentary governmen t ,  rule by coalition , and centralized government makes 
policy consistency a significant feature of  its politics . 
Also contributing to this policy inertia is the nature of  leadership in 
Israel .  The structural features mentioned above , the superior position of  
Western Jews , the historical necessity for Jews to operate secretly, and the 
limited access to important information in Israeli society have created an 
elitist system of  leadership.  The characteristics and views o f  this elite , and 
in fact the specific individuals in the elite group , have not changed much 
in Israe l ' s  history. 
The ideology o f  Zionism and the translation of  its principles into social 
structure and government policy has had a tremendous impact on the conflict in 
the Middle Eas t .  I t  has worked against the creation o f  good relat ions between 
people, cultures, and nations there and prevents a lasting solution to the 
Palestinian question. Israel can not grant equal rights to Arabs within its 
borders without compromising Jewish control and it can not allow Palest inian 
self-determination withou giving up territory i t  needs to accomodate more Jew­
ish ipunigration to Israe l .  The country ' s  political s t ructure and the nature 
of its leadership have contributed to its policy consistency and make major 
changes unlikely in the future. 'Ille most successful force in creating any 
policy change has been external pressures , particularly from the United States . 
Tilis is most dramatically illustrated by the Camp David Accords which were a 
direct rest•lt of  U . S .  mediation efforts . However ,  Camp David did not succeed 
in extracting maj or concessions from Israel or in setting adequate groundwork 
for a solution to the Palestinian problem. Flexibility on policy questions 
by Isra.el is  necessary to achieve a fair and permanent solution t o  Middle 
East problems. 'Ille ideology o f  Zionism, Israel ' s  political system, and its 
elite leadership severely restrict Israel ' s  ability to be flexibl e .  Internal 
change in Israel is a necessary ingredient in the achievement of Middle East 
peace and stability. 
-· .. - ·-.. -
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
The conflict in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors has been an intense one with worldwide repercussions and 
has the potential to be a dangerously unstable situation. The many 
issues involved have been investigated, discussed, analyzed, and 
negotiated by many scholars and policy makers. Always, when carry-
ing out relations with other nations, a country's internal situation 
is of vital importance. This paper is an attempt to relate Israel's 
domestic policies and internal structure to the Middle East questions. 
The significance of the domestic scene in the formulation of 
foreign policy has been often noted. In relation to the American 
context, Dr. Henry Kissinger states that incompatible domestic struc-
tures between nations can generate a gulf and become an obstacle to 
understanding. In such a situation, according to Kissinger, the 
symbolic aspects o f  a conflict can come to overshadow the substantive 
1 ones. This may be particularly relevant to the case of Israel in 
which religious and national symbols have played such a great part. 
The more basic connection between domestic and foreign policy is 
described by Marian Irish and Elke Frank, who say, "Responses as well 
as initiatives in foreign policy are inevitably conditioned by the 
domest,ic setting in which policy makers must operate."
2 
In addition, 
the setting in which policy makers have operated in the past affects 
their view of the world to further condition the nation's fo·reign 
policy responses and initiatives. 
Inherent in any discussion of Israeli politics is the ideology 
of Zionism. This ideology, as formulated by leaders of the Zionist 
movement and as put into practice by the leaders of the Jewish state, 
has had and will continue to have great impact on all aspects of 
Israeli policy. This study will examine ideology, policy, and 
structure within the state of Israel to provide an overall analysis 
of the issues raised above. 
Propositions 
The study focuses on the following propositions: 
1 .  Ideology, political structure and public policy in Israel combine 
to 'form a domestic political scene that has a definite impact upon 
the nation's foreign policy. The environment in which foreign policy 
decision-making occurs is conditioned by characteristics of each of 
the factors. Also, the Israeli domestic situation influences the 
Arab vision of Israel's nature and purpose, further affecting inter­
national relations in the Middle East. This paper will attempt to 
analyze this domestic environment and determine its effect on the 
Middle East situation. 
2 .  Because the ideology of Zionism is so important to the politics 
of Israel, its precepts and its practice must be examined thoroughly. 
One issue in this examination is whether the ideology is a racist one 
and whether racial discrimination against Arabs and Jews of Asian and 
African origins exists in Israel. More significantly, it is neces­
sary to determine if racism is a function of Zionist ideas and of 
government policy. 
3 .  Another �mportant aspect of the Middle East situation that is 
affected by Zionism and Israeli policy is land. Critics of Israel 
have claimed that, based on ideological concepts, the state has 
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embarked on a continuing plan to extend its boundaries and increase 
the area under Jewish control. A goal of this paper is to determine 
if Zionism and Israeli policy have created a program of expansionism. 
4 .  The structure and operation of a political system are major 
determinants of policy in any country. In Israel, the system is dom­
inated by political parties. This study will examine the development 
of this system, including the influence of Zionist ideology on that 
development. Also, the effect of the structure in terms of policy 
results and the distribution of power and benefits will be analyzed. 
5 .  One noticeable aspect of Israeli politics has been the tremendous 
success of the La.bor Party in maintaining control of the government. 
Consequently, only a small number of .individuals have reached top 
leadership positions in the state. A topic to be con�idered here is 
whether this indicates that Israel has been dominated by an elite 
during most of its existence and what factors could have created and 
maintained the elitism. If a political elite has existed, did the 
election of Menahem Begin and the Likud Party bloc eliminate it and 
lead to major foreign policy changes? 
6. The problem of the Palestinian Arabs, involving their demands for 
return of land taken over by Jews and for a national homeland, is the 
crux of the Middle East conflict. Therefore, an important subject of 
this paper will be how Israel's domestic political situation affects 
possibilities for a solution to this problem. 
7. To provide a more comprehensive view of the Middle East situation 
and Israel's role in it, two supplemental issues will be studied. 
One of these is the meaning of the Camp David Accords agreed to by 
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Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menahem 
Begin, and U.S. President Jimmy Carter in September, 1978 and the 
peace treaty signed by Egypt and Israel in March, 1979. Do they 
indicate real progress toward an overall settlement involving all 
parties? Do they represent major changes in Israel's position on 
major Middle East issues? The other issue .. is the role of external 
pressure, particularly from the United States, in the formation of 
Israeli foreign policy. 
Before addressing these specific questions, a brief discussion 
of the background and the problems of the Middle East conflict is 
necessary to obtain a general understanding of the situation. 
The Setting 
The establishment of the state of Israel and the manner in which 
it was created have caused immense problems in the Middle East. For 
centuries a few Jews had chosen to make their homes in Palestine for 
religious reasons, but in the 1880's a different type of Jew began 
to enter Palestine with the intent of agriculturally colonizing the 
land. They came largely because of Eastern European anti-Semitism 
and because of their belief that the redemption of their people de­
pended on transforming their lives from merchants and financiers into 
hard working and self-sufficient pioneers. Leo Pinsker's pamphlet 
Auto-Emancipation was an expression of the thinking behind this im­
migration, stressing the impossibility of eliminating anti-Semitism 
and the necessity for Jews to move away from the rest of _society. In 
1896, the publication of The Jewish State by Dr. Theodor Herzl gave 
rise to the establishment of the World Zionist Organization. Dr. 
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Herzl also felt that anti-Semitism was inherent in non-Jews and 
encouraged Jewish immigration to Palestine. The first Zionist Con-
gress met in Basle, Switzerland in August 1897 and proclaimed its 
goal of creating a Jewish refuge secured by public law. The use of 
the term "public law" meant that the Jews were going to seek auton-
3 omy in an area under protection of some great power. Between 1881 
and 1914, the Jewish population in Palestine rose from 25, 000 to 
4 80, 000. Most Jews, however, were not motivated to move by the 
Jewish nationalism of Herzl and the Zionists, but by hardships 
d b  . . . 5 cause y anti-Sem.Ltism. 
Seeking the protection of a great power was exactly Herzl's 
intention as he bargained with the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, 
Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, and with Great Britain to achieve his 
goal. Herzl himself was unsuccessful, but under the leadership of 
Chaim Weizmann, the Zionists obtained from Britain the Balfour Dec-
laration. In this the British government stated that it viewed 
with favor the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people and will 
use their best endeavors to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly 
understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish conununities in Palestine, 
or the rights and political status enjoyed 
by Jews in any other country." 6 
The European backgrounds of the Zionists allowed them to present 
their plan as part of the same national expansion movement that Euro-
pean countries had been pursuing themselves. Weizmann indicated his 
wish to present Zionism within this perspective when he sent a note 
to the British war cabinet during the Balfour Declaration discussions 
- 5 
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which said he hoped "the problem would be considered in the light of 
imperial interests and the principle for which the entente stands. 11
7 
Dr. Maxime Rodinson explains efforts to carry out the Zionist plans 
got under way because of a political decision made by Great Britain 
under pressure from the Zionist Organization. British reasoning in-
valved gaining support for the war effort from American and Russian 
Jews plus serving its own interests in the Middle East. 8 
Jewish immigrants to Palestine often purchased land from rich 
Arab effendi (absentee owners) and then evicted the poorer fellahin 
who actually lived on the land. This created the original Arab hos-
tility as social intercourse became non-existent and economic ties 
rare and peripheral.
9 
This hostility increased as the Arabs began to 
feel that Jewish immigration was a threat to their national rights 
and security. It seemed to them that a foreign power, Britain, had 
decided,- without their consent or participation, that they should 
10 sacrifice for the solution of the Jewish problem. The Arabs saw 
the Balfour Declaration as a breach of British promises, making 
Israel a product of colonialism. 11 They saw it as an attempt of a 
�uropean power to impose on them a new and foreign element thanks to 
its victory over another European power. This was substantiated by 
British protection of Jewish immigration after World War I when 
. . . h d 1 . 12 Britain was given t e man ate to govern Pa estine. 
In the 1930's, this opposition surfaced in serious armed clashes 
between Arabs and Jews. Immigration had drastically increased be-
cause of Nazi persecution of Jews. This civil strife subsided some-
what during World War II, but became even more violent following the 
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war, with both Arabs and Jews engaging in offensive military 
maneuvers. Often, the British Mandate forces were the victims of 
this violence as both sides accused Britain of favoring the other. 
These attitudes created basic problems that still exist today. The 
Arabs saw Israel as a project of British imperialism, and thus an 
illegitimate imposition. The Jews, on the other hand, glorified 
their military action as a fight against British tyranny and aroused 
the public conscience with the sacred task of saving threatened 
European Jews. This pushed the Arab problem into the background, 
distorting the true conflict. Unable to deal with the situation or 
to satisfy the demands of either side, Britain decided to give up the 
Mandate in 1947 and put the question before the United Nations. 
Several months later, on November 29, 1947 the UN approved a 
plan to partition Palestine, forming a Jewish and an Arab state. The 
Jews approved the partitioning but the Arabs rejected it and moved to 
block its implementation by force. This led to organized warfare be­
tween Jews and Arabs. The state of Israel was officially declared on 
May 14, 1948. The British mandate officially ended that day and Pal­
estine was invaded by Egyptian, Transjordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian 
forces. After months of fighting Israel had secured an even larger 
share of Palestinian territory than had previously been allocated in 
the UN partition. The armistice lines set up at this time were not 
declared as territorial boundaries, but only to delineate areas be­
yond which the respective armies could not move.
13 
During the fight­
ing, many Arabs living in Palestine fled from areas controlled by 
Israel into Syria, Transjordan, and the Gaza Strip, becoming refugees. 
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By 1949, there were an estimated 940,000 of these refugees. A 
continuing problem. in the relations between the Arab states and 
Israel is who caused and who is responsible for the refugees. The 
Israelis claim that Arab leaders encouraged their people to leave 
in order to make it easier for the Arab armies to destroy Israel, 
after which, all the refugees could return to their homes. The 
Israeli government has consistently denied that their behavior in 
the war caused the exodus of Palestinian Arabs. But General Yigal 
Allon, a prominent Israeli military leader during the 1948 war, said, 
"While planning the capture of the Arab part of Safed, it was not our 
intention to prevent the flight of the Arab population." And Is-
raeli battle plans show orders to push the- Arab population out of 
certain parts of the country to establish defensive areas.14 Also, 
an example of how the Israelis spread panic among the Arabs with 
force is the Deir Yassin massacre engineered by the terrorist group 
Irgun under the leadership of the present Israeli Prime Minister 
Menahem Begin. On April 10, 1948, the Irgun killed 200 Arab men, 
women, and children who had not fled the village. This had an im­
mense impact on the people of the area, and was not an isolated in­
cident. Civilians expected to be annihilated if they fell into the 
enemy's hands.15 
Also, there is no substantial evidence that Arab leaders 
encouraged the evacuation of the refugees. In a study of radio 
broadcasts of the period, Erskine Childers found that these broad­
casts did not call on Arabs to leave and, in fact, advocated that 
they remain rather than give up land to the Israelis. He believes 
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it was natural for Arabs to retreat with their troops or to leave 
during attacks. He says that Arabs were progressively pushed back 
rather than fleeing the area immediately. He supports his belief by 
pointing out that many Arabs remain in Nazareth and in Galilee be­
cause lightning attacks in these areas le� no time to flee.
16 
It appears that the Israeli claim of innocence in the creation 
of the refugee problem is unfounded and that the Arab belief that 
fear of Israeli force and general rni�itary .activity were causes of 
the Arab exodus is more likely correct. The 1967 war increased 
Israeli responsibility for the refugees as their invasion of Arab 
territory drove some refugees further away and extended Israeli ter­
ritory such that it gained military control over much of the area 
inhabited by the refugees. 
The history of the establishment of the state of Israel created 
two major problems that have plagued the Middle East ever since. The 
first is the nature of the state established which was largely deter­
mined by the ideology of Zionism and the manner in which it was 
achieved. The dispossession of the Palestinians, the confirmation 
of Arab fears about Jewish intentions to create a state in their ter­
ritory, and a series of military defeats leading to the development 
of a strong Jewish state in the Middle East, have damaged Arab self­
esteem as well as deprived the Palestinian Arabs of the chance to 
build their own nation and has led to uncompromising intransigence. 
Many Arabs have refused to admit that Jews have any rights in Pales­
tine. They also claim that the state of Israel continues to base 
its existence on the violation of the rights of Arab people and on 
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the expansion of their territorial hegemon y .  
The Jews , howeve r ,  have been determined t o  deny that there are 
logical , legitimate reasons for the Arab position and blame their 
animosity on the Arab elite and Britain. Israel claims that the 
Arab elite has used antagonism toward Jews to distract their people ' s  
attention from their poor conditions and to improve their power posi-
tion within the Arab world. It also accused Britain from yielding too 
much to Arab demands and forcing the Jews to fight to achieve their 
17 goa l .  Israel holds that its State is based on the historic rights 
of the Jewish people to live in Palestine and that its position is 
based on the right of the state to exist in peace. 
The second important problem is the question of the Palestinian 
Arabs, many of whom were made refugees by the creation of Israel. 
This is widely considered to be the crux of the Middle East conflict 
and has been often discussed by the United Nations , the most recent 
debate held in Augus t ,  1979 . Since Israel denies responsibility for 
creating the problem, it also refuses to take responsib ility for 
reaching the solution. It believes that refugees should be perma-
nently settled in the existing Arab states where they would have a 
common cultural link and opportunities to improve their economic 
pos ition. The Israelis also do not wish to seriously discuss Pales-
tinian Arab rights until terrorist activities directed against Israel 
are stopped. The Arabs believe, howeve r ,  that Israel should re-
patriate and compensate the refugees or allow a Palestinian home-
land to be created on territory now controlled by Israel . They are 
especially adamant about the land conquered by Israel in the 1967 war , 
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demanding its return to the countries it was taken from or its 
conversion into a Palestinian entity. 
These two fundamental disagreements form the basis of the Middle 
East confrontation. It is the purpose of this study to analyze how 
the ideology, domestic political structure, and particular domestic 
policies of Israel contribute to the creation, continuation, and 
potential solution of these problems. 
Methodology and Sources 
This study of Israel's domestic political scene is basically an 
empirical one. It relies on facts discovered through research to ex­
plain what situation exists in Israel, how it operates, and why it is 
that way. These explanations are then analyzed as components of the 
overall Middle East conflict. The empirical method was employed be­
cause it presents a more accurate and complete view of the issues 
involved. The Middle East conflict has been characterized by emo­
tional charges and accusations. In this clash of nations and cul­
tures, it would be difficult to produce a meaningful analysis of the 
situation based on a normative position of what ought to be. There­
fore, a determination of what is , through an empirical approach to 
the subject, is most appropriate. However, that does not mean that 
this study will consist of a listing of facts. Judgments have been 
made as to what should be emphasized and facts have been interpreted 
as to their full meaning. 
This study cannot be confined to one area of political science 
but must include structural, behavioral, and theoretical aspects. 
This requires the use of both ptimary and secondary sources. In the 
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case of Israel, the unique development of the state necessitates the 
use of an historical approach to some of the problems involved. Some 
statistical analyses from secondary sources will be used as will some 
descriptions and examinations.of Israel's political structures and 
institutions. In all of these cases, I will interpret the evidence 
presented and sometimes rely on the interpretations of others, as it 
relates to the subject under investigation. In considering the de­
velopment of Zionist ideology and its influence on Israeli policy, 
historical analysis will be important. The evolution of ideas put 
forward by Zionist leaders is important for understanding the theo­
retical foundations for the policy choices of Israel and the activi­
ties of its leaders. Ideology can limit policy alternatives, justify 
actions of leaders, and affect election results. In general, it pro­
vides a theoretical framework for decision-making within the state. 
The pattern of Zionist thought must be studied thoroughly and must be 
related to policy choices made before and after the establishment of 
Israel and to the structures created within the state. This natural­
ly includes fundamental tenets of Zionism, but also involves revi­
sionist ideas that gained dominance within the movement or were 
rejected by the Zionist mainstream. One important object of this 
study is to determine which Zionist ideas did become predominant and 
had the greatest effect on Israeli politics. To do this, the works 
of the most important Zionist leaders and thinkers have been studied. 
Theodor Herzl, Leo Pinsker, David Ben-Gurion, Ahad Ha'am, Martin 
Buber, Chaim Weizmann, Golda Meir, Menahem Begin and others have been 
studied in an effort to understand all aspects of Zionism. I have 
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chosen to emphasize the writings and statements of people engaged 
in the actual creation of Israel rather than pure theoreticians be­
cause as practitioners of the ideology, they will give a more accu­
rate view of the Zionist ideas that provide the basis for state 
policies. Secondary interpretations of Zionism and its leaders 
have also been important in that they helped to focus my opinions 
on the meaning and effect of Zionism. 
The discussion of Israeli domestic policy also involves some 
historical examination but, for the most part, is confined to the 
time period since the establishment of Israel. Statistical informa­
tion will provide evidence as to policy choices and policy perfor­
mance in the Jewish state relating to such areas as land, labor, 
education, political representation, economics, and others. Par­
ticular laws and regulations of the state also serve as a guide to 
Israeli policy as do statements and reports of Israeli leaders. 
Secondary works provide the major source of information in this 
area, including sociological studies of the effect of Israeli poli­
cies in addition to descriptions of the policies themselves. News­
papers, periodicals, and Israeli government publications were used 
to report more recent developments. 
The validity and objectivity of sources had to be considered in 
weighing the evidence. The Journal of Palestine Studies is published 
by the Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University and is 
oriented to the Arab point of view. It presents scholarly studies 
of the issues, not emotionally inspired essays. The same can be said 
about the U.S. publication Conunentary which takes the Jewish position. 
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Middle East International, published in London, combines news 
presentations with essays by English and American reporters and 
scholars. It presents a pro-Arab view, but does include news stor-
ies written in the Israeli press. The Palestine Digest and The Link 
are both decidedly biased in favor of the Arabs and their information 
is regarded accordingly. However, they do present some documented 
facts not available elsewhere. Current History and Foreign Affairs 
are basically moderate in their approach to the Middle East. Both 
are scholarly and sometimes analytic journals with relative objec-
tivity. Being American publications using primarily American authors, 
there is sometimes an apparent bias toward Israel as a U.S. ally. 
As for· the political structure of Israel, secondary sources 
have been the sole source of information. Studies by Leonard Fein, 
Michael Brecher, and W. F. Abboushi have been of prime importance 
18 here. This area includes examination of political parties and 
their subsidiaries like the Histadrut labor union and the Jewish 
Agency fund raising group, non-partisan political movements, and 
elections. The effect of these groups and processes on policy will 
be analyzed and put into the perspective of the entire Middle East 
picture. 
The use of these approaches and these sources should allow an 
adequate investigation of the propositions previously stated. 
Contribution to Political Science 
The propositions being studied in this paper are relevant to 
one of the most potentially explosive world situations. The align-
ment of great powers, the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel, the 
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oil power of the Arab states, and the appearance of the conflict as 
one between the imperialist West and developing nations brings great 
and complex forces into confrontation in the Middle East. The crea­
tion of a just and lasting solution is necessary to insure future 
world stability. Political scientists, being students of the human 
relations and structural conditions involved in social and govern­
mental decision-making, have a duty to present the relevant fact� and 
interpret them in order to establish a foundation for the solution of 
problems. 
In this paper, an attempt is made to study one aspect of the 
Middle East situation in order to make a contribution to the complete 
understanding of the problem. To reach a truly comprehensive solu­
tion, the inunediate negotiating points must not be the only things 
considered. The reasons for animosity, the ideological differences, 
and the infl�ence of domestic structures and policies cannot be 
ignored. As stated earlier, foreign policy initiatives and responses 
are always conditioned by the domestic situation. Policy makers 
should be aware of this and consider it when making decisions. Again, 
the political scientist is in a position to aid policy makers by 
presenting evidence and forming reasonable opinions based on it. 
As a contribution to the science itself, this paper may serve 
as a practical study of the influence of domestic politics on inter­
national relations. It could also be an example of how an ideology 
can come to dominate a system and have impact on its decisions. In 
addition, it may show the importance of structures like political 
parties, legislatures, quasi-political institutions, and election 
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systems in affecting policy makers; their view of the world, their 
range of alternatives, and their decisions. 
Possibly the most important contribution this study can make is 
to dispel some myths about Israel in a general search for truth. 
Israel has long been accepted as a bastion of freedom in an oppres­
sive area; as the only democracy in the Middle East; and as a truly 
liberal, almost utopian socialistic state that represents the Western 
view of humanitarianism. Perhaps it is because the West can relate 
more easily to the European-oriented Israeli society than to the un­
familiar Arabs, or .because of a collective sense of guilt over the 
inhuman Nazi persecution of Jews, or because Israel has consistently 
allied itself with the Western bloc against the Conununists, that 
Israel is accepted so readily. The true nature of the state of 
Israel and the ideology of Zionism have not effectively been made 
known to the United States public. Knowledge about the realities of 
Israel and Zionism is valuable for its own sake. 
- 16 -
Chapter 2 ZIONIST IDEOLOGY 
Ideology is not a transitory thing which can be changed to fit a 
situation. Social institutions and economic enterprises are based on 
ideology. It exists in textbooks and in the minds of teachers, thus 
shaping the minds of the young. Political parties adopt philosophies 
that guide their behavior. So an ideology is an important part of 
any political system. In the case of Israel, Zionist ideology was 
the reasoning and justification behind the existence of the state it-
self, and is still an integral part of its political system. It plays 
an important role in determining Israel's posture toward its neigh-
boring states and in the setting of domestic policies and priorities. 
The Zionist movement was directed toward the single goal of 
establishing a national home for all Jewish people to be located in 
Palestine. The ideology behind the movement was based on two funda-
mental tenets: 1) That Jews throughout the world constitute a nation; 
and 2) That anti-Semitism is inherent in non-Jews and is incurable. 
Leo Pinsker's Auto-Emancipation was an early and significant publi-
cation in the Zionist movement. In it he said, 
Judeophobia is a psychic aberration. As 
a psychic aberration, it is hereditary; 
as a disease transmitted for 2000 years 
it is incurable . • .  so fight against such 
an hereditary form is in vain. All people 
hate the Jews. l 
Theodor Herzl, who founded the Zionist organization and led the move-
ment in its early years, presented similar ideas in his book, The 
Jewish State. He claimed that the Jews were one people and that 
wherever they iived anti-Semitism would exist. He said, "Every 
single one of the nations in whose midst Jews live are shamefacedly 
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b l . s . . 2 or razen y anti- enu.tic." More recent Zionists have continued 
using the same ideas. Chaim Herzog, Israeli ambassador to the UN 
during the administration of Yitzhak Rabin siad, "I believe'that the 
fundamental cause of anti-Semitism is that the Jew exists.11
3 
Herzl 
and other leaders felt that anti-Semitism could not be cured through 
enlightenment or assimilation and that the only solution was a sep-
arate state for the Jews. The historical, religious, and emotional 
attachment of the Jewish people to Palestine made it the natural 
choice to be their homeland. In fact, redemption of the Jewish 
people depended upon reunification with the Land ?f Israel, espe-
cially to Eastern European Jews. Martin Buber described a funda-
mental relationship between Jewish people and the Land of Israel. 
Fulfillment of commandments and settlement of the land are linked 
together according to Buber. He stated that, "The world can be re-
deemed only by the redemption of Israel and Israel can be redeemed 
only by reunion with the land.114 
Herzl's ideal conception of this homeland was an admirable one. 
He did not believe nations were ready for unlimited democracy but no. 
member of the Jewish state would be discriminated against. He was 
opposed to theocracy and thought every person should.be free and un-
disturbed in his faith and his nationality. Equality before the law 
for people of all creeds and nationalities should be practiced.
5 
This view of the state was expressed in Herzl's 1902 book Altneuland. 
It describes ·a Palestine aided by modern technology and methods in 
which a progressive, cooperative society thrived. As Walter Laquer 
interprets it, 
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Women are fully emancipated, education is 
free, criminals are not punished but re­
educated. There is a division of church and 
state and full freedom of conscience. 
Tolerance is the supreme principle on which 
the state is based.6 
As to dealing with the Arabs in Palestine, there are many noble 
sentiments and ideas expounded by Zionists. Herzl put it this way: 
My testament to the Jewis� people: so build 
·your state that a stranger will feel con­
tented among you • . .  It would be immoral if we 
would exclude anyone, whatever his origin, 
his descent, or his religion from partici­
pating in our achievements. ? 
Writer and historian Hans Kohn believed that Herzl thought that a 
national, chauvinistic party which wished to make Jews a privileged 
1 b 1 f . 
8 
e ement was a etraya o Zion. Other Zionists seemed to envision 
the same type of state as Herzl. Yitzhak Epstein advised the Seventh 
Zionist Congress to enter into an alliance with the Arabs and warned 
that encroaching upon the rights of a proud and independent people 
9 such as the Arabs would be dangerous. David Eder, the first diplo-
matic representative of World Zionist Organization President Chaim 
Weizmann, formulated a cooperative Zionist policy with four major 
points: 1) Jews must not segregate themselves from Arabs; 2) Tel 
Aviv must not become a symbol of Jewish exclusiveness; 3) Jews 
should deal with the Arab world as a whole and show the same respect 
for Arab national aspirations as they demanded for their own; 4) 
As an Oriental people, Jews should abandon their pretensions to be 
10 Europeans. Even so staunch a Zionist as David Ben-Gurion, Is-
rael's first Prime Minister, told the Anglo-American Committee of 
Enquiry on Palestine in 1946, 
- 19 -
We will have to treat our Arab and other 
non-Jewish neighbors . . •  as if they were Jews 
but make every effort that they should pre­
serve their Arab characteristics, their 
language, their Arab culture, their Arab 
religion, their Arab way of life, while 
making every effort to raise their standard 
of life.11 
Weizmann, who was also the first president of Israel, expressed it 
simply when he said, "The world will judge the Jewish state by what 
it will do.with the Arabs.11
12 
This general view of concern for Arabs and Arab rights was ex-
pressed in extreme form by a wing of the Zionist movement known at 
different times as Brit Shalom (1925) , Kedmah Misraha (1936) , and 
Ihud. It included such thinkers as Abad Ha'am, Martin Buber, Judah 
Magnes, and Ernest Simon. These groups wanted to give up the idea of 
a Jewish state for a binational one in which Jews and Arabs would 
enjoy free development along with full political, social, and civil 
rights. Their thinking was based on Western humanism rather than 
the colonialist approach of some of the Zionists.
13 
Some of their 
ideas originated with Moses Hess, a contemporary and follower of 
Marx, who posited the link between the Jewish people and Palestine 
before the existence of any Zionist movement. Hess thought a Jewish 
presence in Pale'stine could reconcile modern Occidental culture with 
Oriental culture, rather than serve as Herzl stated, as a "wall 
. A . 
14 against sia." To Ahad Ha'am, Zionist writer and philosopher, the 
creation of a state was merely a way to reach the. goal of Zion, which 
15 was to revive Jewish cultural values. Therefore, any violation of 
Arab rights would betray the ultimate goal because it would not fit 
Jewish values. He also thought Palestine was unsuitable for the 
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solution to the Jewish problem because it was inhabited by others 
with national interests and the Jewish historical right to Palestine 
did not override the tangible right of the Arabs, based on genera-
16 
tions of life and work on the land. Buber disagreed with Ha'am 
here, emphasizing the link between Palestine and the redemption of 
the Jewish people. However, both believed protection and respect for 
Arab rights was essential in making Israel an authentically Jewish 
state. These men were interested in solving the more abstract prob-
lem of Judaism rather than simply solving the particular problem of 
Jews. Political activity was not sufficient for this. It had to be 
accompanied by the moral strengthening of the Jewish consciousness. 
However, the views of these groups were attacked by other 
Zionists and were not incorporated by the majority of the movement. 
Other Zionist leaders held negative attitudes toward the Arabs, rang-
ing from invisibility and indifference to hostility based on feelings 
of Jewish superiority as well as a desire to achieve their goals. 
When the Zionist movement was beginning, most Jewish attitudes 
toward Arabs were based on invisibility and indifference. They did 
not often recognize the existence of Palestinian Arabs and did not 
see the importance of the problems that could come from confronting 
them. Many early Zionist writings reflected racial prejudice based 
on 19th century nationalistic concepts and the general view of Euro-
pean supremacy. To most Zionists, Palestine provided a land without 
people for a people without a land. For example, Zionist leader Max 
Nordau, upon hearing from Herzl that there were Arabs living in Pal-
estine said, "I didn't know that. . . . . . 17 We are comnutting an in]ustice. "  
- 2 1  -
Zionists saw Palestine as an empty, barren land and saw themselves as 
18 representing the apogee of civilized development. During this 
period, Zionists were emphasizing immigration, land purchase, and 
political maneuvering to gain support and protection for their plans. 
Their attention was primarily directed to the Turks; Germans, and 
British rather than dealing directly with Palestinian Arabs. They 
were hardly concerned with Arab reaction to their activities. Objec-
tion to J�wish colonization was seen by the Zionists, not in terms of 
the rights of existing residents but as a collusion of political 
19 
powers. For example, in their writings, Weizmann and Begin never 
recognize the legitimacy or significance of Arab opposition or na-
tional aspirations. Weizmann could not understand pro-Arab decisions 
under the British mandate because he thought that what the Jews 
wanted should always come first and was blind to the British obliga-
tion to the Arabs. Begin barely acknowledged Arab nationalism, ex-
cept to say it was initiated by the British, whom he saw as the major 
opponent to the Jewish state. In general, the early Zionists, being 
Europeans, followed the national chauvinism of 19th and early 20th 
century Europe in not seriously considering an area's existing popu-
lation and the effect of their actions on them. 
After the establishment of the state, some aspects of this 
invisibility concept still remained. It led to the idea that the 
Jews were entirely responsible for the development of Palestine. Many 
·' 
first generation leaders, including Golda Meir and David Ben-Gurion 
retained the concept for a long time. As late as 1969, Meir said, 
h . h h" 1 
. . . •20 "T ere is no sue t ing as Pa estinians.' 
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In 1976, Yitzhak Rabin 
stated that Arabs in Israel had no national characteristics of their 
21 own . 
When Zionists did recognize the existence and aspirations of 
Arabs , more blatant racism often occurred and many extremists asserted 
Jewish superiority to the Arabs . Max Nordau, in a speech to the Zion-
ist Congress ,  said Jews are "more industrious than the average Euro-
. h ib d . . d f . 22 pean, not to mention t e mor un Asiatic an A rican . "  William 
Ziff ' s  1937 book, The Rape of Palestine , contains many racist comment s ,  
depicting Arabs a s  barbarians and using stereotypes about the physical 
appearance ,  sexual habits, violent nature , and lack of intelligence of 
Arabs . He described the Islamic world as having "debased moral stan-
dards , superstitions , and bigoted ignorance , "  while Jews were superi-
or, · intelligent, and "the best colonizing material in the world . "  He 
also claimed a lack of racial consciousness among Moslems and a will-
ingness to accept anyone · into their religion has made the Arabs "a 
motley assortment of peoples ,  low in the scale of human development , 
23 who speak the Arab tongue . "  
The 1967 war and the subsequent takeover of territory by Israel 
forced the ultimate recognition of the Palestinians. But the Israeli 
attitude was that Palestinian nationalism was artificially created by 
a reaction to Zionism and was not a true national movement. After 
this recognition o f  the Palestinians , Jews justified taking over 
their land with two points : 1) The Jewish need was greater ;  and 2) 
that Jews are superior to Arabs . Often this was done by creating a 
negative image of the Arab s .  J .  L. Talmon said in Israel Among the 
Nations that Arabs are "terribly inhibited and handicapped by neurotic 
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. d .  d . d ib . l . . 
24 i.mpe iments an overstraine suscept l. ities . "  Creating these 
negative images was part of an attempt to undermine the Arab posi-
tion as irrational. Robert Alter said in a 1968 issue of Commentary 
that, "The Arab position in Israel. . •  has been blind, fanatic, self-
deceptive, self-destructive, harshly inflexible, in many respects 
25 morally obscene." These ideas indicate an extremely poor view of 
Arabs who are seen as barbaric, neurotic, as incapable of having a 
real nationalism, as being duped by their irrational leaders, and 
whose decisions are therefore, not to be taken seriously. 
M:>re prominent Zionists also displayed attitudes about the 
cultural and social inferiority of the Arabs. Weizmann wrote in his 
autobiography that the Arab national movement was "crude in nature, 
which tries to work up the hatred of the British and the Jews, looks 
to Hitler and Mussolini as its heroes, and is supported by Italian 
26 
money." David Ben-Gurion, who epitomized Israel and the Zionist 
movement for many years, is especially illustrative of racist atti-
tudes. It is easy to find statements by Ben-Gurion expressing concern 
and sympathy regarding Arabs. But he has also indicated many times 
his disdain for Arabs and their culture. His actions (including 
organizing strikes where Arabs were employed) showed he believed 
there was no place for Arabs in Israel. Ben-Gurion once said, " faith 
in my fellow man makes me confident that the wretched and degrading 
effect of the Arab heritage will not last forever. 1127 Ben-Gurion 
despised the Arab way of life and warned publicly against the danger 
that Israel might become another Levantine country. The word "Levan-
tine" is often used in Israel as a derogatory term indicating a lack 
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of culture and intelligenc e .  Ben-Gurion believed i n  attaining a 
purely Jewish community and thought for this purpose the fewer Arabs 
living in Israel the better. He learned Spanish for the sole reason 
of reading Don Quixote in the original but never bothered to learn 
Arabic, which is closely related to Hebrew. In his first ten years 
as Prime Minister ,  Ben-Gurion never .visited an Arab town or received 
ab d l . 28 an Ar e egation. Besides having a low opinion of Arabs ,  Ben-
Gurion also had an inflated view of Jews . He declared, " I  believe 
in our moral and intellectual superiority and our capacity to serve 
29 as a model o f  redemption for the human race . "  
Ideas of that kind led some Zionists to call for eliminating the 
Arab presence in Palestine through land expropriation, land. purchase, 
and force. Josef Weitz , former head of the Jewish Agency Coloniza-
tion Department , said in 1940 and repeated in 1967 that, 
Between ourselve s ,  it must be clear that there 
is no room for both peoples together in this 
country . . •  We shall not achieve our goal of being 
an independent people with the Arabs in thj s 
small country. The only solution is Palestine , 
at least Western Palestine, without Arabs . And 
there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs 
from here to the neighboring countries; to 
transfer all of them; not one village , not one 
tribe should be left. 30 
The idea of removing Arabs from Israel in order to form a Jewish state 
is not a modern one . Herzl himself once said, "the penniless popula-
tion" of Palestine should be "spirited across the borders." and "de-
nied employm�nt in our country . "  He also said, "We must expropriate 
1 . 1 . 
. ab 
31 gent y the private property" of Pa estinian Ar s .  But Revisionist 
Zionist Vladimir Jabotinsky and his followers saw no need for gentil-
ity in their actions . The Arabs were not invisible to Jabotinsky , 
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who described them as "a yelling rabble dressed up in gaudy , savage 
32 
rags . "  He said in 1930 that a Jewish state meant " first of all a 
Jewish majority in Palestine so that under a democratic rul e ,  the 
Jewish point o f  view will always prevail . 11 3 3  Jabotinsky and the 
Revisionists knew that creating this majority would bring inevitable 
Arab opposition and believed they would have to fight politically and 
' militarily to overcome it. They supported mass immigration, land 
expropriation, disregard of Arab rights ,  and violence to achieve 
their goal. This view was opposed by Weizmann and his followers, 
who favored less aggressive policies, hoping to reach some concilia-
tion with the Arabs . But Jabotinsky ' s  view became extremely popular, 
causing the Zionists to adopt a more violent approach. In fact , by 
1947, according to a former President of Hebrew University, Judah 
Magnes, the entire movement had accepted Jabotinsky ' s  view about the 
necessity of forc e .  Ben-Gurion, who had been a bitter enemy of 
Jabotinsky, held an attitude scarcely different than his regarding 
the Arabs and eventually realized most of his aims . 
This narrower Revisionist Zionism is not drastically different 
than moderate or sympathetic Zionism. Racist ideas have been ex-
pressed by nearly every Zionist thinker and leader, including Herz l ,  
Weizmann , and Ben-Gurion . Jabotinsky differed from the others in 
style and bluntness more than in substance. Opposition to Jabotinsky 
was based on the existing political configuration and fears that his 
tactics would upset diplomatic efforts. It was not because of any 
ethical considerations or because of a desire to make brothers of 
the Arab s .  The precepts of Zionism and the way they have been 
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interpreted in light of existing political realities can be construed 
as racist. The views of later Zionists are logical developments of 
earlier Zionist thought. The desire for creating a purely Jewish 
state meant that there would necessarily be conflict with the exist­
ing Arab population. In order to achieve their goals and j ustify 
their actions, it was inevitable that racist ideas would appear and 
then dominate within the Zionist movement. 
Naturally, the creation o f  a Jewish state could not become a 
reality without land. Once the acquisition of land in Palestine by 
Jews had begun, it was inevitable that the land under Jewish control 
would increase. The Zionist movement has always had an expansive 
tendency in the sense that it sought from the first to acquire ter­
ritory that it did not initially possess. It cannot be seriously 
questioned whether the Zionists always intended to exercise complete 
control in a Jewish homeland. The creation of a cooperative, bi­
national state with the Arabs was not part of Zionist plan s .  It 
was always intended that a Jewish majority be established to allow 
for Jewish dominance in decision making. These intentions are widely 
documented in the writings and statements of Zionist leaders. For 
tactical reasons, the goal o f  the Jewish state was not always clear­
ly expressed and loudly pronounced, but a study of Zionist statements 
and actions leaves no doubt that a separate state was always their 
goal. 
In 1917 , Ben-Gurion stated that, "We must create a Jewish 
majority in the Land of Israel in the next twenty· years. That is the 
central issue in this new historical situation . 11
34 Later he wrote , 
- 27 -
At the present time , we speak of 
colonization and only of colonization. 
It is our short term objective . But 
it is clear that England belongs to 
the English, Egypt to the Egyptian s ,  
and Judea to the Jews . In our country 
there is room only for Jews . We will 
say to the Arabs : ' Move over ; ' if they 
are. not in agreement , i f  they resist, 
we will push them by forc e . 35 
Besides Ben-Gurion, nearly all important Zionist leaders , including 
Pinsker ,  Herz l ,  Buber, Weizmann, and Jabotinsky emphasized Jewish im-
migration to Palestine in order to build a Jewish majority as a foun-
dation for the Jewish state. 
The 14 , 920 square kilometers granted to the Jewish state by the 
United Nations in the 1947 partitioning of Palestine was not what 
the Zionists had originally hoped to gain.
36 
It appears that most 
Zionists wanted the Jewish state to embrace a much wider area to 
accommodate the influx of a large number o f  Jews . Martin Buber 
claims that one of the reasons the Zionists preferred Palestine as 
the site for their state was that it offered the possibility of ex-
. . l . 37 pansion into a greater Pa estine . Rael Jean Isaac , author of 
Israel Divided , reports that before British pressure, the Zionists 
agreed among themselves that the future Jewish state should claim 
territory greater than that controlled by Jews in ancient periods, 
in order to incorporate the areas where past invasions had come 
3 8  
from. The Israel of Herz l ' s  Altneuland extended to the Euphrates 
River and in�luded Beirut and other parts of Lebanon. Similar 
boundaries were suggested by the Zionist Organization of America in 
1917. The Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 
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called for the inclusion of Transjordan and southern Lebanon. 39 
Appearing before the Palestine Royal Commission, Vladimir 
Jabotinsky presented a plan for Jewish development that included 
both sides of the Jordan River and asked the British to open Jordan 
. h . 40 to Jewis penetration. In the mid-1930 ' s ,  Ben-Gurion presented a 
similar plan, transforming the entire ancient Land of Israel on 
bo h . d f h d . . . h 
41 t si es o t e Jor an Rl.ver into a Jewis state. Ben-Gurion 
stated his ideas on Israel ' s  boundaries clearly at a military parade 
in 1948 when he said, 
victory will not be consummated until the 
pioneering effort of our nation in Israel 
and the Diaspora gathers all the exiles 
into the liberated homeland - until the 
desolation of this country is reclaimed 
to its maximum extent. 4 2  
Earlier i n  that same year h e  had stated that "a nation declaring its 
independence does not have to define its boundaries" and reasoned 
that land captured through military victories would be added to the 
4 3  state . Subsequently, the National Administration voted 5 - 4  i n  favor 
of Ben-Gurion ' s  position and decided not to include boundaries in 
44 Israel ' s  Declaration o f  Independence. This seems to be a clear 
indication that Israel did not intend to place permanent limits on 
its territory. Israel ' s  current Prime Minister Menahem Begin de-
clared in The Revolt that , 
the partition of the homeland is illegal . 
It will never be recognized . . .  It will not 
bind the Jewish people .  Jerusalem was 
and will be forever our capital . Eretz 
Israel will be restored to the people o f  
Israe l .  All of i t .  And foreve r . 45 
In 194 4 ,  the convention of the Zionist Organization of America 
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adopted a resolution calling for a Jewish Commonwealth which "shall 
embrace the whole of Palestine , undivided and undiminished. " The 
same stand was adopted by the World Zionist Conference in 1945 . 46 
This commitment to the concept of Eretz Israel , an emotional 
attachment to all of Palestine where all Jews would be united to form 
a great civilization, is actually official Israeli policy. The cen-
tral task of the state, as defined by law is not to protect or im-
prove the lives of its citizen s ,  or to foster and exemplify a more 
ethical way of life; but is to gather in all the "exiles11 • 47 Jews 
not living in Israel are considered to be exiled in the Diaspora and 
it is the prime purpose o f  the state of Israel to bring them there . 
This policy means that Israel has always planned to expand in order 
to accommodate this ingathering. Israeli leader Yigal Allon con-
firmed this part of Israeli ideology in 1968, saying, "Our duty to 
populate Greater Israel is no less important than in the past, when 
it was a mandate and the rally of the Beisan ; he who doubts this truth 
d ub h . . . . .. 48 o ts t e entire Zionist conception. So, the "central task" of 
the state of Israel and the "entire Zionist conception" depend upon 
immigration and the population of additional land areas . 
The effect of such an ideological base could easily have been 
predicted. It has made Zionism appear to be a threat to Arab terri-
torial, political, and cultural sovereignty in Palestine . The Zion-
ists have j ustified their acquisition of land and effective 
establishment of political control over it in a variety of ways . 
Some pointed out the discrimination against Jews in liberal Western 
nations and persecution of them in. less liberal nation s .  It was felt 
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that the only way for Jews to achieve freedom was to create their 
own state, and that need was so great that negative consequences of 
their actions could be ignored. Some cultural Zionists believed a 
Jewish homeland would revive a morally and intellectually valuable 
culture that would be of great benefit to the world. The religious 
argument has been expressed by Martin Buber in this way, 
With however little or much right in each 
case the nations can accuse each other of 
being robbers, their charge against Israel 
is totally unjust because it acted under 
authority and in the confident knowledge 
of their authorization. The revelation, 
the faith in it, and the action following 
from this faith are what differentiate 
Israel from the other peoples, not merely 
'religiously, ' but also historically • . •  no 
other people has ever heard and accepted 
the corcmand from heaven as did the people 
of Israe1 .49 
After the birth of Israel, even more reasons for expansion were 
cited by the Zionists. The security of their newly constituted state 
surrounded by hostile neighbors led Israel to expansionist moves in 
order to gain strategic advantage, to obtain foreign policy momen-
tum, or to keep their adversaries on the defensive. But regardless 
of the justification offered, it is undeniable that achievement of 
the Zionist movement's goals depended upon taking over land that was 
not originally theirs and that continued adherence to Zionism neces-
sarily commits Israel to further expansion. 
The ideology of Zionism was the driving force behind the effort 
to create Israel and still guides the policy decisions of the current 
Israeli government. Therefore, it is an important factor in deter-
mining the nature of the Jewish state. Logically developed, the 
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ideas presented by a wide variety of Zionist leaders and theoreticians 
lead to the conclusion that Zionism is both racist and expansionist . 
The United Nations has defined racial discrimination as 
any distinction , exclusion, restriction, 
or preference based on race , colour, 
descent , or national or ethnic origin 
which has the purpose or effect of nul­
lifying or impair,i.ng the.· recognition, 
enjoyment, or exercis e ,  on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic ,  
socia l ,  cultural or any other field of 
public life. SO 
The Zionist doctrine is one which calls for a state that places 
Jews in a superior position in the society in order to protect the 
Jewishness of the state. Also, the comments of Zionist leaders re-
veal racist tendencies , varying from indifference and invisibility 
to a disregard for Arab rights and a belief in Jewish superiority . 
As Noam Chomsky , MIT linguistics professor and student of the Middle 
East said, 
If Israel is to be both a democratic state 
and a Jewish state , then non-Jews must be 
expelled . . .  the respects in which the state 
is ' Jewish ' will be the respects in which 
non-Jews are denied equal rights . Thus , 
democratic principles are violated when a 
state discriminates between two categories 
of citizen s . 51 
A state which seeks to acquire territory from others in order to pro-
vide for the mass influx of a large number of people must ne'cesaarily 
be expansionist. In the case of Israe l ,  the mystical notions of 
attachment to the Holy Land make expansion more likely as a method 
to achieve national purpose and unity. 
A complete analysis of Israel ' s  domestic politics requires 
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discussion o f  the policies carried out by the state . The way in 
which Zionism is actually implemented in the Jewish state is of 
more significance to the situation than the ideology itself. 
- 3 3  -
Chapter 3 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ZIONISM IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
After examining Zionist thought and drawing conclusions as to 
its ultimate implications , it is necessary to test the practical 
validity of those conclusion s .  The most meaningful test, o f  course, 
is to view the actual conditions in the Jewish state. If Zionism 
really is racist and expansionist , this should be refiected in Is­
raeli social structure and dome stic policy, including activities in 
the occupied territories. Zionism is a complex ideology with varying 
wings and subject to varying interpretations .  However , this chapter 
will show which wings and which interpretations are , in reality , em­
phasized by the society and the government. The transformation of 
ideology into practice and the situation that has been created more 
clearly define the nature of the state and allow a more accurate 
j udgment on the foreign policy ramifications o f  domestic conditions. 
Theoretically, for the Zionists to create and maintain a truly 
Jewish state in an area where Arabs were a great majority, either the 
Arabs had to be expelled or a regime of occupation giving Arabs 
second class citizenship would have to be installed. Israel has 
practiced both approaches in order to increase Jewish control in the 
state. Legal structure, institutional structure , and administrative 
practice must be studied to determine i f  discrimination against non­
Jews is practiced in or by the state. Also , a study of Israel ' s  
policies with regard to land and territory is necessary to make a 
j udgment on its expansive nature. These issues will be addressed by 
analyzing the purpose and effect of various domestic policies, and by 
studying historical examples of Israel ' s  attempts to expand its area 
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of control . 
Citizenship, Immigration, and Emergency Regulations 
Israeli citizenship laws give advantages to Jews while making 
citizenship difficult for native Arabs to attain. The "Law of Return " 
grants Israeli citizenship to any Je.w living anywhere in the world. 
But Arabs born in what is now Israel and who fled during conflicts 
are not allowed citizenship unless they are naturalized. This 
naturalization process can be very difficult. It is only possible 
by proving birth in Israel , residence there for three out of five 
years preceding application for citizenship, intention to permanently 
settle there , and sufficient knowledge of Hebrew. Even after meeting 
these requirements , the Minister of the Interior still has discretion 
f • t • h .  1 to grant or re use ci izens ip. This has resulted in the denial o f  
citizenshi� to about one fifth of the Palestinian Arabs living in 
2 
Israel . These laws appear to be discriminatory since they auto-
matically grant to the world ' s  Jews rights which are withheld from 
part of the native population o f  non-Jews . 
Israel ' s  Declaration of Independence establishes the "ingathering 
of the exiles" as the fundamental purpose of the state. Any Jews 
living outside Israel are considered to be in the Diaspora and exiled 
from their natural homeland. So the state has actively sought to 
stimulate Jewish immigration to Israel while discouraging the return 
of Palestinian Arabs to land they had left during military conflicts. 
Count Folke Bernadotte, a UN mediator for the Middle East, said in 
1948, 
It would be an offense against the principles 
of elemental justice if these victims of the 
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conflict are denied the right to return 
to their homes while Jewish imrnigrants 
flow into Palestine, and indeed offer at 
least the threat of permanent replacement 
o f  the Arab refugees who have been rooted 
in the land for centuries . 3 
Israeli immigration policy has been aimed a t ,  and has effectively 
accomplished this goal of permanent replacement. Between 1918 and 
the establishment of the Jewish state on May 14 , 1948, the Jewish 
population in Palestine rose from ten per cent of the total popula-
4 tion to thirty per cent. In 1976, it was reported that 85 . 1% of 
1 . l . . h 5 Israe i popu ation was Jewis • Such a drastic increase was made 
possible by a strong commitment to attracting Jews and to discourag� 
ing entrance by non-Jews . In fact , a variety of tactics that will be 
discussed in detail later were used to encourage the migration of 
Palestinian Arabs out of Israel . Sociologist Alex Weingrod explains 
that once this migration of Palestinians started, the Israeli 
authorities did little to stop it because they saw it as a quick way 
1 h b l  f . . h 
6 
to so ve t e pro em o Arab presence in a Jewis state . David Ben-
Gurion admitted, "in the matter of immigration that the law distin-
7 guished between Jews and non-Jews . "  A policy to allow for discrim-
ination in immigration would appear necessary to fulfill the Zionist 
goal of creating a Jewish state. Such discrimination may not appear 
racist, but further study shows that it i s .  First, Zionists have 
always regarded Jews as a race with identifiable characteristics de-
serving of nationhood . Therefore, non-Jews must belong to a different 
race. More practically, immigration practices provide better service 
and more favorable treatment to immigrants from the United States and 
Europe than to those from Asia and Africa. In order to attract 
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immigrants who will fit culturally into the Western-oriented 
Israeli society and who will bring needed skills , educational 
leve l s ,  and capital into the country , American and European (par-
ticularly Russian) immigrants are usually provided with better 
housing and jobs in more convenient and prosperous areas of the 
8 countr y .  An example of the policy in action is the distinction made 
between "northern" and "southern" French immigrants . In fact, the 
distinction is not based on place of birth or residence , but on 
racial heritage . "Northern" French are people of European origin 
who , upon immigration, are normally settled in urban area s .  "South-
em" French are those of· North African origin, and they are usually 
sent to distant development towns where the quality of life is not 
as high. 9 
Immediately following the establishment of the state of Israel, 
Arabs already living in the country were made subject to a number of 
Emergency Regulations ,  including military governing of Arab dominated 
areas . During the mandate period, Jews complained of the injustice 
of the restrictive British policies .  However ,  after gaining inde-
pende�ce , the regulations were lifted only for Jews , while remaining 
in effect for Arab s .
10 
Regulations were especially strict in areas 
close to borders or where there were suspicions of espionage or sabo-
tage activities. Military governors were superimposed on the regular 
d . . dmi . t . ab 11 1str1ct a nistra ors in Ar area s .  These governors could order 
house arrest ; bandishment, and administrative arrest without going to 
12 court. They could also subject people to police supervision, deny 
them access to their own property, deport them, and confiscate or 
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1 3  destroy their property . Gaining political and economic control 
over Israeli Arabs was easily accomplished through these regulations .  
Until 197 3 ,  many Arabs were required to have passes in order to move 
. th .  h 14 wi in t e country. Potential political leaders and suspected 
troublemakers could be controlled by placing them on a pass black-
list. In addition, occupational opportunities were severely lim-
ited under such restriction s .  A person ' s  professional life, his 
relations with others, his entire livelihood could be controlled 
through the use o f  these regulations. 
Military government also had a cultural impact by separate 
administration of the Arab sector with separate advisory offices for 
minorities . Arabs could get a feeling of only partial participation 
in such a system while the view of Arabs as a distinct and poten-
tially dangerous part of the population could be reinforced. These 
regulations undoubtedly had impact on other areas such as occupation, 
education, social status , and political participation. 
Military government and the pass system in Israel proper have 
been eliminated, but their meaning and impact should not be minimized. 
Although j u�tified in the name of security, added results were to 
limit Arab opportunities at the crucial time of the state ' s  estab-
lishment and to set the pattern for the future relationship between 
Jews and Arabs in Israel. Also, in the Israeli-occupied Arab ter-
15 ritorie s ,  the same Emergency Regulations are presently employed. 
Economics 
Israeli economic policy has, since 1948, revolved around the 
following three principles :  Socialism, protectionism, and dualism. 
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These were the result of conscious choices designed to fulfill the 
purposes of Zionism and to meet certain needs of the state. A So-
cialist economy was thought to be appropriate in the Zionist state 
where all Jewish people were to work together to achieve salvation 
and prosperity for their nation. Other reasons for choosing so-
cialism were to attain a . high degree of social j ustice among the 
population and to build a sense o f  community and national together-
ness. Also, considering the importance o f  economic success to a 
newly created nation, the planning and control allowed in a public-
ly managed economy seemed necessary. 
Towards these ends , the Israeli government plans and administers 
the nation ' s  economy . It controls the flow of capital inve stment , 
deciding the locations and purposes for which it is to be used. Ad-
ministrative regulations over wages and prices were extensive until 
the 1977 victory of Menahem Begin ' s  Likud bloc , which is committed 
to moving Israel toward a more free enterprise economy . Government 
sponsored housing, agriculture , and industry are determining fac­
tors in economic development nationally and regionally.
16 
Social 
and demographic conditions can be vitally affected by the govern-
ment under an economic system of this type. 
An especially important part of Israel ' s  economy is the kibbutz , 
a cooperative agricultural settlement. These are the symbol of 
Israeli socialism, fostering the values of public service , coopera-
1 7  
tion, simplicity , egalitarianism and the dignity of labor. 
Kibbutzim are based on a communal life style but modern agricultural 
equipment and tchniques are used. The government often prefers to 
settle new immigrants in kibbutzim to inculcate the values of this 
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pioneer ethic into them, as well as to strengthen the system and 
. . 1 d . . 18 improve agricultura pro uctivity. 
Immediately following independence, Israel instituted a policy 
of protecting its industry from foreign competition. Protection was 
necessary to create viable industrial and commercial sectors in the 
country . Complete reliance on imports could eventually damage the 
nation ' s  security. Continuing that reliance could also lead to an 
imbalanced economy and massive trade deficits that could inhibit the 
growth of incomes , prevent substantial improvements in the standards 
of living, and generally slow economic development. So a protective 
policy was used to promote the replacement of imports with an eventu-
al 19 shift to exports . 
The principle of dualism had its beginning in the mandate period. 
Jews made a great effort to be economically independent and in doing 
this, excluded Arabs from participating in their sector. The Arabs 
were helped by British-created employment and public service and had 
their main economic connection with neighboring Arab states. During 
these years , Jewish immigration forced many Arab fellahin off the 
land. Trends established then showed that the eventual Jewish ma-
jority would create an isolated sector removed from the Arab economy 
and characterized by a growing disparity of economic level.  After 
the creation of Israel , the government faced the task of administer-
ing a nation of both Jews and Arabs . But the dualist concept was 
maintained. ·This is not exactly separate development in the South 
African IrOld, but areas have been developed differently according to 
the type of inhabitants. Arab regions can be identified by their 
- 40 -
economic structure. It is primarily agricultural and uses 
traditional techniques of production in sharp contrast to the more 
d d d . dl d '  . h . 20 a vance an more rapi y expan ing Jewis regions . 
A variety of strategies and plans have been employed to carry 
out these three principles. Israel has relied heavily upon the use 
of foreign capital. Total foreign capital has averaged about . 15 to 
20% of Israel ' s  Gross National Product ,  the highest in the world. 
Between 1950 and 1960 ,, foreign capital inflow was equal to total in-
vestment in the country, indicating the tremendous importance of 
foreign money to the IsraeLi economy . 21 From Israel ' s  establishment 
to the present , U . S .  aid to Israel has am::>unted to $ 14 . 5  billion, 
with an additional $4 . 3  billion in private contributions and $ 2  
2 2  billion worth o f  Israeli bonds in U . S .  accounts . Foreign money 
was absolutely necessary to stimulate and make pos�ible the economic 
growth necessary for a small , newly created nation to improve the 
lives o f  its citizens, legitimize its authority, raise its world 
position, and provide for its security. 
From 1948 to 1964 , the Israeli government emphasized 
2 3  agricultural development . This was done to promote Zionist 
values ,  to meet basic needs of the people, to provide necessary 
employment, and to ease the absorption process for immigrants, 
especially those from Africa and the Middle East. Industrial 
enterprises were gradually developed to reduce the importance o f  
imports with ;plans for further expansion. Protection of the com-
petitive position of these industries was provided in government 
policy. This proved to be a very successful period in Israel ' s  
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economic history . From 1950 to 1 9 6 5 ,  GNP rose by 11 . 4% ,  the highest 
in the non-Soviet world. During this time, Israel ranked between 
sixteenth and eighteenth in per capita GNP and became one of the 
world ' s  thirty most affluent nations . 2
4 
In 1964, a big balance of 
payments deficit led the government to plan a recession to slow 
inflation and reduce the deficit . 25 
After the 1967 war, Israel experienced an economic boom 
characterized by full employment with increased tourism, building 
. . 26 construction, exports ,  and prosperity. The country ' s  GNP grew 
25% from 1968 to 1969 . 2 7  The 1968 government plan was designed to 
take advantage of these good conditions and reduce reliance on 
capital import s ,  reduce the trade deficit , and to attai.n economic 
independence. Doing this would require furthe r  economic growth and 
industrial expansion. Since this type o.f activity had normally been 
accomplished with foreign capital , it conflicted with the goal of 
economic independence. The clash between the desire for self-
sufficiency and the necessity of outside assistance seems inherent 
in the Israeli economy . 
\ 
Problems with these policies began to surface in 1971 , when the 
consumer price index rose 25% while hourly wages increaaed only 12 
to 15% . Again, a balance of payments deficit occurred and the 
government devalued the currency by 20% to make imports more ex­
. 28 pensive . 
However ,  the most damaging economic crisis came with the October 
War of 197 3 .  In monetary terms , this war cost almost the equivalent 
of one year ' s  GNP ; Since then, Israel has been spending about 40% 
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of its budget and one third of its annual GNP on national defense .
29 
This is compared to 6% of GNP spent by the U . S .  on defense and 4 to 
8% by most industrialized nations .
30 Loss of life and manpower have 
, made the costs of the war and its consequences even higher . In addi-
tion, Israel has been unable to substantially reduce its reliance on 
outside assistance because of its defense posture. The defense 
burden also includes loss of production through reserve duty and 
the higher costs of border settlements that are established for 
security reasons without regard to economic feasibility. To combat 
this situation, the Israeli government took drastic measures . It 
passed an austerity budget, devalued the Israeli pound by 40% , re­
duced subsidies on foodstuffs, and raised taxe s . 3 1  The results of 
these decisions were staggering . The consumer price index rose 60% 
in 1974. This was broken down for specific categorical increases 
as follows : foodstuffs increased 85%; gasoline 85 % ;  natural gas 
155%; electricity 117%; and water 115%. 32 These changes led to a 
rapid and drastic decline in Israeli living standards . 
But the government continued to follow the same general 
direction. In October ,  1975 policy decisions were made to further 
devalue the pound by 10% , increase consumer prices by 22% , and to 
3 3  
adopt a new 10% sales tax. B y  1976 , inflation was estimated to 
be moving at a 30% rate , while unemployment remained low at only 
3i . 34 And in 1977, real disposable income was estimated to be 15% 
less than in � l9 7 3 . 35 One apparent consequence of these conditions 
was a decline in immigration . 1975 statistics showed emigration 
(18500) nearly equal to immigration ( 20000) . The figure of people 
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moving into Israel was down from 31970 in 1974 and 58886 in 19 7 3 . 36 
In this way, economics was damaging the effectiveness of the Israelis 
in achieving the central task of the Zionist state, the ingathering 
of the exiles. The centrality of defense in Israeli thinking and 
spending that has been obvious since the inception of the state is 
probably the single most important fact in causing these economic 
troubles. 
With the election of the Lik�d government, Israel underwent 
substantial economic change. The new conservative leadership of the 
country was committed to moving Israel away from socialism into a 
free enterprise economy. Most government imposed economic controls 
were eliminated, the pound was floated on the world market, and most 
foreign cur·rency regulations were dropped. Despite these changes, 
basic ideas on solving immediate problems remain similar. The new 
government imposed a 12 %  value added tax in 1977 . 37 Again, the 
purpose was to make Israeli products less expensive internationally 
and to increase exports. Exports increased by 25% in 1978, but 20% 
l . th . . 
. 38 
of that was arms sa es to Chile, Sou Africa, and Nicaragua. 
Begin's policies increased foreign investment in Israel by 58% in 
1978.
39 
These policies would also leave less money in the hands of 
Israelis as a way to decrease imports. However, the Begin govern-
ment has not made any effort to reduce government spending on de-
fense, welfare, or social services. In fact, since the Likud 
victory, pubxic expenditures are up, the number of public employees 
is up, and wages have risen higher than productivity and inflation. 
Inflation ran at a 50% rate in 1978 and was near 100% in 1979 . The 
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1978 Israeli budget was higher than national output , while the 1979 
budget was only slightly less. The 1978 balance of payments defi­
cit was one quarter of the nation ' s  GNP for that year. 40 
Despite Israeli efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign 
capital , the amount flowing to it has been increasing. Of the $14 . 5  
billion in U . S .  aid given to Israe l , . $10 billion has come since 1973. 
The Camp David accords provide for $ 2 . 8  billion per year in U . S . 
financial assistance, and will cause Israel to depend on the U . S .  
d f f .  . · 1  l . . d 41 s an Egypt or suf icient 01 supp ies to meet its nee s .  o ,  
neither the policies o f  the Labor governments or the Likud govern-
ment have had major success in solving Israel ' s  most pressing 
economic problems or in increasing its self-sufficiency. 
There are consequences of Israeli economic policy that reveal 
more about the country ' s  internal conditions , its purposes, and its 
nature. The economic situation and treatment of Arab residents in 
Israel and of Jews of Asian and African descent, known as Oriental 
Jews , are direct evidence as to the government ' s  commitments and 
priorities. Information on the extent of poverty, income. distribu-
tion, and possession of durable consumer goods is valuable in this 
analysis. 
It is widely acknowledged that the economic differences between 
these groups is a problem Israel inherited and imported rather than 
created. The important issues are whether the Israeli government 
is committed to eliminating this gap and what progress has been 
achieved since the establishment of the state . Also important is to 
determine i f  economic conditions have been used to build and maintain 
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a dominant -. position within the state for European Jews . Zionists 
have continually claimed that they have improved living conditions 
for Arabs more than had the Arab leadership � However ,  this would 
not justify the possibility that Jewish advantages in technology, 
financial enterprise s ,  and industrial establishments have contrib-
uted to making Arabs and other racial groups second-class citizens . 
In income distribution, the Israeli record is a varied one . 
The annual income of Arab families in 1976 was about two thirds that 
of Jewish families , despite the fact that Arabs have more wage 
earners ( d d .  ) ' l  
4 2  
an accor ingly, more mouths to feed per fami y .  A 
related statistic is that Arabs spend 60% of their income on food 
and shelter compared to 49% for Jews . 
However, information about Israeli families native to the 
country, of European origin, and of Asian-African origin are more 
significant in determining income . distribution along racial line s .  
I n  1951, four years after establishment of Israel, Israelis o f  
Asian-African origin earned about 61% of that earned by families 
of �estern origin. By 195 7 ,  this figure was 41% . Also signifi-
cant in that year, it was found that Israeli-born children of 
Eastern parents earned only 68% of that earned by Israeli-born 
h '  ld f . . 
. 4 3  c i ren o European-American origin. In 1960 , the income of 
Asian-African families was 45% that of European-American s ,  in 
1963-64 it was 5 1 % ,  and in 1970 it was 55% . 44· Important to con-
sider in judging these figures is that the average Oriental family 
is larger than the average Western family. In 1968-69, the dif-
45 ference in family size was 4 . 7  for Orientals to 2 . 9  for Westeners. 
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That made real Sephardi income only 44% that of Western family 
income . These figures seem to show a decline in relative income in 
the 1950 ' s  with a closing of the gap appearing in the 1960 ' s .  
The following table , based on information collected by the 
Horowitz �ommittee on Income Distribution and Social Inequality, 
under the auspices of the government of Israel, shows the change 
in income distribution over time . 
Indices of Relative Income by Area of Origin •46 
Continent of 
Birth of Head 1959- 1963-
of Family 1951 1954 1960 1964 1970 1973 
All Families 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Asia-Africa 88 . 8  7 6 . 2  75 . 7  6 3  6 9  70 
Europe-America 101 . 2  107 . 9  1 12 . 1  124 126 
Israel 102 . 9  103 . 7  111 . 5  125 119 
According to these figures , there has not been steady progr�ss 
toward income equalitr in Israe l .  However, from 1963 to 1 9 7 0 ,  
Asian-African families had a larger increase than other groups . 
This could indicate a trend toward more equality. The Horowitz 
Committee concluded that the standard of living of Oriental fami-
lies improved in the l960 ' s  with higher income , better housing, and 
4 7  
possession of more consumer durables. However, the relative 
position of Oriental families in the area of income seems to have 
declined overall since 1950 despite improvements in the 1960 ' s .  
Also important to note is that of the 20% o f  Israel ' s  population 
*Data for 1963-64 and 1970 reflect an adjustment for family size and 
are thus not directly comparable to date for previous years . Similar 
adjustments for earlier years would presumably have increased rela­
tive differentials to about the level of the later years. 
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that was below the poverty line in 197 3 ,  90% were Orientals. 48 
Possession of durable consumer goods is another indicator of 
relative economic conditions . The following list presents informa­
tion on this indicator for 1960 and 1970. 49 






























These figures clearly show that in the area of consumer goods , 
the position of Asian-African Israelis has markedly increased, 
virtually closing the gap completely. This occurrence, coupled 
with the increase in Oriental family incomes in the late 1960 ' s ,  
seems to support the Israeli claim that living standards have im-
proved for citizens of Asian and African origin. 
One factor in j udging Israel ' s  commitment to racial equality is 
the distribution of government aid to individuals and communities in 
Israel. Between 1948 and 1975, the Jewish Agency spent $ 1 . 2  billion 
to develop Jewish settlements .  Arab villages have no access to 
these funds and Israeli government aid to Arab villages has averaged 
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so 
about $1 million per year. In 1971-72, the Arab sector received 
1 . 1% of all grants to local authorities with no loans to cover 
deficits in local authoritie s '  budgets and no money for repayment 
f d f . . 
51 o e icits . Nazareth Mayor Tawfig Zayad reported that his city , 
a major Arab center of 45000, received $ 3 1  million in the 1976 Is-
raeli budget , while the new Jewish settlement of Upper Nazareth , 
with a population of 16000, received over $40 rnillion. 52 In 1972 , 
43 of 105 Arab villages had electricity, with 20 ItX>re in the planning 
5 3  stages .  A study in the same year reported that 20 of 94 Arab 
villages sampled had acceptable levels of rnodernization. 54 
Major results of these unequal policies have been to create an 
unbalanced economy and to transform the nature of the Arab sector in 
the country . The study j ust cited and a report by Hebrew University 
in the same year both found that Arab villages were more developed 
under the B�itish mandate than in present times. Both reports said 
55 
that since 1948, the Arab region has declined as a producer. Con-
struction of factories ,  expansion of agriculturai production , and 
development of local services in Arab areas have not increased ,  fore-
ing many Arabs to leave their villages or farms to work in the Jewish 
56 sector; This pattern of economic development supported by govern-
ment expenditures has created an economy in which the Jewish sector 
is predominant in production and management while the · ·Arab 
sector functions as a labor supply for Jewish enterprises. The 
Israeli government has taken the position that their development 
policy has stimulated aggregate investment, assuming that the effects 
of this would be beneficial to all regions . However, economist 
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Gunnar Myrdal rejected this theory in his 19S7 work , Economic Theory 
on Underdeveloped Regions.  He stated that unbalanced economic de-
velopment produces even greater imbalances .  Continued investment 
in more developed regions attracts labor and capital away from less 
S7 developed regions,  reducing their potential for development. So , 
the impact of Israel ' s  spending policy is much greater than simply 
the difference in regional expenditures .  Fred M .  Gottheil predicted 
in the early 1970 ' s  that present development policy would make the 
Arab region Israel ' s  Appalachia , although increased incomes would 
give its inhabitants a higher standard of living.
SS 
It is possible 
that the economic fabric of the country has been transformed since 
the mass Jewish irranigration to make the economic and social devel-
opment of the settlers a direct function of the underdevelopment of 
the natives. Although the existence of Israel has brought increased 
wealth to the country ' s  Arabs ,  it has served to put Jews in control 
of the economic structure and provide them with superior benefits . 
Nowhere is this type of relationship more clear than in the 
occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, as described by Dutch 
economist Brian Van Arkadie .  He explains that since the initial 
policy decisions were made to employ Arab labor from the territor-
ies in the Israeli economy , to open the territories to the inflow 
of Israeli products ,  and to allow the sale of selected territorial 
products in Israel following the 1967 war, economic relations 
. 
with Israel have become the predominant ones for both area s .  The 
West Bank and Gaza are affected by tariffs , exchange rate ad-
justments , and fiscal and monetary policies framed to meet Israel ' s  
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needs . Because Israel has exercised complete control over these 
policies with no participation in their shaping by either West Bank 
or Gaza inhabitants ,  there has been no possibility of modifying them 
to meet local needs. Control of these policy decisions allows Is-
rael to determine production , consumption , and employment patterns 
in the two areas . Dominance of trade by Israel may cause the terri-
tories to lose opportunities to develop markets outside Israel.  The 
combination of economic control and trade dominance could stunt the 
potential for economic growth in the territories and reinforce the 
existing structural imbalance . 
It is true that West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in 
Israel earn incomes substantially above what could be earned in the 
territories. However, these short-term economic gains do not elim-
inate the disadvantages involved in placing Palestinians in the 
specialized role of poor working class in Israeli society. Also, 
extensive withdrawal of labor from the territories creates problems 
for the local economies, with the possibility that the West Bank and 
Gaza could become dormitories for manual labor in the Israeli econ-
omy, intensifying the bias in the structure and in the skills of the 
5� 
Palestinian people. Itzhak Ben-Aharon, former Secretary General 
of Israel ' s  Histadrut labor union has said that, "Israel was building 
Zionism on the backs of hired labor from the occupied territory. 1160 
There is a danger that this imbalance could concentrate Palestinian 
workers at the lower end of the wage scale without the same possi-
b · 1 · . f h . t 61 1 1t1es or growt as in recen years . The description of econom-
ic development in the occupied territories shows how the government of 
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Israel has used its powers to place Jews in a superior position to 
Arabs , both in terms of economic well-being and economic power . 
.r-bshe Sharett, who served as Foreign Minister under Ben-Gurion, went 
as far as to say in 1957 that Israel had tried to buy the national 
birthright of the Arabs with economic and social progress. 62 
But the economic and social progress of Israel ' s  Arabs does not 
I 
seem to be equal to that of Jews and it appears that its price may 
have included roore than their n�tional birthright . This is shown in 
the occupational distribution of Israel ' s  workers and in the govern-
ment ' s  labor policies.  
During the early Jewish immigration to Palestine from the 1880 ' s  





Near the end of that period, a movement em-
phasizing self-reliance among Jews emerged and became dominant. This 
feeling manifested itself in many ways, including the exclusive use 
of the Hebrew language and the development of strictly Jewish de-
fense mechanisms . Another result of that trend was the practice of 
64 
using only Jewish labor within the Jewish economic sectors. Ac-
cording to Knesset member and newspaper editor Uri Avnery , the 
struggle for Hebrew labor was the real beginning of the Arab-Israeli 
65 
war. Hebrew labor meant, necessarily, no Arab labor. To many of 
this movement ' s  supporters , strikes and violence were j ustified to 
force employers to hire only Jews . 
Hebrew l:abor , more than anything else, created the gulf between 
the two peoples living in British and Turkish Palestine. The devel-
opment of two separate economies was a major step toward the 
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development of two nations . Reduced economic relations meant 
greatly reduced social contact between Arabs and Jewish immigrants . 
The implementation of the Hebrew labor principle was strong evi-
dence to Palestinian Arabs that the Jews had not come to Palestine 
to live with them, but had come to displace them. 
After the establishment of Israe l ,  the Hebrew labor policy was 
continued. The Jewish National Fund stipulates that on land it owns , 
66 "It shall be a matter o f  principle that Jewish labor be employed. " 
This is extremely important when considering that the JNF owns 90% 
of the inhabited area in Israe 1 . 6
7 
The extremely close ties of the 
Histadrut to the ruling Labor party made Arab exclusion even rrore 
significant. A decision to allow Arabs into the Histadrut with 
equal rights was a legal departure from Hebrew labor ideas, but did 
not lead to a major change in Israeli occupational distribution . In 
1966, the label "Jewish workers "  was officially dropped from the 
full title of the Histadrut . 69 This marked the end of the Hebrew 
labor policy as it had originally been defined. 
In present day Israe l ,  Arabs are no longer excluded from 
participation in the Jewish economy but are concentrated at the 
lower end of that economy . JNF regulations prohibit non-Jews from 
70 opening businesses on their land. In Upper Nazareth where the JNF 
has acquired land and developed industries, the businesses are all 
Jewish owned , although the area is inhabited by a majority of Arab s .  
Arabs have been employed i n  Upper Nazareth factories i n  primarily 
menial jobs.
7 1  
I n  fact , over half of Israel ' s  Arabs are employed 
. d  h 
. 72 
outsi e t e Arab region. Also, Israel ' s  Arab workers make up over 
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half of the unskilled and semi-skilled in the country while being 
only 9 . 8% of the work force . In 1944, before the creation of Is-
rae l ,  Arabs were 33% of those employed. in the commercial , banking , 
public service, and personal services sector s .  By 1968, this had 
dwindled to 1 7 . l t .
7 3  
Arabs have also experienced a decline in agri-
cultural employment. Arab population growth , the founding of new 
Jewish rural communities , and Arab use of traditional farming methods 
have resulted iri a shift of Arabs out of agriculture . Farm employ­
ment o f  Arabs decreased from 50% in 1950
.
to 31 . 5% in 1969.
74 
The 
labor surplus this created contributed to the phenomenon of thou-
sands of landless Arab workers who work in the citie s ,  living in 
shanty towns during the week , and traveling home by bus on week-
75 
ends . Many Israeli employers consider Arab workers to be a bonus 
because they have high productivity , can be easily dismissed, make 
no demands , and are more willing to accept industrial jobs than are 
. 76 
l . Jewish workers . An examp e of employers '  perceptions of Arab 
workers is this excerpt from a circular distributed in the Gaza 
Strip published in the newspaper Haolam Hazeh: "Fixed Price s :  One 
Hour ' s  Labor - 12 . 50 Israel Pounds ,  One Hour ' s  Arab Labor - 5 . 0  
Israel Pounds . "  
Again, the more important issue to understand is the distribution 
of Israeli workers along racial rather than religious lines . Native 
Israelis and citizens of European-American origin make up a decisive 
majority and ·are represented far above the national average in aca-
demic , scientific, executive, administrative , and clerical positions. 
People with Asian-African origins are employed in these professions 
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lower than the national average. The opposite is true for positions 
of semi-professional skills and manual labor. 77 In 1969, more than 
half of all Asian-African workers were employed as industrial or 
service workers , compared to one third of European-American and na-
tive Israelis. 17% of the Asian-Africans had jobs in the high paying 
scientific , technical, administrative , executive, managerial, and 
clerical professions . This compares to 38% for European-Americans 
and 44% for native Israelis . 78 
Workers of Asian and African origin constitute 34% of Israel ' s  
work force.  Yet they make up 53% of construction workers, 41% of 
industrial workers, and 48% of those in service jobs. They are 
heavily concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs , low in 
prestige and payment. They represent only 16% of the professional 
work force and 19\ of the total white collar employment. They hold 
just l . 2% of government positions although . 40i of all government 
k d h h . h d . 79 wor ers o not ave ig er e ucation . 
Yoram Ben-Porath attributes the occupational imbalance to the 
following causes : differences in imported characteristics of 
European-American and Asian-African immigrants to Israel; differences 
in initial job allocation upon immigration; differences in learning 
and mobility processes over time in Israe1.
80 Although Israeli 
policy cannot be blamed for differences in imported characteristics, 
the other two phenomena are within the scope of government policy 
decisions. Initial employment allocation of immigrants has been and 
continues to be strongly affected by Israel ' s  absorption policies. 
Geographic placement of immigrants by the government is a 
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determining factor in the employment opportunities available for 
the immigrants .  Also, assistance from the government and political 
parties to immigrants in finding employment is often an essential 
part of the job placement process . 
Learning and mobility processes in any country are greatly 
affected by the entire spectrum of government social policie s .  Wel­
fare, housing, education , health, affirmative action , public employ­
ment, and other government policies are all related to employment 
patterns and opportunities . In Israel ' s  socialist oriented economy 
where there are such strong relationships between the government, 
political parties ,  and economic organizations like the Hist-adr:ut and 
the Jewish National Fund, the government ' s  ability to affect employ­
ment and occupational distribution is more pronounced. In Israel , 
there is no equality in occupational distribution along religious 
or racial lines and no sign of a trend toward equality. This cannot 
be totally blamed on differing characteristics of the racial groups 
involved. Israeli government policy must , in large measure , be held 
responsible for employment inequality and for contributing to racism. 
Land and Residence Policies 
Policies and practices relating to residence, land use, and land 
ownership also indicate Israe l ' s  character. These policies began 
with the Emergency Regulations discussed previously. The military 
administration of Arab regions allowed the government to determine 
the area of residence for Arab s ,  control their movement, and confis­
cate their land and property .
81 
The Land Acquisition Law gives the
' 
Israeli government power to take over land that is declared abandoned 
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or whose owner is dee are absentee.  The use of the Emergency 
Regulations and the Land Acquisition Law gave the government much 
power in converting land to its control after the state was estab-
lished. Another important tool in this effort was the Law of 
Prescription, passed in 195 8 .  This law required anyone claiming 
ownership of land to prove continuous possession of the land for 
15 years or forfeit it to the government . This was often impossible 
for many people since no land was registered during the British 
Mandate, which had ended twelve years earlier. 83 
In addition to Israel ' s  confiscation of private land, residence 
and the use of land are also controlled in a discriminatory fashion. 
According to Israel Shahak, a professor at Hebrew University and a 
member of the Israeli League for Human and Civil · Rights , the towns 
of Carmel , Upper Nazareth, Hatzon , Arad, and Mitzpeh-Roman prohibit 
non-Jews from living there by law. As discussed earlier, the Jewish 
National Fund denies to non-Jews the right to acquire housipg or open 
a business on their land. The situation in Upper Nazareth was cited 
to explain one effect of these practices. But the joint implementa-
tion of labor and land policies in Upper Nazareth is only part of a 
consciously designed government plan to achieve a major Zionist goal . 
In order to continue progress toward totally transforming Palestine 
into a Jewish state, the Israeli government introduced the "Judaiza-
tion of GaliJ,.ee" program in 1975. Galilee is the major Arab region 
in Israel and includes Nazareth, the largest Arab city with a popula-
tion of 45000 . The purpose of the Judaization of Galilee was to 
change the dell¥)graphic composition in the area into Jewish majority. 
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So ,  the government invested heavily in busi�ess, hous1.ng, and 
recreational development to attract Jews to the area . But a con­
comitant occurrence has been to deprive the Arab majority of some of 
their land and of equal rights to ownership, employment , and resi­
dence on land controlled by Jews. Arab land was expropriated in 
various ways by the JNF to accommodate Jewish development and Arabs 
cannot own businesses or live on that land. This program, which is 
still being implemented, illustrates how Israel ' s  commitment to in­
creasing the Jewishness of the state means violating the rights of 
non-Jews . 
Education 
An essential basis for improving the position of any group within 
a given society is equal education. The commitment of the Israeli 
government to providing such education to Arabs and Oriental Jews is 
then, a crucial test of the state ' s  intentions. In regard to the 
Arab population, Israel has failed that test . In 1975, Arabs were 
15% of Israel ' s  population . At the elementary school leve l ,  Arabs 
made up 20% of all school children. By secondary school, this figure 
drops to 7 . 7% and then to 2% at sub-university institutions. In Is­
raeli universities ,  Arabs amount to only 1 . 8% of the student popula­
tion. 
84 
Also, only 6 . 3% of financial assistance to university stu­
dents goes to Arabs, and 0 . 2% of students receiving aid are Arabs . 85 
David Ben-Gurion offered the typical Israeli explanation for such 
differences when he stated that Arab education had not reached the 
Jewish level because the Arab population and authorities had not 
shown the same interest in fostering education and in taking on the 
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86 
necessary financial bur ens. It is pointed out that every 
· d A ab ttl h a school bu ; ld ; ng
87 
and that all recognize r se ement as • • 
Arab children between the ages of 5 and 14 go to state primary 
88 
schools where Arabic is used. While it is true the Israelis have 
made efforts to improve Arab education, their success in providing 
equal education cannot be demonstrated statistically. Also, the 
lower income and larger family size of Arab households prohibits them 
from undertaking the financial burdens Ben-Gurion claimed to be 
necessary. 
Another important factor is that the educational system is 
biased against Arab students , making progress difficult. Arab chil-
dren must attend the state secular schools while Jewish children have 
the option of attending the secular or rel�gious school s ,  all state 
89 supported. Israeli high school is incredibly difficult, with each 
student taking about 14 subj ects , going to school six days a week, 
90 and preparing four to five hours of homework each day. Few chil-
dren from underprivileged backgrounds could be reasonably expected to 
do well under such a system. The curriculum in Israeli schools also 
favors Jewish students. 
ib th 
9 1  
the B le as e Koran . 
Six times as many hours are spent studying 
An Arab child studies Arabic, Hebrew, and 
English in that order . A Jewish child studies Hebrew , English , and 
9 2  
i s  then given a choice of Arabic or French. Actually, only 4% of 
93 
Israeli university students have Arabic as second language . This 
has created a language barrier within the educational system. Arabs 
claim that their schools must teach Zionism from a Jewish perspective , 
that Arab children learn their history through a negative perspective 
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and that school books are biased in favor o f  the Jewish position on 
political issue s . 94 There is also the claim that Arab school facil-
ities and teachers are inferior. For example, in Arab schools the 
average pupil/teacher ratio is 31 to 1 ,  while in Jewish schools it is 
25 to 1 . 95 Also, half the teachers in Arab regions of Israel are un-
. 6 . . . 96 trained compared to l % in Jewish regions. 
In addition to inequalities in the education system, another 
factor must be considered. Ben-Gurion was at least partially correct 
when he stated that Arab families were less interested in education 
than Jewish ones. A major reason is that the achievement of a com-
plete education by Arabs is not often seen to be worthwhile econom-
ically. An Arab with education equivalent to a Jew cannot compete 
equally in the Jewish controlled econQmic sector or in government 
because of cultural, lingui stic , and social differences, even without 
considering discrimination . An Arab youth may not complete his edu-
cation because he must get a job to help his economically disadvan-
taged family or because the limited economic benefits he may derive 
from education are not worth the struggle through the biased and un-
equal education system. It can be seen that in Israe l ,  th�re has been 
created a cycle of discrimination in education, employment, and 
standard of living that forces Arabs into the role of second-class 
citizens within the Jewish state . 
Not only Arabs , but Oriental Jews also suffer under this 
discrimination . The Compulsory Education Act of 1949 provided for 
free and compulsory education for all children 5 to 1 3 .  Tuition 
97 
was charged for secondary schools which were not compulsory. This 
- 60 -
made secondary school attendance difficult for Orientals, considering 
their lower incomes and larger families, even though some tuition 
grants were available. The examination system also creates problems 
for disadvantaged children. At 14 , a nationwide exam is given, sue-
cess on which entitles students to benefit from the tuition grants . 
Those who go on to complete secondary school must take a matricula-
t . 17 1 . f f h .  h d . 98 ion exam at age to qua 1 y or ig er e ucation. The system is 
a very selective one in which only the IIKJst qualified students can 
succeed. Those not passing the qualifying exam for secondary school 
can go on to a vocational or agricultural school .  However, the aca-
demic secondary school is the main avenue to white collar occupations 
while the vocational schools tend to prepare children for lower occu-
99 pational levels. In 1957-58, 43% of the students from European and 
American backgrounds attained the highest level on the secondary 
school exam, 30 . 4% of the Israeli-born did, and 16 . 8% of Asian and 
African students did. 63% of the Asian-African students fell into 
100 the lowest category. 
Recognizing these problems, the Israeli government instituted 
many reforms in the early 1960 ' s  designed to improve education for 
Oriental Jews . These included subsidizing nursery programs , lower-
ing the compulsory age for kindergarten children from low income 
families, extending the school day for low income childre n ,  estab-
lishing seventy special classes to help children with difficulties 
due to psychalogical-social background , developing a special program 
of aid and scholarships through the Jewish Agency, increasing 
extracurricular activities in slum areas , providing selective 
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intensive aid to children of low socio-economic status or in remote 
areas , setting up 16 boarding schools to mitigate the effects of an 
unsupportive home environment , lowering standards for Oriental stu-
dents to increase their eligibility for state aid in post-primary 
education, and grouping for particular subjects while maintaining 
th 1 . 1 . 
101 
e c ass as a socia unit . 
The net effect of these reforms has been limited. For example, 
in 1966, after the reforms , 75% of students with Western parents 
passed the secondary schools ' placement test while two thirds of 
Oriental students failed it. 102 Between 1963 and 1970, the per-
centage of 14 to 17 year old students of Asian-African origins in-
creased from 27% to 44% while the corresponding ra�e for European-
American went from 60% to 76% showing that the gap was not substan-
. 11 d d d . th . 103 tia y ecrease uring at time . 
1 . . . h · 11 ·  104 Israe i citizens w o are i iterate . 
Oriental Jews make up 84% of 
In 1975, Oriental Jewish 
children made up 63% of all children entering kindergarten . At the 
eighth grade level they constituted 42% of the student population 
and were 28% of those that graduated from 12th grade . Orientals 
were about 19% of those that entered universities ,  and made up 7% 
of students receiving bachelors degrees, 5% of those earning masters 
degrees , and only 3% of the doctorate degree recipients . 
The Israelis explain these continuing differences by lack of 
motivation, intellectual inferiority, an Oriental preference to 
purchase consumer goods rather than pay for education, and a lack 
of community leadership and commitment . They also claim that budget 
problems , teacher shortages ,  and lack of adequate facilities have 
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1 d . 1 . f h f 106 s owe imp ementation o t e re orms . However ,  the Oriental 
Jews face the same problems in dealing with the education system as 
do Arabs . The lower income and higher housing overcrowding among 
Orientals contribute greatly to educational difficultie� . 107 The 
schools in development towns and slum areas inhabited by Oriental 
families are inferior to schools in the established towns and sub-
b 108 ur s .  The curriculum is heavily slanted toward Europeans and 
teachers are predominantly of Western origin. In secondary schools , 
75% of all teachers are Western109 and in the universities ,  99% are 
110 Western. The highly selective nature of the education system, 
the expenses involved, and the Western domination of it discriminate 
against both lower income people and those from Eastern cultures .  
Reforms in education policy have not really improved the relative 
situation of Oriental Jews in Israe l .  This cannot be completely 
explained by the social and cultural inadequacies of the Orientals . 
Inequality in income and occupations contribute to this condition . 
Students from Asia and Africa have succeeded in other countries ,  so 
there is no inherent reason why they cannot succeed in Israel. For 
instance , there are 15000 North African Jews on the faculties of 
schools in France . In Israe l ,  there are fewer North African Jewish 
d . h . . . 111 stu ents in t e universitite s .  The statistics and the type of 
system in place both indicate the existence of discrimination in 
education on the basis of race , since it affects both Arabs and 
Jews of Asian-African origin. 
Political Representation 
One consequence of the educational and economic inferiority of 
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both Israeli Arabs �d Oriental Jews , according to Seymou� _ Martin 
Lipset, is an inability to politically organize around their needs 
and interests.
112 This is especially critical , since Lipset real-
ized that political participation and power are the only ways to 
. bo h . th ' f' . f l ' . 113 bring a ut c anges in e strati ication o Israe i society. 
It is correct that Israeli Arabs and Oriental Jews have not 
organized effectively within the Israeli political framework, and 
are not equally represented in the government. The small number of 
Arabs and Oriental Jews holding government employment has. already 
been cited. The situation regarding elected positions is similar. 
In 1976, Arabs had six seats in the Knesset and no Cabinet minis-
114 ters . A correct porportion according to their weight in the 
population would have been 18 Knesset members and 3 ministers. In 
115 fact, no Arab has ever held a Cabinet position in Israel. Also , 
Arabs are not nominated to serve on the Knesset standing committee 
d f d f . f . 116 on e ense an oreign a fairs . 
The position of Oriental Jews in the Israeli political system is 
not much better. They participate in politics about as much as Euro­
pean Jews but receive less for their efforts . 117 Orientals make up 
13% of the Knesset membership although they represent 60% of the 
population .
118 
Leonard Fein has concluded that Jews of Eastern ori-
gin have never been e ffectively incorporated into the system, primar-




It is not simply educational and economic inferiority that has 
created this situation. Jews in Palestine were better prepared for 
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self-government than Arabs through the· training they received under 
the British mandate. Jews were allowed to set up a Community Gov-
ernment which was given authority over the Jewish community ' s  inter-
nal affairs. The system consisted of an elected Assembly, serving 
as the legislature; a National Council, which acted between Assembly 
sessions; and an Executive Council which performed administration for 
the Community Government. Over 20 political parties participated in 
the four Community Government elections under the mandate, establish-
ing the tradition of proportional representation before the existence 
of Israel. Also, the Community Government was granted the power to 
tax in 1927, enabling it to carry out public services and social 
120 programs. Arabs were allowed no such institution during the man-
date years. This gave the Jews a great advantage, having control 
over a quasi-govern.mental institution at the time Israel was created. 
The type of political system and actions of political parties 
also serve to restrict the political opportunities of Arabs and 
Oriental Jews. In Israel's proportional representation system, po-
l�tical parties are the only vehicle to elective office. Jewish 
parties, dominated by Europeans, were in a superior position in 
Israel's early years due to their mandate experience and because of 
the use of Emergency Regulations to restrict the activities of Arab 
political leaders. Established Israeli political parties also act 
as social agencies in assisting their members to obtain housing, em-
ployment, and' other services. Parties use this power along with 
distributing their own newspapers and adjusting their positions on 
issues to attract ethnic groups to their ranks. These advantages 
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and powers have contributed to the fact that there is no party 
primarily oriented toward the interests of Oriental Jews . There is 
also no independent Arab party in Israe1. 121 About 50% of the 
Oriental population is a ffiliated with the Labor Party, 30% with 
the ruling Likud bloc, and the rest divided am)ng smaller parties . 
In this situation, Arabs and Orientals must vote for candidates 
chosen by the established political parties which are not closely 
aligned with their interests and do not often choose candidates of 
their race . Even when Arabs or Orientals are elected to the Knesset , 
the parliamentary system forces them to follow the positions of their 
party . Since all the major parties except the Communists are domi­
nated by Europeans and strongly committed to Zionist ideal s ,  it is 
unlikely that an Arab or an Oriental or a person expressing radical 
ideas could rise to a high party position. With the Zionist· princi­
ple of the Jewish state dominating politics in Israe l ,  it is not 
clear i f  an Arab should be allowed an important government position, 
and the Israeli government has not tested that question yet. In 
essence, the governmental system has made it very difficult for Arabs 
and Oriental Jews to form political parties of their own , and within 
the established Zionist partie s ,  they are co-opted into instrumental 
participation without real influence in decision making. 
Israel and its supporters have countered such arguments by 
claiming �hat the proportional representation system takes longer to 
respond to cnanges in the electorate ' s  composition, but that Arab 
and Oriental participation in local government i s  an indication of 
coming change . For example , in 1948 there was only one non-Jewish 
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local council . By 1968, there were 45 Arab and Druze local councils, 
48 self-governing Bedouin tribes . 75% of the non-Jewish population 
lived under its own local government compared· to 27% before 1948. 
Also, �he number of Orientals among Jewish members of local govern­
ment councils increased from 15% in 1950 to 44% in 1967. 122 These 
figures represent significant gains for Israeli ethnic groups in 
, 
local government . However, Israel ' s  centralized government and pro-
portional representation system limit the effect of these gains . 
Since the national government controls public spending and adminis-
ters social programs , local government is not in a position to ex-
ercise significant powers. Also, the proportional representation 
system allows parties rather than geographic areas to choose national 
representative s .  Participation and achievement i n  local government 
are not as effective a vehicle for obtaining national office under 
the proportional representation system as they are in a federal sys-
tern. The increased representation of Arabs and Oriental Jews in lo-
cal government does not necessarily mean they have or will have in-
creased influence on policy making or administration� Again, it 
probably serves to co-opt them into the existing system and reduce 
their demands for change . 
Political rep resentation seems to follow the discriminatory 
pattern visible in nearly all areas of Israeli life. The system in-
hibits meaningful participation of Arabs and Oriental Jews by the 
advantages that exist for European Jews . This pattern cannot be a 
simple coincidence .  The policies o f  the state o f  Israel are con-
sciously designed to follow the ideas inherent in Zionist ideology 
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and have resulted in the creation o f  racist institutions. 
Culture and Public Attitudes 
Underlying this institutional discrimination is the belief in 
the cultural inferiority of both Arabs and Oriental Jews. Zionist 
attitudes toward Arabs are typical of those felt by all colonial 
powers toward the native population. The European immigrants that 
formed the state of Israel have always considered themselves part of 
the Western world and established institutions and social structures 
based on Western values .  The economic success o f  the Zionists in 
Israel made them feel they had achieved progress and brought benefits 
to the area that the existing Arab population was incapable o f .  When 
the Arabs found themselves a minority in a society vastly different 
than their traditional way of life , they did not adjust quickly or 
easily . The inherent racial bias in the institutions and structure 
of Israeli society discussed previously contributed greatly to Arab 
problems . Combining these attitudes and occurrences has allowed 
Israel to create a myth of Arab inferiority and to dehumanize their 
culture . Negative stereotypes regarding Arabs have been internal-
ized bv Israeli society. For instance , the expression "Arab ' s  work " 
is a coll'II1¥)n derogatory statement in Israel describing incompetence or 
lack of skill in the performance of task s .
123 
A 1971 survey by 
Yochanan Peres showed that 80% of the sample of Israeli Jews agreed 
that "Arabs will not reach the level of progress of Jews . "  90% pre-
ferred to see· fewe r Arabs in Israel and 90% agreed that "Arabs under-
124 
stand only force . "  Opinion polls by Louis Harris and local organ-
izations continually show that the majority of Israeli Jews regard 
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125 Arabs as inferior people . The components of the social system 
reinforce these negative feelings by preventing Arabs from gaining 
access to the good things in the society while giving d«ninant Jews 
an ideological defense for their assumed superiority. 
A statement by Israeli Jew Vitold Yadlitzky explains much about 
this relationship . He said, 
I am a Polish Jew and a former Nazi 
prisoner. I went through some of the 
worst experiences of the Holocaust . 
My quite salient memory of those times 
is the memory of popular anti-Semitism 
in Eastern Europe . Some typical expres­
sions of this popular anti-Semitism 
were , for instance, the stories of Jewish 
mentality, expressions , such as , ' the 
Jew understands only the language of 
money , ' or 'the Jew understands only the 
language of force , '  or ' the Jew is the 
fellow you cannot trust. • ·  All these 
things I hear again and again in this 
country , with the exception that this is 
not in Polish but in Hebrew, and instead 
of the word ' Jew ' , the word '·Arab' 
appears. 126 
There are several current manifestations of the Jewish attitude 
of superiority toward Arabs other than opinion polls . 
h . . · 1 . d .  . I l 127 t ere is no civi marriage or ivorce in srea . 
For example, 
Allowing only 
religious marriage means that a Jew cannot marry a non-Jew, prohib-
iting Arabs from joining the mainstream of society through marriage . 
The establishment of the Ministry of Minorities and of Arab depart-
ments in all government agencies has tended to strengthen the Arab 
128 feeling that �hey are somehow different than Jews . Also, Arabs 
are not allowed to serve in the Israeli Army because they are not 
129 trusted to be loyal. This combined with memories of the military 
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government , further adds to the separation of Jewish from Arab 
culture in Israe l .  Government policy and public attitudes have 
inevitably become a self-fulfilling prophecy by doing little or 
nothing to foster a positive Arab orientation toward Israe l .  In 
fact , they have created hostility among Arabs toward Jewish society 
because it regards them as strange and rejects them from a major 
role in the society . The feelings of envy and inferiority among 
Arabs result from their lower economic status and from what is con-
sidered to be a lower cultural status. This is especially dangerous 
considering the former majority position of the Arabs in what is now 
Israel. Zionist ideology and Israeli government policy are major 
factors in deteriorating the relationship between Jews and Arabs in 
Israel. 
However, this relationship has not developed merely along 
religious lines , but also along racial lines . Oriental Jews are 
also viewed as inferior by those of European-American origin. Uri 
Avneri, newspaper editor and former Knesset member,  has written 
that the inferiority of Oriental Jews is a familiar attitude in Is-
l . . 130 rae i conversation. American anthropologist Raphael Patai sum-
marized the feelings of Western Israelis toward Oriental Jews in 
this way : 
In addition to instability, emotionalism, 
impulsiveness, unreliability and incompetence, 
the Oriental Jew is accused by European 
born Israelis of habitual lying and cheating, 
la.iiness ,  uncontrolled temper, superstitious­
ness, childishness, lack of cleanliness and 
in general ' primitivity' and ' lack of 
culture . • 131 
The term "cushi ' is often apJ?.lied to Oriental Jews in much the same 
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II • 11 • d • h • d s 1 3 2  way nigger is use i n  t e Unite tate s .  Since the society is 
dominated by the values and customs of the Western world, the tradi-
tions of the Oriental Jews are viewed as strange. This even affects 
religious rituals . The rituals practiced by Western Jews are con-
sidered by the government to be the official· and proper �ne s ,  while 
those practiced by Orientals are considered deviations that the 
government allows to take place under the principle of religious free-
d 1 3 3  om. Golda Meir once said that , "Anyone who doesn ' t  speak Yiddish 
(the traditional dialect of European Jews) is not a complete or per­
fect Jew . 11 134 This means that in the opinion of a former Prime 
Minister that at least 60% of Israel ' s  population cannot be con-
sidered "complete or perfect Jews " .  
One result of this attitude is the attempt to absorb Oriental 
Jews into the society through assimilation. Patai. and others have 
stated that a major aim of Israeli absorption policy is to completely 
reeducate Orientals to shape their social life along the lines of the 
. . 1 d . . . . h . 135 existing va ues an institutions in t e European image . One 
reason for this is to minimize potentially disruptive effects caused 
by the mixing of cultures . The fact that Orientals outnumber the 
Europeans constitutes a threat to the cultural foundations estab-
lished by the Zionists. This policy has been fairly successful 
according to Patai . The Orientals have given up traditional cul-
tural practices such as polygamy , child marriage , female illiteracy, 
itinerant peddling, and traditional handicrafts .  The patriarchal, 
extended family concept is on the way out and fertility is being 
controlled more than in the past. The use of old costume s ,  utensils, 
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folk medicines ,  amulets, and folk arts have virtually disappeared .  
Western forms have replaced the traditional features o f  Oriental 
136 
culture. 
However, some have claimed there is more to the reeducation of 
the Oriental Jews than just to stabilize the society and eliminate 
outmoded practice s .  I t  can b e  interpreted a s  part of the overall 
scheme to place and maintain Western Jews in a position of superior-
ity within Israel. ·Remodeling the Oriental Jews to conform to the 
society shaped by the early Zionists perpetuates the institutions and 
values that were created for and function to the benefit of Western 
Jews . It is ironic that the early Zionists considered assimilation 
into existing societies as an unacceptable alternative because it 
would not provide equal opportunities for Jews and would destroy 
their . culture . Yet this same unacceptable policy is now being used 
by Israel in its treatment of Oriental Jews . The result has been 
exactly what the early Zionists predicte_d. Oriental Jews have not 
gained equal opportunities in any area of Israeli society and their 
culture has been radically changed. This has caused much resentment 
among Orientals who have conformed to the dominant group as they were 
expected to but have not been able to derive benefits accordingly. 
Now, the objective factors of inequality are continuing to forge an 
ethnic identity in Israel that the absorption policy sought to 
eliminate .  
� 
In every aspect of Israeli society, racial discrimination exists . 
Arabs and Oriental Jews are in an inferior position to Jews of West-
em origin. The policies and practices of the Israeli government and 
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other maj or institutions have not worked to address these racial 
differences and move toward equality . Present racial inequalities 
cannot be sufficiently explained by initial differences in the 
characteristics of  the racial groups in the society . 
The intention of  Zionism was always to create a state under Jewish 
control and the movement was always dominated by European people 
who negotiated and fought with European nations to implement that 
plan. The policies of the government of Israel have been designed, 
in the most par t ,  to protect and maintain the Jewishness o f  the 
state and to continue and enhance its connection to the Western 
worl d .  The result has been that non-Jews and non-Westerners , who 
usually face an initial competit ive qisadvantage because o f  their 
backgrounds , are necessarily relegated to second class citizen 
status in order that the aims o f  Zionism be carried out . Israeli 
ideology and policy work consciously to insure that to be a Jew from 
Europe or America is ipso facto to be a member of a more prestigious 
group than others in the society . This is the true implementation 
of  Zionism and serves to protect the position of  the existing 
dominating elite.  
Early Zionist Land Gains 
In order for the Zionists to achieve the goal of establishing a 
Jewish state, i t  was , o f  course, necessary for them t o  acquire land. 
This became especially essential when mass immigration to Palestine 
began. In 1900, it is estimated that 5 0 , 000 Jews lived in Palestine. 
By 1 9 1 8 ,  the figure rose to 7 0 , 000 and by 1939 , to almost half a mil­
lion, which accounted for 30% of the population o f  Pales tine. This 
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percentage remained stable up to the time o f  Israel ' s  
abl . hm 13 7 . h l d da est is ent. · To obtain t e an necessary to accommo te 
them, Jews used a variety of means . The most common method was 
to purchase land from large landowners, many of them absentee 
owners, and then evicting the resident farmers. To this end, the 
Jewish National Fund was established. It purchased its first land 
in 190 5 .
138 
During the British mandate period, the number of Jewish villages 
increased from under 50 to over 250 . 139 Howeve r ,  by 1947, Jews owned 
only 6 . 6% o f  the total land area in Palestine . 140 This amount was 
not sufficient to furnish all Jews in Palestine with the kind of 
independence and self-sufficiency envisioned by the Zionists . But 
a 1917 document indicates that the Zionists were interested in more 
than a homeland to provide self-sufficiency for Jews . The "Outline 
of the Program of Jewish Resettlement of Palestine in Accordance 
with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement" submitted to the Brit-
ish government said, "The suzerain government shall sanction a for-
mation of a Jewish company for the colonization of Palestine for 
141 the Jews . "  The fact that the Zionist movement was supported by 
the British , through the Balfour Declaration, made Arabs fear col-
onization even more. Chaim Weizmann admitted that the Zionists 
h 1 .  h . d h . 1 . 142 soug t Eng is ai because t ey were "superior co onizers . "  Uri 
143 Avnery stated that "Zionism was essentially a colonizing movement . "  
One indication of Zionist intentions and attitudes is that ac-
quisition of land in Palestine by Jews has always been described as 
"redeeming" or "liberating" the land. The implications of these 
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terms were humiliating to the Arabs and increased their su9picions 
regarding Zionist intentions .  Prior to Israel ' s  creation, Zionist 
claims used to j ustify Jewish immigration to Palestine and the 
eventual development of a homeland there were typical of other colo-
nial powers . When Arabs protested the increasing Jewish presence 
in Palestine, the Zionists responded by saying that they were bring-
ing civilization to the land, that the natives had neglected the 
land, that discriminatory acts were only temporary until equality 
could realistically be established, that the natives were not inter-
ested in politics, and that native unrest was artificially agi-
144 tated. 
The pattern of mass immigration, support of a Western power, 
acquisition of land, and justification of actions seen in the Jewish 
movement to Palestine is typical of most colonial movements and set 
the basis for the type of state Israel was to be. 
Expansion and Consolidation of Zionist Control ,  1947-1967 
On November 2 7 ;  1947, the United Nations resolved to partition 
Palestine into two states, one Jewish, one Arab . The Jewish were 
allocated 1 4 , 920 square kilometers and the Arab state , 11 , 000 square 
k ' l  145 1 ometers . It is evidence of the r�markable political power of 
the Zionists that they were allocated such a large share of Pales-
tine when Jews comprised only 30% of the population and owned only 
6 . 6% of its land. The Jews accepted the UN resolution but the Arabs 
did not, and'the result was military confrontation . The war af-
forded the Zionists an opportunity to gain land that they had been 
unable to acquire through purchase. David Ben-Gurion claimed that 
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Arab opposition to the UN resolution partitioning Palestine 
eliminated Israeli obligations to stay within the borders set in 
h 1 . 1 46 t e reso ution. In fact, Israel did not , adding 2500 square 
miles of territory to that assigned by the UN to the Jewish state . 
Also, Jordan acquired 2200 square miles and Egypt obtained the Gaza 
strip as a result of the fighting. Over one million Arabs were dis-
placed by the war with 450 , 000 incorporated into Jordan , 150 , 000 re-
maining in Israe l ,  and 600 , 000 bec.oming refugees .  Of the refugees ,  
147 56% went to Jordan, 1 1% to Syria, 1 1% to Lebanon , and 22% to Gaza. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 ,  Israel has continually claimed that 
it is not responsible for the Arab displacement.  Howeve r ,  it  appears 
that in the process of  expanding the area under Zionist control , the 
Israelis took deliberate actions designed to remove Arabs in order 
to clear the way for Jewish settlement .  The massacre at Deir Yassin, 
also noted in Chapter 1 ,  is one example of such actions. Later in 
1948 , similar incidents took place at the villages of Ramle and Lydda . 
However ,  these cases were slightly different in that instead of  being 
carried out by a radical splinter group such as Begin ' s  Irgun , these 
were conducted by official Israeli forces o f  the Haganah . In fact, 
the forces involved were under the general supervision of Yigal 
Allon , with Moshe Dayan in direct command .  In both cases, Dayan ' s  
forces attacked by driving directly into city stree ts . The panic 
and terror caused by such. tactics led to the departure of all vil-
148 lagers from the area. Nathan Choshi ,  an Israeli p ionee r ,  said in 
Jewish News letter in 1959 tha t ,  
We old Jewish settlers in Palestine 
who witnessed the flight could tell 
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him how and in what manner we Jews forced 
the Arabs to leave cities and villages, . . .  
some of them were driven out by force; 
others were made to leave by deceit , lying, 
and false promises. It is enough to cite 
the cities of Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle , Beersheba , 
Acre, from among numberless others. 11149 
Zionist intentions and actions during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49 
were consciously designed and carried out to expand the area under 
their control and reduce the number of Arabs in that area. 
Following Israel ' s  defeat of Arab forces and the establishment 
of the state, it embarked on a plan to increase Jewish control of 
land within its boundaries . A series of government action and legis-
lation combined to form a policy of land expropriation that trans-
ferred much of the land owned by Arabs to Jewish ownership. 
In 1948, Israel _started setting up machinery to deal with 
unoccupied land by appointing a general custodian of absentee prop-
erty. In 1950 , the Knesset established a development authority. 
The Development Authority Law stipulated that the Authority could 
release property under its control only to the State, to agencies 
representing Arab refugees within Israel , or to local governments, 
with the condition that it first be offered for sale to the Jewish 
National Fund. In 1953 ,  the general custodian of absentee property 
turned over all land under his control to the development authority . 
Much of this land, along with some "state land" was then sold to the 
JNF. State land was land seized by Israel that was .considered not 
to belong to 'anyone. Later, all state land and JNF land was de-
clared to be national land. This completed a complicated process by 
which about 92% of the total area of Israel has come to be .owned by 
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the government and the JNF .  A United Nations Cormnission estimated 
that over four million dunums of Israeli land was originally the 
property of Palestinian refugees, although there is not enough de-
· 1 d . f . k . 
150 
tai e in ormation to ma e an exact estimate. Another indication 
as to the extent of Israeli land acquisitions is that of the 803 
Arab villages in Palestine in 194 5 ,  only 104 existed in 1971. Also, 
350 o� 370 new Jewish settlements established from 1948 to 1953 were 
151 on absentee property. 
All of this land was not acquired by taking control of abandoned 
areas. Israel devised and implemented a legislative program that 
enabled the government to expropriate Arab land. The Absentee ' s  
Property Law of 1950 transferred the property of absentees to the 
custodian mentioned earlier. The significance of the law is in the 
following definition of "absentee:" A person who, at any time during 
the period between . • .  November 2 9 ,  1947, and the day on which a 
declaration is published • . .  that the state of emergency declared 
by the Provisional State Council . • .  on May 1 9 ,  1948 has ceased to 
exist (the state of emergency is still officially in effect to 
this day) was a legal owner of property situated in the area of 
Israel or enjoyed or held it, whether by himself or through another, 
and who, at any time during the said period- i) was a national or 
citizen of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq, 
or the Yemen, or ii) was in one of these countries or in any part 
� 
of Palestine outside the area of Israel, or iii) was a Palestinian 
citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine a) 
for a place outside Palestine before September 1 ,  1948 or- b)  for a 
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place in Palestine held at the time by forces which sought to 
prevent the establishment of the state of Israel or which fought 
against it after its establishment. The dates used in the defini-
tion mean that virtually all Ar� villages eventually occupied or 
annexed by Israel were in an area that could be included under the 
definition. The definition also meant that any Arabs forced out 
by circumstances of war or who left for a trip to a neighboring 
village could be declared an absentee and have their property con-
f .  d b d '  152 iscate y the custo ian. The custodian has the power to issue 
certificates as to who is an absentee, and such certificates have 
the effect of law unless it can be proven to be incorrect. Also, 
the law provides that custodians cannot be questioned about the 
sources of information involved in issuing a certificate. Another 
article of the law says that 
any transaction made in good faith between 
the custodian and another person, in re­
spect of property which the custodian con­
sidered at the time to be vested property 
shall not be invalidated and shall remain 
in force even if it is proved that the 
property was not at the time vested prop­
erty . 153 
So, even if the custodian was proven incorrect in designating prop-
erty as absentee, the inj ured party could not reclaim his land if the 
custodian has sold, transferred, or disposed of it in any way. It 
was possible for land owners to obtain a release o f  their property 
by making a �equest and securing the consent of a government corn-
rnittee. However, this was a complicated procedure which seldom met 
. h 154 wit success. As stated previously, the custodian of absentee 
property turned over the land under his control to the development 
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authority in 195 3 ,  insuring that it would be used for Zionist 
purposes and not be returned to its original owners. 
Another law used in land expropriation was Article 125 of the 
1945 Defense Regulations . These regulations were part of the mili-
tary government used in Israel until 1966. Article 125 allowed 
military governors to declare areas "closed" for security reasons . 
Once such a declaration was made , access to the area was restricted 
to those with written permits approved by the army chief of staff or 
the Minister of Defens e .  The Article gave Israel great power in pre-
venting Arabs who had fled or been expelled from their villages dur­
ing the fighting from returning home . 155 
The Emergency ( Security zones) Regulations of 1949 were also 
important in the military government procedure, and were extended to 
1972. This law gave the Minister of Defense the power to designate 
"security zones "  with approval from the Foreign Affairs and Security 
Committee of the Knesset . The security zones differed from closed 
areas in that , not only was access restricted by permits , but perma-
nent residents could be required to leave by the authorities .  A 
special committee was set up to hear appeals of orders to leave . 
However, the appeals committee has never reversed a military order 
removing residents from security zones. It is interesting to note 
the areas that were designated security zone s .  Almost half o f  
Galilee (a northern section o f  the country where 60% of Israel ' s  
Arabs live) , ·all of the Triangle (a central section which is the 
home for 30% of the Arabs) ,  an area near the Gaza strip, and an area 
bet ff d 1 d . 156 ween Ja a an Jerusa em were ma e security zones .  
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It seems no coincidence that the zones were placed around Arab 
population centers, but part of the overall Israeli plan to ex-
propriate Arab lands to make room for Jews . 
An example of how these regulations were used. is . the village of 
Ikrit , the first village they were enforced against. The villagers 
were removed from Ikrit on November 5 ,  1948 under the security zone 
authority and told they could return in 15 days . That 15 days 
lasted three years , leading to a series of appeals to various admin-
instrative offices and to the courts by the villagers . In 1 9 5 1 ,  the 
Supreme Court ruled that there was no reason to prevent the return 
of the villagers to Ikrit. The military authorities failed to imple-
ment that decision and the villagers again appealed to the Supreme 
Court, who agreed to hear the case in February , 195 2 .  However ,  on 
Christmas Day, 195 1 ,  the Israeli Army blew up every house in the 
· 11 h "  h l t d b Ch . . ab 1 5 7  vi age, w ic was popu a e y ristian Ar s .  The government 
subsequently announced the expropriation of all the v.illage ' s  
1 d 
158 
an . The case of Kafr Berem is quite similar . The village 
was evacuated by the army at about the same time as Ikrit. In 
September, 1953, the Supreme Court ordered the authorities to give 
reasons for preventing the return of the villagers. About two weeks 
later, the infantry and air force attacked the village and completely 
destroyed it. The land of Kafr Berem was also taken over by the 
159 government. In 197 2 ,  former residents of Ikrit and Kafr Berem 
� 
again appealed to be allowed to return home and were again denied 
I 
160 that right by the Meir government. 
The fourth in the series of expropriation laws is the Emergency 
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Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Ordinance of 1949. This 
allows the Minister of Agriculture to 
assume control of the land in order to 
ensure its cultivation in cases where 
he is not satisfied that the owner has 
begun, is about to begin , or will con­
tinue to cultivate the land. 161 
So, at the Minister ' s  discretion , he could seize any land in Israel . 
Article 24 allowed the Minister to approve expropriation that re-
sulted in the cultivation of untilled land, even where it had been 
taken without permission or before the law was passed. The period of 
time the Minister can hold this land has been extended to last as long 
162 as the state of emergency exists ,  which is to say permanently. 
The Emergency Land Requisition Law of 1949 also assisted in 
Israel ' s  efforts to gain more land. This allowed the government to 
seize property when neces sary for "the public services ,  the absorp-
tion of inunigrants , or the rehabilitation of ex-soldiers or war in-
l ' d  163 va i s . "  This was used primarily in urban areas and was applied 
. 1 h . 164 main y to ousing. 
Since these four laws never actually transferred land ownership, 
but only affected who could use the land, Israel ' s  plan was not com-
plete. The Land Acquisition Law of 1953 was passed to empower the 
Minister of Finance to transfer the ownership of any expropriated 
1 d h f I l h h h d 1 h . 
165 an to t e state o srae t roug t e eve opment aut ority. 
Article 2 stat'ed that , with a certificate from the Minister of Fi-
nance, showing that the property was not in the possession of the 
owners on Apri l ,  1952 , and that between May 1 4 ,  1948 and that date 
"it was used or assigned fc;>r purposes of essential development , 
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settlement or security , " and ".is..: still needed for any of these 
l.• t ld b d h d 1 h . 
166 
purposes , "  cou e turne over to t e  eve opment aut ority. 
The Knesset rej ected a proposed amendment allowing owners who could 
167 prove the certificates false to request annulment of the transfer. 
This law completed the expropriation mechanisms of the Israeli gov-
ernment by taking the final step of transferring the actual owner-
ship and by legalizing previous land acquisitions . 
To make sure that, once �cquired, land would continue to be held 
by Jews , the Knesset passed the Basic Law: Israeli Lands in 1960 . 
The two essential principles of this law illustrate clearly Zionist 
intentions in regard to land. They are as follows : 1 )  Jewish prop-
erty is inalienable; land controlled by the state, the development 
authority, or the JNF cannot be transferred to any non-Jew; and 2 )  
Only Jewish labor can be employed i n  Zionist colonies. The purpose 
of this whole series of legislation was to permanently expropriate 
Arab land to serve the purposes of the Jewish state. This is consis-
tent with the Zionist goal of providing a home for Jewish exiles in 
the Diaspora. However ,  it presupposes that Jews have a greater right 
to property than non-Jews and creates a disc�iminatory system. The 
land gains of the Jewish immigrants and their control over its use 
show how remarkably effective the Zionists have been in achieving 
their goals.  They also demonstrate that the state of Israel is based 
on the concept of colonialism, as Jewish inunigrants to Palestine have 
built their society by dispossessing the native Arab population. 
An extreme example of Israeli expansionism is the 1956 invasion 




announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal , Great Britain and 
France used military intervention in an attempt to prevent that. 
!; 
Israeli forces moved across the Egyptian border into the Sinai two 
days before the Anglo-French invasion began . The reasons behind 
Israel ' s  actions have never been made clear. In 1956 , Israel was 
facing no threats from any Arab state and had not been directly pro-
k d 168 VO e . Some have theo rized that Israel intended to topple or at 
169 least discredit Nasser. In any case, Israel offensively attacked 
a neighboring country without provocation. 
Near unanimous world opposition to the military action was soon 
made clear. However, only U . S .  pressure and the threat of economic 
. . d l . thd . f 
1 70 
sanctions convince Israe to wi raw its orces . To Arab na-
tions , the Sinai campaign confirmed suspicions about the expansive 
character of Israe l .  Israel demonstrated this character i n  the 1949 
war, expropriation of Arab land within Israel, and in the Sinai in-
vasion of 1956. 
The 1967 War and Its Consequences 
It would be fruitless to evaluate the causes of the 1967 Six Day 
War with the intention· to lay blame for aggression on either side. 
The Israelis claim that their air strikes and invasions were defen-
sive actions to protect themselves from what they viewed as an immi-
nent Arab attack on Israel . Arab troop movements , military pacts , 
threatening statements , and the closing of the Straits of Tiran seem 
to support that position . However, some believe that Israel real-
ized it was not threatened by attack because of their superior mili-
tary position and that Arab actions were propaganda measures and not 
- 84 -
seriously aimed at an invasion of Israe l .  Vitold Yadlitzky, an 
Israeli humanist, claims that Air Force Commander Ezer Weizmann, 
Minister of Housing Mordechai Bentoff , military analyst Mattetyahu 
Peled, and Chief of Staff Chaim Bar-Lev all admitted that the Gen-
eral Staff did not fear an attack in 1967. In fact, Weizmann (now 
Defense Minister) , stated that Israel was pursuing "our legitimate 
. . th . hb . . . ,1 71 interests in e neig oring territories . '  
In any case, the issue of who started the war has little bearing 
on its results. Israel gained 2 6 , 000 square miles of Arab territory 
172 in the war. Until 1979, it refused to return any of that land. 
The area still held by Israel in Syria and Jordan coincides closely 
. h th 
. . 1 . . l d . f h . . 173 wit e origina territoria esires o t e Zionists. Much of 
this territory , especially the West Bank of the Jordan River and 
Jerusalem, hold religious significance for Jews and is included in 
the concept of "Eretz Israel " ,  referring to land supposedly promised 
to Jews by God and which supposedly made up the ancient Jewish King-
dom in Palestine . Former Minister of Interior Elisha Efrat de-
scribed the occupied territories as forming "part of the land of Is-
1 . . l b d . 174 rae in its natura oun aries . "  To avoid the appearance of ex-
pansionism, Israel has claimed that holding the occupied territories 
is necessary for security reasons.  However, American Colonel Merill 
A. McPeak wrote in Foreign Affairs that, " Israel does not have a 
strong case, on the narrow argument of its own physical security for 
retaining any of the territory occupied after June 1967. 11 He ex-
plained that no set of borders was a great deal more secure than 
those of pre-1967 and that security would be better found through 
- 85 -
175 peace. The crucial test in determining Israel ' s  expansionist 
tendencies is its actual policies within the occupied territories 
and its intentions for the future . An impoq:ant indication of this 
is the enforcement of the previously discussed military regulations 
against the population of the occupied territories .  These allow 
detention without trial , punitive curfew, deportation, destruction 
f h d . . f l d 176 o ouse s ,  an expropriation o an . 
The Sunday Times of London , June 19, 1977 reported on the use of 
torture on Israeli prisoners in the territories ,  concluding that 
"Torture is organized so methodically that it cannot be dismissed as 
a handful of ' rogue cops ' exceeding orders . It appears to be sanc­
tioned at some level of deliberate policy . "177 
In addition to violations of individual right s ,  Israel has been 
accomplishing a de facto annexation of much of the occupied lands 
through a variety of means . It has been estimated that 15 , 000 homes 
in the territori.es ;1ave been destroyed since 1967. Israeli journal-
ist Ammon Kapeliouk reported in Le Monde May 1 5 ,  1975 that 10 , 000 
farmers and Bedouin had been driven off by Israeli soldiers, their 
homes bulldozed and dynamited, their crops destroyed, and their wells 
filled. 178 The Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights reports 
that from June 11,  1967 to November 15,  1969, 200,000 Arab homes in 
d h k d . d 179 Gaza an t e West Ban were ynamite • The villages of Yalu, 
Anwas , Beit Nuba , and Nusairat , and camps at Jilik and Jericho were 
� 180 . h destroyed by Israel.  The effect of such actions on t e Arab 
population in territories is not surprising. During a five-month 
period in 1968, 16 , 000 people left Gaza for the East Bank. 181 
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Jordanian figures showed that in 1970 , 428 , 669 refugees fled into the 
East Bank. Also, between 1967 and 1971, the population of the Gaza 
Strip declined from 389 , 700 to 381 ,000.  In the West Bank , popula-
tion decreased from 740 , 000 in 1949 to 625, 000 in 197 1 .  These fig-
ures are more significant when considering that both areas have birth 
h ld h . h 182 rates among t e wor ' s  ig est . Israeli actions in Jerusalem 
have been similar. The Washington Post reported in 1977 that 6 , 500 
Arabs had been evicted from the old city of Jerusalem since 1968 to 
183 make room for Jews and to restore the Jewish Quarter there . The 
Dean of S t .  George ' s  Anglican Cathedral in Jerusalem criticized evic-
tion of Arabs and demolition of their homes in 197 7 ,  claiming that it 
was an indication that the Israelis "will not tolerate the existence 
184 of a single Arab family in the Jewish Quarter . "  
Despite all this evidence , Golda Meir maintained in her 
autobiography that Arabs had not been mistreated in the territories . 
She stated that there is no death penalty there , that only terrorists 
had been jailed, only the houses of Arabs sheltering terrorists had 
been blown up, and only Arabs inciting and encouraging terrorists 
185 were expelled. As to expansionism, Meir claimed that Israel was 
186 entitled to dictate borders after the 1967 war. 
The removal of population from the territories gave Israel an 
opening to expropriate more land for the use of Jewish settler s .  
About 10 ,000 Israelis now live in the occupied territories .  In 1975 , 
the Labor Government approved a plan . aiming at a Jewish population 
th f 30 000 b 1982 d 60 000 by 1992. 187 ere o , y an , The Likud bloc vie-
tory in 1977 brought in a new government that revised this plan 
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somewhat. But Minister o f  Agriculture Ariel Sharon stated that 
"the government will first of all carry out the settlement plans 
that have already been decided. " His plan called for 2 million 
settlers by the year 2000 and generally followed Labor ' s  plan for 
their placement . That was to consolidate the strip along the Jordan 
River, populate the western slopes of Samaria, and widen the Jeru-
1 ' d 188 sa em corri or . 
The result of these policies has been the establishment of 65 
settlements in the West Bank, 26 in the Gaza Strip, and 26 in the 
Golan Hel.. ghts .
189 I h f ' t  t 1 th B . n t e two years o l. s con ro , e egin govern-
ment has been responsible for 2 1  West Bank settlements, 4 Gaza set-
1 . . 190 t ements, and one in the Golan Height s .  To compare the record 
of the Labor government to the Likud in the territories ,  an average 
of about 9 settlements per year were created in the 10 years of 
Labor control, while Likud has averaged 1 3  per year. The Begin 
government also took the important steps of legalizing the settle-
191 ments and approving the Sharon plan. 
In terms of land, Israel has made substantial acquisitions . In 
the West Bank alone , Israel has expropriated 4 2 5 , 200 acre s .  O f  this 
land, 50% was acquired through taking over public domain lands 
formerly belonging to Jordan , 20% was declared absentee property , 
10% was expropriated by designating land as closed areas , and 20% 
192 was purchased. 
The actions of Israel in enforcing the Emergency Regulations ,  
taking over land, establishing settlements, and facilitating popula-
tion transfers violates several international agreements and has 
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been condemned by the United Nations. UN resolution 194 of 
.. 
December, 1948 called for the return of Palestinian refugees to 
their homes , which Israel has continually prevented . Their ac-
tions clearly violate the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. Article 49 states that , 
Individual or mass forcible transfers, 
as well as deportations of protected 
persons from occupied territory to the 
territory of the Occupying Power or to 
that of any other country , occupied or 
not are prohibited, regardless of their 
motive . The occupying power shall not 
deport or transfer parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory 
it occupies. 
And Israel has also violated Article 5 3 ,  which reads , 
Any destruction by the Occupying Power 
of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private 
persons , or to the state , or to other 
public authorities , or to social or 
cooperative organizations is permitted. 
On June 14 , 196 7 ,  the UN passed Resolution 237 , calling on 
Israel to 
ensure the safety, welfare , and security of 
the inhabitants of the areas where military 
operations have taken place and to facilitate 
the return of those inhabitants who have fled 
since the outbreak of hostilities. 
In no way has Israel complied with this resolution, and in fact , its 
activities have worked to achieve opposite result s .  The UN Security 
Council, with U . S .  concurrence, expressed this view November 11 , 
1976, saying it "strongly deplores" Israeli policies in the occupied 
territories ,  calling them "an obstacle to peace " .  It expressed 
"grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the 
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occupied territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation . "  
The statement called on Israel to comply with the Geneva Convention 
in administering the territories. The Security Council also said, 
"the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that 
alter demographic composition or geographical nature and particu-
larly the establishment of settlements are strongly deplored. " It 
also termed the expropriation of land and the transfer of popula-
. . l ' d 193 tions inva i . 
Israel has also used direct means to facilitate its control 
over occupied Arab territory. Its manipulation of the economic re-
lationship with the West Bank and Gaza was discussed, in part, pre-
viously. Israeli economic policy in the occupied territories, 
particularly the West Bank, seems to be aimed at exploiting their 
various economic sectors to suit Israeli needs and at increasing 
their reliance on Israel for economic health. For example, the 
number of Palestinian Arabs working in Israel increased from 6 , 000 
in 1968 to 75 , 000 in 1974. This means that about 1/3 of the labor 
. h . d . . l ' . 194 force in t e occupie territories depends on Israel for a iving. 
A contributing factor in this transfer is that Israeli land expro-
priation has forced many farmers to seek other work. Th9se remaining 
in farming work under regulations issued by Ministry of Agriculture 
directing West Bank farmers to pJ..ant crops for the Israeli market . 
Seven agricultural committees were set up to supervise production so 
. 195 as to prevent competition and to meet Israeli market demands. A 
major result of this was to increase the West Bank's usefulness to 
and dependence upon the Israeli economy. To extract benefits from 
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other sectors, the government allows Israelis opening new businesses 
in occupied lands to qualify for loans of up to 50% of working cap-
ital at 9% interest (low in Israel) and requires investors to put 
up only 20% of the total capital. This has increased industrial pro­
duction, but primarily for the benefit of the occupying power.
196 
The "Guidelines for Regional and Physical Planning" by Elisha 
Efrat of the Interior Ministry illustrate Israel's intentions 
clearly. 
The underlying ideas of the Master Plan 
are: development of agriculture for ex­
port, the urban development of Jerusalem 
and its satellites with a proportional 
growth of the various other towns in the 
area and their adequate industrialization; 
the settlement of the unpopulated Jordan 
valley and the Dead Sea area and making it 
arable; the expansion of agriculture wher­
ever possible; utilization of available 
groundwater resources; the clearance of 
slums and refugee camps; the development 
of the economic . rural functions of the 
bigger villages ;  the improvement of inland 
and air communications; the utilization of 
the tourist potential of the area for the 
benefit of the entire country; and the de­
velopment of the periphery of Samaria and 
Judea the West gank so that it may become 
integrated with the rest of the country. 
Obviously, Israeli policy is to expand its borders permanently 
by a wide variety of tactics. Military action, land expropriation, 
population transfer, and economic control form a comprehensive pol-
icy that cannot be coincidental. A crucial point in this is not 
simply the e�ansion itself, but the way in which it is occurring. 
Israel's methods are typical of the pattern set by the great colo-
nial powers. The facts show that Israel is expanding the area under 
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its control , and doing so in colonial style . 
The Refugee Problem 
The refugees created by the 1948 and 196 7 wars are the 
responsibility of all the parties to the conflicts. It has been 
explained that Israel i s  role in creating this problem was sub-
stantial and was part o f  a deliberate government policy. It is 
also clear that Israeli policy has been aimed at preventing the 
return o f  displaced Arabs to their home s and has actually increased 
the displacement. However ,  Israel ' s  position on the refugees re-
mains that stated by Ben-Gurion, who said the state of Israel 
bears no responsibility for the mass flight of Arabs . 19 7 
That being the government contention , it logically follows that 
Israel should not accept responsibility for solving the refugee 
problem. Mass inunigration, military action , enforcement of the 
Emergency Regulations ,  land expropriation, settlements in the oc-
cupied territories, and statements of government leaders all show 
Israeli determination to avoid that responsibility and prevent the 
return of any Palestinian Arabs to their original home s .  Uri Avnery 
confirms that Israel has maintained that after 1948, the "imaginary" 
Palestinian nation ceased to exist and its conflict was solely with 
198 
the Arab state s .  However ,  the UN has not agreed with Israeli 
prin9iples or policies in this matter. Following the 1948-49 war, 
UN resolution 194 
Resolved that the refugees wishing to 
return to their homes and live at peace 
with their neighbors should be permitted 
to do so at the earliest practicable date , 
and that compensation should be paid for 
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the property of those choosing not to 
return and for loss o f  or damage to 
property which , under principles o f  in­
ternational law should be made good by 
the government or authorities respon­
sible. 
And Resolution 242 ending the 1967 war called for a "just settlement 
of the refugee problem. "  Also, in 1967, the . UN Security Council 
adopted a resolution calling on Israel to insure the safety and well 
being of the inhabitants of the occupied areas and to help return 
those people who had fled during the fighting to their home s .  Al-
though a member of the UN, Israel has not complied with these reso-
lutions . Israel can argue with accuracy that Arab nations have not 
taken adequate steps to accommodate refugees but this does not re-
lieve it o f  its responsibility. This is particularly true since it 
was Israel who expropriated their land , destroyed their home s ,  pre-
vented their return, and brought in Jewish immigrants to replace 
them. 
Vio.lation of human rights in Israeli occupied territories have 
been documented and protested by many organizations . Some of the 
more prominent ones include the following: UN Special Committee, 
1968-1978;  International Committee of the Red Cross , 1969; Amnesty 
International , 1977; U . S .  Department of State , March 1977 and 
February 1978; Sunday Times of London, June 197 7 ;  Swiss League of 
Human Rights , July 197 7 ;  and the International Inquiry Commission of 
the United P�ace Council , 197 5 .  Such a wide variety o f  groups agree-
ing on this issue lends credibility to the argument that Israel is 
systematically following a policy of violating human right s .  
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The laws , government policies ,  economic conditions , and social 
circumstances discussed in this chapter have more clearly defined 
the way in which Zionism has been implemented in Israe l .  In short , 
the goals of Zionism were to create a Jewish state and to accomplish 
the "ingathering of the exiles " into that state . This chapter has 
shown that to create a Jewish state, Israel has violated the rights 
of non-Jews and placed them in an inferior position. Also, in order 
to accommodate Jewish immigration into Palestine, Israel has system­
atically expanded the land area under Jewish control and displaced 
Arabs in the process .  
This chapter has also pointed out that discrimination is being 
practiced against Oriental Jews , indicating the Western orientation 
of the state . The description of Israeli policy in the occupied 
territories shows that Israel was extracting economic and security 
benefits from the areas without allowing equal fX?litical representa­
tion or providing equal benefits to the existing population . 
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that Zionism, 
as implemented in the state of Israe l ,  has placed Jews in a superior 
position to the original population, has created a system biased in 
favor of individuals with Western origins , and has expanded the ter­
ritory under the state ' s  control . These characteristics make Israel 
and the Zionist movement resemble the European colonial powers of 
the past, in both methods and results . 
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Chapter 4 POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL 
The political structure of a nation is comprised of the matrix 
of institutions through which decisions are made and applied. Of­
ten, structure is as important as behavior in a political system 
and is equally influential in the decisions that are generated. 
This is particularly true in Israel where parties are the focus of 
nearly all political activity. The relationships and interactions 
between parties are major factor� in determining public policy in 
Israel . . Only Zionist ideology and an occasional strong individual 
personality can rival the power of parties in the political system. 
Political parties and their companion organizations ( the Jewish 
Agency and the Histadrut) form the most important structural insti­
tutions in Israe l .  
One important characteristic o f  the Israeli system is its 
multi-party makeup . The large number of parties is partly the re­
sult of heterogeneity of the Jewish people who have historically 
been divided over issues of religion , socio-economic principles , 
foreign policy, and territorial claims . 1 Proportional representa­
tion also contributes to multiplicity, in allowing many parties to 
participate in the Knesset without achieving broad support. One 
indication of the strength of party diversity is that no party has 
ever gained a majority in Knesset elections . Coalitions are the 
established pattern.
2 
David Ben-Gurion described the situation by 
saying, "Our . electoral system has caused an exaggerated degree of 
fragmentation and the creation of many small factions tha t ,  ta.ken 
together ,  form a majority in the knesset . 11 3 
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A major function of most political parties is to nominate 
candidates for office. In a proportional representation system, 
where voters choose parties rather than individuals, their power 
is even greater .  Israeli parties control the placement o f  candi-
dates on election lists and the governing coalition controls 
Cabinet positions after elections .  The manipulation o f  election 
lists is an important tool for Israeli parties. Representation 
of various factions on the party list of candidates can be used 
to bring them into the party without giving them real power .  For 
example, although Arabs are not allowed to be members of Israel ' s  
Labor Party, it sponsors companion Arab election lists as a device 
to gain Arab votes . 4 The co-optation of some members of the Arab 
elite does not mean true representation. Since anyone aspiring to 
most local government post s ,  a Knesset seat , or a Cabinet position 
depends upon party leaders to be placed on an election list, their 
allegiance will be owed not to the people ,  but to the party. This 
is an encouragement to party discipline within the Knesset. Use of 
the parliamentary system also does this, in that losing a vote of 
confidence means the removal of the current government and holding 
new elections . Discipline is also reinforced by the competitive 
nature of the multiparty arrangement . To gain and maintain support , 
Israeli parties must take specific stands on issues and have an 
established and recognizable political perspective . This insures 
that most members will have general support for that party ' s  posi-
.. 
tion. Leaders have always had strong positions in Israeli parties . 
Party founders set their basic positions and then move to attract 
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supporters rather than altering their stands to please the 
membership. Traditionally, Israeli party leaders have also con­
trolled the party ' s  finances, giving them great power. 5 
Israeli parties have functions not related to elections or 
public policy making that are equally important in attracting sup­
port, co-opting factions , and encouraging party discipline . par­
ties have acted as agencies for the absorption of new immigrants. 
They use patronage and other employment services to assist immi­
grants in finding jobs, they help them find housing, and they 
publish their own newspapers to attract newcomers . These services 
are sometimes used to draw active elements among immigrants into 
positions within the party in order to influence the rank and 
file . 6 Parties are also involved in establishing agricultural 
settlements and cooperatives .  Some provide kibbutzim with credit 
and funds to operate on. The Kibbutzim then provide money and 
support to the party, becoming integral parts of the apparatus . 7 
In addition , many parties set up banks and insurance agencies to 
serve existing supporters and attract new one s .  Other services 
provided by parties include youth clubs , medical care , and recre­
ational facilities. 8 So , parties have assumed many of the roles 
nonnally performed by private interests or the government as a 
whole. As such, they are often seen as instruments for attaining 
economic benefits as well:as for the achievement of political goals . 
They are also major vehicles for socialization and integration in 
Israeli life. In a situation in which an individual may live in 
party housing, work at a job provided ?Y the party, be a member of 
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a party trade union, and read the party newspaper, it is clear that 
breaking with a party can mean a serious change in life. The de-
velopment and operation of political parties in Israel has involved 
them in non-political functions that provide services to people and 
provide them with additional tools with which to exercise and in- - -
crease political power. 
Two other organizations have functions which are similar to or 
compliment those of the political parties. One of these is the 
Jewish Agency. It acted as the government of Zionism before the 
creation of Israel and was recognized in Article 4 of the mandate 
9 agreement. In this capacity, it became the w0rldwide spokesman for 
the Zionist cause and was heavily involved in international policies. 
Now the J.A. is a federation of political party secretariats that 
divides and distributes ironey raised outside of Israel. With no 
public control, the J.A. finances youth organizations, educational 
activities, and propaganda agencies to sustain the apparatus of 
Zionist parties. Its most important functions, however, are in 
organizing immigration, absorbing inunigrants, establishing new set­
tlements, and sustaining old ones.
10 
This agency gives parties 
control over vast amounts of money to use for their own purposes, 
independent of democratic processes. 
As important as the Jewish Agency is, it is not nearly as 
powerful as the Histadrut, Israel's General Federation of Labor. 
The Histadrut is controlled by the Labor Party, which totally dom-
inated Israeli politics until the Likud bloc victory in 1977. The 
government, the Jewish �gency, and the Histadrut together constitute 
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the public sector of the Israeli economy which accounts for 2/3 of 
h . . . 11 t e country ' s  economl.c activity. The Histadrut also predates 
the existence o f  Israel . 
As a labor union, the Histadrut is primarily interested in 
organizing workers. Throughout its existence, about 75% of Jewish 
workers have been members. It agreed to allow Arab members in 
12 1959 ,  and about 1/2 are now members . The Histadrut consists of 
about 40 national unions which act as departments in the federation. 
It is organized with local wo
.
rkers ' committees, regional labor 
council s ,  the Histadrut convention, the General Council , the Exec-
13 utive Committee, the Executive Bureau, and the Secretary Genera l .  
The Histadrut has functions other than organizing and 
representing workers. It operates the largest medical organization 
in the country , with its health insurance fund covering 3/4 of the 
1 . 14 popu ation. In fact, the Histadrut health fund has a bigger bud-
h h . . 1th 1
5 
get t an t e Ministry of Hea • Howeve r ,  only about 1/3 of Arab 
k mb . h . 16 wor ers are me ers in t e insurance program. It provides other 
social services such as social security benefits, a widow ' s  fund, 
a pension fund, a fund for invalids , worker ' s  training programs , 
and youth organizations .  It also owns a publishing house and prints 
17 the country ' s  largest morning newspaper, Davan. 
A subcommittee of the Executive Committee operates as an 
entrepreneur for the union . The General Cooperative Association of 
Jewish Workers finances and runs many economic enterprises such as 
construction firms and heavy industry. By 1960, half of the heavy 
industry in the country was the result of Histadrut actions . Early 
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in its history, the federation was involved only in ventures based 
on cooperative principles ,  like the collective agricultural settle-
rnents . In fact , most of these settlements are affiliated with the 
Histadrut. Today , it also acts in a capitalist fashion and is 
directly involved in almost every aspect of the economy . It also 
contributes in joint ventures with private capital, including 
f . . 18 oreign capital . 
The importance of the Histadrut lies in the facts that it 
performs many important social and economic functions normally car-
ried out by governments or private .enterpris e ,  and that it is con-
trolled by a political party. This allows the Labor Party to play 
a dominant role in Israeli life and to assume the position of gov-
ernmental institutions even when it does not control the government. 
Such a powe rful role contributed to Labor ' s  near complete domination 
of the Israeli political system. 
The following tables of election results show the extent of 
Labor ' s  success�9 Only the current government , led by the Likud bloc, 
has been formed without Labor participation. 
First Knesset Election - January 25 , 1949 
Party 
Mapai 
Mapam (includes Ahdut Haavoda) 
He rut 
United Religious Front (National Religious 




Arab Lists ( affiliated with Mapai) · 
Others 
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% of Knesset 
Vote s Seats 
35 . 7  46 
14 . 7  19 
11 . 5  14 
12 . 2  16 
4 . 1  5 
5 . 2  7 
3 . 5  4 
3 . 0  2 
10 . 1  4 
Second Knesset Election - July 30 , 1951 
Party 
Mapai 
Mapam (includes Ahdut Haavoda) 
He rut 
Torah Religious Front (Agudat Yisrael 
and Paolei Agudat Yisrael) 
National Religious Party 
Progressives 
Communists 
Arab Lists (affiliated with Mapai) 
Others 






Torah Religious Front (Agudat Yisrael 
and Poalei Agudat Yisrael) 
National Religious .Party 
Progress ive s 
General Zionists 
Communists 
Arab Lists (affiliated with Mapai )  
Other 






Torah Religious Front (Agudat Yisrael 
and Poalei Agudat Yisrael) 




Arab Lists (affiliated with Mapai) 
Other 
- 101-
% of Knesset 
votes Seats 
3 7 . 3  45 
1 2 . 5  15 
6 . 6  8 
3 . 6  5 
8 . 3  10 
3 . 2  4 
4 . 0  5 
4 . 7  5 
0 . 7  0 
% of Knesset 
Votes Seats 
3 2 . 2  40 
7 . 3  9 
8 . 2  10 
1 2 . 6  15 
4 . 7  6 
9 . 1  11 
4 . 4  5 
10 . 2  1 3  
4 . 5  6 
4 . 9  5 
1 . 9  0 
% O f  Knesset 
Votes Seats 
3 8 . 2  47 
7 . 2  9 
6 . 0  7 
1 3 . 6  17 
4 . 7  6 
9 . 9  12 
4 . 6  6 
6 . 1  8 
2 . 8  3 
3 . 5  5 
3 . 4  0 







Poalei Agudat Yisrael 
National Religious Party 
Liberals (Progressives and General Zionists) 
Communists 
Arab Lists (affiliated with Mapai) 
Other 
Sixth Knesset Election - November 2 ,  1965 
Party 
Labor Alighment (Mapai , Ahdut Haavoda) 
Rafi 
Mapam 
Gahal (Herut and Liberal) 
Agudat Yisrael 
Poalei Agudat Yisrael 
National Religious Party 
Independent Liberals 
New Cormnunist List ( Rakah) 
Israel Cormnunist Party (Maki) 
Arab Lists (affiliated with Labor) 
Haolem Hazeh (New Force) 
Other 
Seventh Knesset Election - October 2 8 ,  1969 
Party 
Labor Alignment (Mapa i ,  Ahdut Haavoda, 
Mapam, and Rafi) 
Gahal (Herut and Liberal) 
Agudat Yisrael 
Poaeli Agudat Yisrael 
National Religious Party 
Independent Liberals 
New Cormnuni s� List ( Rakah) 
Israel Communist Party (Maki) 
Arab Lists ( affiliated with Labor) 





% of Knesset 
Votes Seats 
34 . 7  4 2  
7 . 6  9 
6 . 5  8 
13 . 7  17 
3 . 7  4 
l . 9  2 
9 . 8  1 2  
1 3 . 6  1 7  
4 . 1  5 
3 . 5  4 
0 . 7  0 
% O f  Knesset 
Votes Seats 
36 . 7  45 
7 . 9  10 
6 . 6  8 
2 1 . 3  26 
3 . 3  4 
l . 8  2 
8 . 9  ll 
3 . 8  5 
2 . 2  3 
l . 2  l 
3 . 3  4 
l . l  l 
1 . 8  0 
% of Knesset 
Vote s Seats 
46 . 2  56 
2 1 .  7 26 
3 . 2  4 
1 . 8  2 
9 . 7  12 
3 . 2  4 
2 . 8  3 
1 . 2  l 
3 . 5  4 
1 . 2  2 
1 . 2  2 
3 . l  4 
l . l  0 
Eighth Knesset Election - December 3 1 ,  1973 
Party 
Labor Alignment (Mapai , Ahdut Haavoda, 
Mapam, and Rafi) 
Likud ( Gahal , State List, Land of 
Israel Movement, Independent Centre) 
Agudat Yisrael and Poalei Agudat Yisrael 
National Religious Party 
Independent Liberals 
Arab Lists ( affiliated with Labor) 
New Conununist List (Rakah) 
Moked (Conununists) 
Civil Rights Movement 




Democratic Movement for Change 
Agudat Yisrael 
Poalei Agudat Yisrael 
National Religious Party 










46 . 2  
3 2 . 5  
4 . 2  
8 . 3  
3 . 3  
2 . 5  
3 . 3  
o . a  
2 . 5  
% O f  
Vote s 
2 4 . 6  
3 3 . 4  
11 . 6  
3 . 4  
1 . 4  
9 � 2  
4 . 6  
1 . 6  
1 . 9  
2 . 0  
1 . 2  
1 . 2  
1 . 4  














3 2  













One of the most obvious characteristics shown in these tables is 
the merging and separating of parties and factions .  But there is a 
basic set of parties involved in the system which have drawn a gen-
erally consistent number of votes throughout Israel ' s  history . Most 
of these par�ies developed around their positions on issues and have 
merged or separated for a wide variety of reasons . 
Mapai has been the dominant party in Israel and currently is the 
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major faction in the Labor alignment which includes Ahdut Haavoda 
and Mapam. Mapai was formed out of the political elite of the 
Zionist immigrants in Palestine prior to Israel's existence, led by 
. d . 20 Davi Ben-Gurion. They are basically a social democratic party 
d . . 21 on omestic issues. As previously mentioned, the party controls 
the Histadrut union. Ahdut Haavoda and Mapam are both Marxist 
oriented parties on economic and social issues, and their inclusion 
in the Labor alignment forces Mapai to move slightly leftward. Mapam 
h h .  ab . . 22 as a. istory of concern for the Ar m.l.nority. One of Mapai ' s  
strong points has been its ability to absorb different groups and 
retain power. Much of this flexibility is due to its early dominance 
of the entire society. It controlled the economic system through 
government investment and the Histadrut, it was responsible for 
economic expansion and rising living standards, and it maintained 
. 
1 h . d h .  
23 an interna co esion of lea ers ip. Success in these areas led 
many people to see Mapai as the political embodiment of the state 
and the natural party to support. Also, as long as Mapai was sue-
cessful in these areas, it was easy to accommodate divergent inter-
ests and dismiss opposition challenges. Troubles began to surface 
for Labor in 1965, when Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan left the party 
and formed Rafi. Differ�nces between Ben-Gurion and Premier Levi 
Eshkol created the split. Ben-Gurion wanted Mapai to discontinue 
the alliance with Ahdut Haavoda, and favored single-member district 
elections over proportional representation. Eshkol and other Labor 
24 
leaders rejected these demands. Although Rafi subsequently won 
only 10 Knesset seats in the election of 1965 and Labor increased 
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its total from 42 to 45 , the incident was the first major split of 
Mapai ' s  ruling consensus . This division became sharper as Rafi 
strongly criticized Eshkol for his actions during the 1967 crisis. 
Eshkol was forced by the criticism to name Dayan as Minister of De-
25 fense. The end of the war brought a new set of problems to Israel 
and to the Labor party in dealing with the occupied territories .  No 
consensus could be reached in the party about whether to integrate 
them into the country , return all of them, or bargain for the return 
of some portions and keeping others . In the general conciliatory 
post-war atmosphere , Labor returned to its history of accommodation. 
In late 1967, both Rafi and Ahdut Haavoda completely merged with 
Mapai. 26 Upon Eshkol ' s  death in 1969 , Golda Meir was chosen Prime 
Minister. She was not committed to any particular position on the 
territories as were some of the other potential choices ,  but was a 
, ld d . . 27 popu�ar o guar Zionist . In effect, the Labor party had decided 
not to push decisions of substance in order to maintain unity . While 
the divisions within the party reflected the diversity in public 
opinion, official party positions did not. This policy continued 
through the 1969 and 1973 elections.  This led the party to boycott 
. ff d . h '  . 
28 
serious peace e orts uring t is time . Even after the 1973 
October War, Israel ' s  position did not change substantially. Public 
disenchantment with Labor appeared to some extent in the December, 
1973 elections as Labor lost five seats and Likud bloc made a strong 
showing, receiving more seats than any opposition party had pre-
viously. Since that time, Labo r ' s  basic position has been a willing-
ness to negotiate with Arab countries and Palestinian groups that 
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would recognize Israel and renounce terrorism. That position meant 
no dealing with the 'Palestine Liberation Organization, the largest 
and most popular group representing the Palestinian people. Labor 
was prepared to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza unde r favorable 
conditions .  It stated that it was not committed to extension o f  
settlements i n  the occupied territories and was against the enlarge-
29 ment of Jerusalem. This position led to a static, though rela-
tively tranquil period in Israeli history. 
Several events contributed to ending this tranquility in 1976. 
First , the election of Jimmy Carter who was more sympathetic to the 
Palestinian position than previous U . S .  Pres idents and who seemed 
determined to make a Middle East initiative rather than accept the 
status quo , concerned Israel and Labor leaders. Then the government 
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was forced to resign in December , 
1976 f 1 . . . 30 a ter osing a Knesset vote over a nu.nor issue . Before the 
subsequent elections were held, several scandals involving the finan-
cial dealings of top Labor party leaders , including Rabin, became 
ubl . 3 1  p ic . Rabin resigned as a candidate for Prime Minister but re-
mained on the Labor election list. 3 2  He was replaced by Shinrin 
Pere s ,  but the party had been severely damaged. 
The Labor alignment was already in trouble because of its 
appearance of weaknes s  and ineffectiveness in a variety of areas . 
Lack of progress in foreign policy, vacillation on the issues of 
settlements and the handling of the religious groups trying to 
establish them, and its inability to deal with domestic labor dis-
putes, social problems, and economic troubles had all caused public 
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disenchantment . In response to this disenchantment and to scandals 
in the Labor Party , university professor Yigael Yadin formed the 
Democratic Movement for Change. This party made inroads into 
Labor ' s  base of support by presenting new faces with clean reputa-
tions , not connected with old style politics. The DMC focused on 
reforming the electoral process while staying in the mainstream on 
d . d f . l '  . 33 omestic an oreign po icy issues. Many observers thought the 
DMC would be a major factor in the elections and would be the only 
party with a chance to unseat Labor . But Menachem Begin ' s  Likud 
bloc won the May 17 elections and became the first party to obtain 
more votes than Labor . 
The base of the Likud is Herut, the traditional conservative 
opposition party. Herut opposed government intervention in the 
34 economy , favoring a free enterprise system. However, its major 
emphasis has always been the Jewish historical right to the Land Of 
Israe l ,  which to them is both conceptual and territoria l .  The con-
cept is that a state for Jews in Palestine is the only way for the 
Jewish people to achieve fulfillment and keep their covenant with 
God. They believe the boundary of this state should coincide with 
the territory granted to Jews in the Old Testament and which was 
contained in the Biblical state of Israel. For them, this includes 
35 the West Bank and parts of Jordan . The Herut ideology is based 
on the revisionist line within the Zionist movement led by Vladimir 
Jabotinsky . Other consitent planks in the Herut platform included 
the rejection of a peace treaty with Jordan because it contained 
"unredeemed" territory, support for peace treaties with other Arab 
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nations , acceptance of Arabs as Israeli citizen s ,  and opposition to 
36 the creation of any Palestinian state. Herut also supported France 
in the Algerian revolt because ties to France were more important 
than idealistic cause s .  Herut has been a strong supporter of South 
Africa and its apartheid policies bec�use it is friendly to Israel 
37 and because of the presence of Jews and Jewish interests there . 
Herut w�s one of the top four parties in all elections up to 
1965 and was second in 1955 , 195 9 ,  and 1961. It was perceived as the 
only real opposition party since it had never participated in any 
gove rnment coalitions . In this capacity, it attracted many voters 
3 8  who were generally dissatisfied with the system. The popularity 
of Herut forced Labor to adopt a more aggressive, expansionist for-
. l '  h . . h h . 
39 eign po icy t an it might ave ot erwise. Its constant demand for 
widening borders to create the land of Israel also contributed to 
Labor ' s  difficulties in building a consensus on the issues o f  the 
occupied territories and Jewish settlements there. 
40 In 1965, Herut was j oined by the Liberal Party to form Gahal . 
The Liberals were oriented toward the private sector but accepted 
41 some government activity in the economy. They were also more in 
line with the Mapai position on foreign policy and the merger brought 
d . . 4 2  some mo eration in Herut statements .  Gahal won 26 seats in both 
the 1965 and 1969 elections , which was less than their combined 
total as separate parties in all previous elections . After the 1967 
war, Gahal entered a unity government , its first participation in a 
ruling coalition. But it withdrew in 1970 after the government ac-
4 3  cepted the Rogers Plan for a Sinai agreement. 
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In 197 3 ,  Gahal brought some minor conservative parties into its 
alliance to form Likud. The Parties involved were the State List, 
44 the Land of Israel Movement and the Independent Centre . In the 
elections of that year, the Likud received 39 seats in the Knesset. 
This was 13 more than Gahal received in 1969, 5 more than the com-
ponent parties totaled in 1969, and more than any - party other than 
Labor in Israel ' s  history. The Likud followed the same line as 
Herut , favoring a free enterprise economy and rej ecting territorial 
concessions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Prior to the 1977 
election s ,  the Likud made its position on the occupied territories 
very clear. The western part of the Land of Israel ( the West Bank) 
was not to be partitioned. The solution to the Palestinian problem 
had to be found east o f  the Jordan Rive r .  Israel should not nego-
tiate with the PLO. There should be no withdrawal from any occupied 
territories without peace agreements and no peace agreements without 
di . . 45 rect negotiations . After the 1977 elections, Begin made it clear 
his position had not changed. When asked about the future of the 
occupied territories , he replied, "What occupied territories? If you 
mean Judea ,  Samaria, and the Gaza Strip , these are liberated terri-
46 tories and an integral part of the Land of Israel . "  The Likud ' s  
continued refusal to seriously negotiate Israel ' s  withdrawal from 
the West Bank and its record on settlements there indicate it has 
not deviated much from this position. 
The Begin governmen t ' s  proposals for Palestinian autonomy are 
consistent with its general stance and do not include any maj or 
1 . . 47 Israe i concession s .  The document ' s  orientation i s  made clear by 
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its title, "Proposal of  Principles for Full Autonomy for the Arab 
Residents o f  Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Distric t ,  and for the 
Maintenance of  the Jewish Settlement in These Areas . "  Two central 
aspects of this plan are that Israel will never allow the e stablish-
ment of a Palest inian state and that after the transitional five 
years of the autonomy plan, Israel will demand sovereignty over the 
occupied territories. An aide to Begin stated the position clearly , 
saying, I assure you, i f  anything comes out of  the negotiation s ,  it  
will not be a Pales tinian state. I f  that ' s  denying them the- right 
o f  self-determination , then so be i t . "  Begin ' s  plan- would· create an 
1 1 -member council elected by West Bank and Gaza residents that would 
I 
administer hospital s ,  schools , social services , and municipal ser-
vices . The council would not be granted any legislative functions 
and it would derive its authority solely from the Israeli military 
government of occupation. This implies that Israel could dissolve 
the council i f  i t  did not follow its charter or administer properly 
the laws and regulations passed for it by Israe l .  Also, the Israeli 
army would retain responsibility for security and public order and . 
would act as an overseer of  Palestinian autonomy . To this end, the 
army would not leave the occupied territoties but would be redeployed 
from maj or urban centers to new emplacements in s t rategic rural areas . 
Tilis is inconsistent with the Camp David Framework for Peace which 
says that, "The Israeli military government and its civilian admin-
istration will be withdrawn as soon as a sel f-governing authority has 
been freely elected , "  that, "a strong local police force" is to be 
created , and that a joint Israeli-Jordanian force will insure 
- 1 10 -
security. In regard to West Bank land, Begin ' s  plan represents 
little change in the power presently enj oyed by the military govern­
ment. State lands, formerly Jordanian public property, would remain 
under Israeli control, and could be used for security needs, settle­
ments, or refugee rehabilitation. Land which is not legally regis­
tered in private ownership, but is privately cultivated could be used 
for security needs, including settlements. Privately owned land not 
in cultivation could be requisitioned by Israel for the same pur­
poses. Privately owned and cultivated land would not be subject to 
government takeover unless unavoidably required for security or road 
building needs. If these principles were accepted, Israel would be 
able to expropriate any land in the occupied territories, if neces­
sary for security reasons. Israel would retain the right to build 
settlements anywhere in the West Bank and Gaza with all settlers sub­
ject ·only to Israeli law under Begin's plan. It would allow Israeli 
citizens to purchase land in the occupied territories and Arabs to 
buy land in Israel if they become Israeli citizens. A crucial point 
is Israel's retention of control over water sources in the West Bank 
and Gaza which presently provide water to Jewish settlements and to 
parts of Israel proper. The proposal states that Israel will plan 
water usage with the Palestinian council. The overall autonomy plan 
illustrates Likud ' s  intention eo remain faithful to the ideology of 
Herut. 
O f  course, Likud is not a majority party and depends upon a 
coalition to maintain its control of the government. After the May, 
1977 elections, both Labor and the Democratic Movement for Change 
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refused to join the government and Likud barely formed a majority in 
conjunction with the National Religious Party, Agudat Yisrael,  and 
Paolei Agudat Yisrael. Moshe Dayan also voted for the coalition in 
exchange for the Foreign Minister portfolio.
48 
The National Religious Party has been a member of every 
government coalition in Israel ' s  history. It compliments the high 
priority of the major parties for foreign policy with a low one , 
h . . . · 1 d . . 49 emp asizing primari y omestic issues.  Its position on economics 
is similar to that of the old Liberal Party, favoring private con-
trol while accepting a degree of government intervention . But its 
so distinguishing feature is its vision of Israel as a theocracy. 
The NRP runs its own education system, and owns two banks and other 
economic enterprises . 51 Agudat Yisrael is the ultra-orthodox Jewish 
party with Poalei Agudat Yisrael as its affiliate representing ortho-
52 dox Jewish workers .  These parties have been able to gain conces-
sions from Labor and Likud on religious issues relating to activities 
on the Sabbath, kosher traditions, marriage , and women in the army 
by supporting their foreign policies . Another factor in their sue-
cess is the government ' s  wish to avoid any religious confrontations 
th . h d . . 1 di . 53 at mig t tear Jews apart an create serious interna ssension. 
In Israel ' s  political system, avoiding these internal splits is 
a constant preoccupation. No party has ever had a majority , govern-
ments have all been coalitions , and each major party consists of 
factions or interests that must be accommodated . The emotional nature 
of many important issues in Israel complicates the situation. Such 
a system faces constant strain and requires delicate b�lancing to 
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avoid either political eruptions or stagnation , which would reduce 
a government ' s  effectiveness and legitimacy. It is not surprising 
that Israeli governments have not always been able to succeed in sub-
merging these differences. An example of that is the conflict be-
tween the Land of Israel Movement and the Peace Movement. The prin-
ciples involved in this conflict have divided Zionists and Israelis 
throughout their history. The division crosses traditional party 
lines and relates to Zionism ' s  fundamental purposes and practices and 
to the nature of the Jewish state . Israel Eldad, a leader in the 
Land of Israel Movement and former member of the extreme underground 
Stern Gang , spoke of these differences as a basic conflict in Is-
raeli society. 
The existence of the partition of the 
country is a function of the division 
of the existential soul of Zionism in 
its different layers . In these layers , 
from the beginning, there was a deep 
fragmentation, with guilt feelings toward 
the cosmopolitan ideals of socialism and 
liberalism, which were to liberate the 
world from nationalism - maybe even from 
the plague of the nation states - and 
which will liberate the Jews entirely 
from their separate unique existence . . .  
This is a typical schizophrenia. We have 
guilt feelings that we presumably have 
betrayed these universal ideas by turning 
to Zionism, which is of necessity ' re­
actionary ' for . it is a return to sometimes 
irrational roots . . .  Had it . only at least 
been possible to implement ' utopian Zion­
ism' in • ways of peace ' through convincing 
the Arabs that we bring blessings to them 
too , and social liberation and progress ! 
But in vain ! To go on with psychological 
language, what is left is frustration -
the feeling that perhaps Zionism is after 
all a reactionary movement. 54 
The Land of Israel Movement first surf aced as a party in the 
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1969 elections . It articulated the traditional ideology of Zionism, 
favoring more immigration, widening Israel ' s  borders , and insuring 
the maintenance of Israel as a completely Jewish state . It s�pported 
whatever political, economic, or military policies that would achieve 
these goal s .  This especially included. establishing settlements in 
the occupied territories , carrying out the central task of the Zion­
ist state . Its membership came from the Labor Party, former under-
ground organizations,  right wing kibbutzim, and some. religious 
55 groups . 
The Peace Movement never officially formed a party, but has been 
an active proponent of views diametrically opposed to the Land of Is­
rael Movement. It believes that in order to exist securely, Israel 
must cooperate with the Arabs and obtain their consent. Strength is 
not sufficient to guarantee security. While certainly not anti­
Zionist, the Peace Movement favors modifying the character of the 
state and deviating from the original precepts of Zionism to bring 
peace. It advocates territorial concessions, withdrawal of Jewish 
settlements in the occupied territories, and internal change . These 
changes would include complete separation of church and state and 
equal rights and opportunities for Arabs . They describe the Land of 
Israel Movement as a "dangerous mixture of religious mysticism and 
national chauvinism, "  which sees war as a glorious mission.
56 
Its membership came generally from Mapam and left wing kibbutzim. 
Also , Labor Party leaders Pinchas Sapir, Abba Eban, and Yigal Allon 




Between 1967 and 1973, the Labor government tried to 
simultaneously use policies o f  both movements . It labelled both 
as extremists and presented itself as the moderating force. The 
Peace Movement ideology was favored by a majority in the govern-
ment, in that it provided the flexible approach to negotiation the 
government wanted to achieve progres s .  One step· taken by the gov-
ernment reflecting this position was its participation in the Jar-
ring talks, indirect negotiations through the UN ,  within the frame-
work o f  Resolution 242 . This implied an agreement to withdraw from 
the occupied territories. It also began using the Peace Movement ' s  
"stages to peace" concept by withdrawing from the cease fire lines 
of 1970 to permit the opening of the Suez Canal , providing Egyptian 
troops did not cross it.
58 
However, many Labor Party leaders did 
not support these concessions and forced the government to take other 
actions not consistent with the Peace Movement . Prime Minister Golda 
Meir and Minister o f  Immigrant Absorption Israel Galili favored al-
lowing Israelis to purchase land in the occupied territories, fur-
thering Jewish settlements there , and considerable modification of 
borders. In 196 8 ,  Moshe Dayan proposed integrating the economies 
of southern Israel and the southern West Bank and suggested that Is-
rael act as the established government in the territories while giv� 
ing Arabs voting rights . Sapir opposed these ideas , fearing the 
results of incorporating a large Arab populous into Israel.  Eban 
was also strongly opposed to this, saying it would be dominating 
ab · h · · 11 d d h · d  59 Ar s against t eir wi an amounte to apart ei . 
The government proceeded generally along the lines proposed by 
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Meir and Galili with some concessions to Dayan. In 197 2 ,  the 
Knesset "reaffirm (ed) and confirm(ed) the historical right of the 
60 Jewish people over the Land of Israel . "  By 1973, the government 
had moved firmly toward the position of the Land of Israel Move-
ment. It had established 44 settlements in the West Bank, Golan 
Heights ,  and the Sinai. It had enlarged Jerusalem ' s  boundaries and 
made plans for the Judaization of Gaza. Economic integration of 
' 
the territories had begun and overall, the basis for incorporating 
the West Bank into Israel had been laid by 1973 . Although the 
majority of the Labor Party still claimed it opposed the proces s ,  
it had nevertheless occurred. Public opinion opposing the return 
of occupied land, the Land of Israel Movement ' s  inflanunatory rhet-
oric, and Dayan ' s  personal popularity all contributed to this situa-
tion. Also, steps taken according to Peace Movement principles did 
not achieve the progress expected. Following the Land of Israel 
Movement made the government appear strong and active , increasing 
. l . 61 its popu arity. In typical Israeli fashion, the government tried 
to follow two policies at once to accommodate all interests . But 
it found this impossible to do and by 197 3 ,  had embarked upon a 
policy of annexation without officially accepting the· ideology behind 
it. This coincides closely with the earlier Zionist decision to fol-
low revisionist Zionism advocated by Jabotinsky in establishing Is-
rae l ,  while claiming to follow more moderate Zionism. Both movements 
offered policies based on traditional conceptions of Zionism applied 
to current realities and the government chose to implement the basic 
principles of the Land of Israel Movement . 
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The Arabs also interpreted Israeli action this way and the 
result was the Yorn Kippur war of October 1973. The war showed the 
Land of Israel Movement that hostility still existeq and that the 
maintenance of expanded boundaries had allowed Israel to survive 
under a surprise attack , government bungling, inadequate prepara-
tion, and still recover to penetrate to within striking distance o f  
Cairo and Damascus. But the Peace Movement argued that the so-
' 
called defensible borders had not prevented war as its program of 
returning territories and recognizing Palestinian national rights 
62 would have . The government ' s  first action was to scrap the Galili 
document which had set up a four-year plan for building settlements 
and acquiring land. It seemed to admit that added territory did 
not protect the country as well as Arab acceptance. It began to 
return to the Peace Movement idea of trading territory for guaran-
teed peace . However, the Peace Movement opposed the government ' s  
step by step program of interim agreements engineered by U . S .  Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger on the grounds that they were fritter-
ing away bargaining power for minor concessions . It favored a 
broader territorial offer in exchange for an overall settlement . 
But the government would not accede to this demand for fear of 
dividing the party and the country. The Land of Israel Movement , 
which by this time had joined the Likud bloc , opposed both approach-
es, claiming they would increase defense needs at the same time the 
willingness of the U . S .  to help meet them would be decreased by oil 
. d  . 
63 
consi eration s .  The 1973 election in which Labor lost support 
and the Likud gained, increased tension within the government even 
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more. Although its leaders still proclaimed support for a moderate 
approach based on Peace Movement principle s ,  it was not in a strong 
position to take decisive action. Any dramatic territorial conces­
sions could have created serious internal rifts with the potential 
for bringing down the government. The government was again trying 
its tightrope act , attempting to satisfy everyone . This explains 
its unclear position on settlements and the lack of progress achieved 
from 1973 to 197 7 .  Then came the Labor Party scandals and the Likud 
victory o f  197 7 .  
The Likud government which included the Land o f  Israel Movement , 
began immediately to implement its position by legalizing existing 
settlements in the occupied territories and committing itself to the 
establishment o f  more . Its record on this, both in statements and 
actions is quite clear . The Camp David agreement is consistent with 
the Land of Israel Movement , but includes some things to please the 
Peace .Movement . The Begin government must also submit to the system 
by accommodating diverse points of view with its policie s .  The re­
turn of the Sinai to Egypt , while not pleasurable to Begin, is ac­
ceptable within the context of the Likud position and the Israeli 
political system. It allows him to meet Peace Movement demands for 
territorial concessions and shows him to be flexible on this issue, 
capable of ma.king progre s s .  But at the same time , it does not really 
violate Land of Israel Movement principles . Israel has never ser­
iously claimed sovereignty over the Sinai . It was the easiest ter­
ritory to relinquish because it was not part of the historical Land 
of Israel. Returning the Sinai may also contribute to Likud ' s  master 
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plan for maintaining control of the West Bank and Gaza by separating 
Egypt from the rest of the Arabs . Begin ' s  Palestinian autonomy plan 
indicates he has no intention of giving up the West Bank and Gaza. 
The vagueness of the Camp David agreement and its lack of time 
specificity allows Israel and the Likud tremendous leeway in meeting 
its conditions , while it eliminates Egypt as a potential military 
threat. 
The key points to understand in looking at Israeli political 
parties are that despite their public differences, their execution 
of policy is similar and that the system of coalitions and factions 
reduces the .differences even further . All maj or political parties 
. . d . d d · 1 64 are Zionist an are oriente towar the Western wor d .  Only the 
Conununists and the ultra-religious parties oppose the concept of 
Zionism. The major parties refuse to deal with the PLO or accept 
a Palestinian state . The main public difference between parties, 
particularly Likud and Labor ,  is over the. return of the West Bank and 
Gaza. Labor and the parties supporting its position claim they are 
willing to return portions of those lands under certain conditions, 
while Likud has consistently stated that they are legitimate parts 
of Israel. However, Labor accepted the construction of Jewish set-
tlements in the occupied territories and began a process of inte-
grating the territories into Israel and making them dependent on it. 
And Likud is the first government to return any land to the Arabs and 
is now negotiating over the Palestinian question which they had 
earlier claimed had to be solved east of the Jordan Rive r .  Both 
parties have remained firm on the most crucial issues of opposition 
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to resettling refugees in Israel and the creation of a Pal:es t..in:L-in-.. 
state . 
In economics, the parties have a variety of positions , from 
Marxism to . a belief in completely free enterprise . The dominance of 
the Labor Party allowed them to set economic policy for most of Is­
rael ' s  history following a socialist-oriented position. The election 
of Likud brought some major change s ,  but Begin has not moved to cut 
government spending , either in defense or social service s .  Again, 
it is seen that party positions as reflected in actual policies do 
not differ greatly. 
Elections in Israel have not brought about major policy changes .  
Labor ' s  domination of the political process for 30 years meant that 
division and differences within the party had more impact on policy 
than public preferences. Labor showed itself to be adept at accom­
m::>dating diverse interests without altering its policies more than 
was absolutely necessary . The division of support among the parties 
remained amaz ingly consistent in the first thirty years of Israel ' s  
existenc e .  Some of this could b e  explained a s  a consistent division 
of public opinion, but the use of non-political functions by parties 
to attract and maintain support contributes much to this phenomenon . 
When election results are so consistent, it is natural that policy 
also remain consistent. The system itself plays a major part in Is­
rael ' s  policy consistency . The multi-party , proportional representa­
tion system in which obtaining a majority in the Knesset is virtually 
impossible , forces parties to depend on one another for support . The 
resulting �rade-offs and compromises do not make major policy changes 
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likely. Since no party represents the maj ority, no party can feel 
comfortable in imposing its position on the coun t ry .  Also, within 
the parties the leadership must form compomises between all the 
factions to av�id the possibility that disgrun tled memb ers could 
leave the party and form a new one. And as with the Land of Israel 
and Peace Movement s ,  many differences can cross party line s .  So 
internal party compromises· tend to mitigate the· differences between 
parties as well. In Israel , the importance of  Zionism to the 
country and the commitment of the major parties to i t  further 
reduce the differences between them. In a system with these char­
acteristics, it  is unlikely that maj or policy shifts will occur 
within parties or as a result of a change in governments after an 
election. This has p roven to be true in Israe l .  
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Chapter 5 LEADERSHIP IN ISRAEL 
The preceding two chapters provide a basis for beginning a 
discussion of the nature of Israeli leadership . Chapter 3 showed 
that Jews of European-American origin have obtained superior posi­
tions in economics , politics,  and in virtually all aspects of life 
in Israel over the rest of its citizens . The functions and powers 
of political parties described in Chapter 4 allow party leaders to 
control jobs, housing, and placement on election lists of their 
members. The system itself tends to perpetuate the existing division 
of power in the state , contributing to policy consistency . · These 
characteristics have produced a country in which those reaching top 
positions must generally meet the conditions of belonging to a par­
ticular racial group , following the orders of existing party leaders , 
and accepting an established policy line . The dominance of govern­
ment and political parties over all parts of Israeli life and their 
close relationship with other majo.r institutions means that these 
conditions apply throughout the society and are passed on through 
the socialization proces s .  
The historical development o f  Israel can explain much about the 
creation of the elitist society. During the period of 1882 to 194 8 ,  
in which much o f  the Jewish immigration to Palestine occurred, nine 
out of ten immigrants were European and most of the native-born Pal­
estinian Jews were of European origin. Zionism began in Europe and 
was influenc�d by the European concept of nationalism. The dominant 
life style in Palestine became that of the Europeans . According to 
Leonard Fein, author of a comprehensive study of Israeli politics, 
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"In education and aspiration, in political organization and content, 
in family life and consumption, it was the Western tradition that 
1 mattered . "  The values of this group of European inunigrants cente.red 
. . . l '  d h . h '  2 on Zionism, socia ism, an t e pioneer et i c .  The kibbutz was the 
perfect manifestation of these ideals. Jews establishing collective 
agrarian settlements in the Holy Land was the fulfillment of many 
Jewish desire s .  In many case s ,  kibbutz leaders became national lead-
ers. Their status as creators and practitioners of an ideology made 
kibbutz leaders the embodiment of Zionism. By emphasizing particular 
values and elevating to leadership the spokesmen for those values ,  
the kibbutz system helped establish an elitist social pattern . 3  
The nature of the Jewish national movement also contributed to 
elitism. It has always been involved in semi-legal or illegal work 
that required secrecy. This club mentality was the result of engag-
ing in politics against Czarist Russia, operating under the British 
mandat e ,  hiding from Naz is , creating an underground army , and main-
4 
taining the security of the state . In such condition s ,  important 
information was available only to a select few, who became the only 
ones capable of decisive action , thus reinforcing their elite status . 
When the state was formed, this group of leaders from the 
kibbutzim, the political organizations, and the military became the 
rulers of the state . It was a homogeneous group with strong ideo-
logical commitments and conunon experiences . The success of this 
group in leading the Zionist movement to the accomplishment of its 
goals reinforced their elite status even further. Their strong 
ideology, common sacrifices, and success led the elite to a point of 
- 12 3 -
view that public opinion was not important.
5 
The elite ' s  
interpretation of Zionism and how to implement it became the basis 
for policy rather than a public consensus . The political structure 
they established included no formal channels for communicating pub­
lic will. 6 They detached themselves from the various informal and 
semi-formal groups in the country, reducing the influence of interest 
groups which are o ften a vehicle for the expression of public opin-
. 7 ion. 
All characteristics of the pre-state Zionist movement can be 
seen in present day Israe l .  The cultural values of the society are 
still based on those imported from Europe , although since 1948, more 
than half the immigrants to Israel came from Africa and Asia.
8 
Chap-
ter 3 describes in detail the dominance of Western culture in Israel 
and the feelings of superiority of European-American Jews over Arabs 
and Oriental Jews . According to Alex Weingrod, the pioneer ethic of 
public service , cooperation , �desty, simplicity , egalitarianism, 
and dignity of labor retains official prominence since vetercn elites 
still have political control and enunciate those values through the 
major national institutions . He also explains that education, mili-
tary service and the policy of settling immigrants in cooperative 
agricultural corranunities contribute to the inculcation of these 
values .  However, Weingrod describes a change in behavior among 
younger Israelis who emphasize materialism and middle-class values 
9 in the Euro-American sense. Although these are contrasting value 
systems , they are both o f  Western origin. Any entrance into the 




it be based on pioneer or middle class values . 
The secrecy involved in the Zionist was incorporated into the 
Israeli political system. Political communication in Israel has been 
described as a "gossip system" with great status accorded to those 
that obtain inside information . Such knowledge creates social as 
well as political distinctions between people in Israe l . 11 Two Is-
raeli j ournalists , Yuval Elizur and Eliahu Salpeter established 
"access to inside information" as a distinguishing quality , writing 
Access to inside information is an 
important attribute of any modern elite 
member. But in Israel it seems this is 
of particular importance. Centuries of 
persecution have led Jews to attach 
extraordinary weight to any bit of in­
formation emanating from a center of 
power that in the past could have had 
life or death implications for them. 
They brought this keen sense of the im­
portance of information with them to 
Israe l ,  and there the relative intimacy 
of the entire structure only adds to the 
value attached to ' being in the know . ' 
With independence came the conviction 
that having inside information is part of 
a two-way communication system: those 
who know qui°ckly what important people 
think or do can also influence decisions 
before they are made final . The small 
size of the country also accentuates the 
snob value of inside information : those 
who know what Moshe Dayan said yesterday 
can also create the impression, or at 
least try to create it , that they are part 
of the decis ion-making circle . Thus in­
formation has become one of the most im­
portant coins of exchange at all levels of 
Israel ' s  national and local elite. 13 
The Israeli elite is perpetuated not only by a dominant culture 
and limited access to information , but also by the political system. 
In addition to the preeminence of elite-controlled political parties, 
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the centralization of the government and the economy contribute to 
elitist politics . All major political organizations, economic in­
stitutions, and public issues are national in scope. Local politics 
is relatively unimportant in Israel, while national politics is well 
organized and highly centralized. Israel's small size inhibits the 
growth of local attachments. Local elections are heavily influenced 
by the national leadership and party affiliation. Because of this, 
immigrants rising to high positions in local government have not been 
able to use this as a springboard to national prominence.14 Pro­
portional representation also limits local power. Local officials 
have few resources to distribute and must make requests for assis­
tance or policy change to national authorities who make the final de­
cisions. As a result, veteran European groups who initially 
controlled parties and the administrative bureaucracies are able 
to monopolize strategic political positions and control entrance 
into the elite. 
Economic power is subject to the same conditions since much of 
economic policy is government planned. Also, government and party 
connections to the Jewish agency and the Histadrut increase the power 
of the elite over the nation's economy. In Israel's short history, 
foreign policy, defense, economic development, and immigrant absorp­
tion have been the dominant political issues. These are all national 
in scope, requiring centrally established policy. Also, the mechan­
isms to deal ·with those issues are set up to limit public access. 
For example, treaties made by the government do not have to be 
approved by the Knesset and are not subject to court authority. The 
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Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset is the only group that can 
demand exp lanations of policy or action from the Foreign Ministe r ,  
15 and it is always controlled by the ruling party. Again ,  intra-
party dynamics are superior to either public opinion or the relation-
ship between parties in the Israeli decision-making system. Prior to 
1977, most important decisions in foreign affairs , defens e ,  and fi-
nance were made within the Labor Party rather than through a public 
16 dialogue or an inter-party proce s s .  The fact that Israel is still 
in a state of Emergency enables the government to use powers without 
Knesset approval. The government is more significant than the Knes-
set in Israeli politics , the ruling party controls the government , 
and elites control the parties . With the veteran European elite con-
trolling parties, economic institutions ,  access to information, and 
the most significant policy decision s ,  their position is extraordi-
narily strong. 
The small number of people significantly involved in Israeli 
policy-making through the system described in the preceding discus-
sion is astonishing. The Israeli j ournalists Elizur and Salpeter 
stated in the Preface to Who Rules Israel? that, 
it is enough to know one hundred, perhaps 
one hundred and fifty or at most two hun­
dred, people in Israel in order to know 
who is responsible for decision making in 
the political and military sphere s ,  who 
makes the wheels of the economy turn and 
who zoolds public opinion .  Despite immi­
gr�tion to Israel during its twenty-five 
years of existence , despite the fact that 
during that period its population grew 
alzoost four fold - and perhaps because of 
these factors - the range where in all 
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political , economic ,  and perhaps even 
cultural power is concentrated is ex­
tremely narrow . 1 7  
Michael Brecher ,  au�hor of two major works on Israeli foreign policy , 
cites even a smaller number .  I n  The Foreign Policy System of Israe l ,  
Brecher says that through interviews and research , he identified 18 
persons , mostly from the Mapai mainstream, who made up the high for-
eign policy elite from 1948 to 1968. Within this group he found an 
inner circle o f  nine who played commanding roles . �8 From 1948 to 
1964, only 39 persons held ministerial positions and in Israel ' s  
f . 25 h 1 4 . . . 19 irst years , t ere were on y Foreign Minister s .  
A look at the composition of the Israeli elite confirms the 
Western dominance of the stat e .  Of the 1 8  persons i n  Brecher ' s  high 
foreign policy elite, 13 were born in Eastern Europe . The inner 
circle he identified for the period 1948 to 1968 consisted of David 
Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharrett, . Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan , Shimon Pere s ,  
Levi Eshko l ,  Abba Eban, Pinhas Sapir, and Yigal Allon. Of the s e ,  
six were born in Europe , one was from South Africa, and only two 
20 were native Israelis , both with European parents . The first Is-
raeli Cabinet had all been born in Eastern Europe between 1880 and 
1900 and came to Palestine before 1924 . By 1963, the Cabinet in-
eluded eight Europeans, two native Israelis , and one Iraqui . The 
1967 Cabinet had nine central or eastern Europeans, two native Is­
raelis, and two from other countries . 21 
The foliowing table shows the geographical origin of Knesset 
members through 1961. It clearly shows the European dominance over 
the Israeli legislature . 
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Geographical Origin of 
First 
Region of Birth Knesset 
1949-51 
Israel 13 
Eastern Europe and 
Russia 86 
Central Europe, includ-
ing Germany 10 
Balkans 1 
Moslem countries 2 
Western Europe· 1 
United States and 
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Of the 212 persons who served as Knesset members from 1948 to 1964, 
73% were born in Eastern Europe . The first Knesset contained four 
members of Asian-African origin and three native Israelis of Middle 
East background. In the fifth Knesset of 1961, 9 Easterners were 
members as were two native Israelis of Eastern origin. 23 The eighth 
Knesset of 1973-1977 had 14 Oriental Jewish members and six Arabs .
24 
Those two groups make up about 75% of Israel ' s  population yet held 
at that time , one-sixth of the Knesset seats.  The top officials of 
the Histadrut are overwhelmingly of Russian , Polish,  and German des-
25 
cent. 
It appears that the advantages of European Israelis described in 
Chapter 3 and the political party system described in Chapter 4 have 
indeed put a European elite in control of Israe l .  I t  i s  true that 
the 1977 Likud victory brought in new faces such as Begin , Ezer 
Weizmann , and Ariel Sharon . But Begin and Sharon had been party 
leaders throughout Israel ' s  history, and Weizmann is a Herut veteran 
whose uncle was the state ' s  first President. Begin ' s  Cabinet also 
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included Labor Party member Dayan and Yigal Yadin, former Army Chief 
of Staff, who was also active in pre-state affairs . So Begin ' s  Cab-
inet contains many elements of consistency and has not brought dras-
tic change in the nature of Israe l ' s  elite. And should the Begin 
government fall, veteran Labor leader Shimon Peres would be the 
likely successor. 
The fact that most of Israel ' s  leaders share common racial 
origins and common expeiences in forming the state , undoubtedly 
affects their policy positions . The dominant factor in the per-
spective of all of them is, �f course , their Jewishness. Regard-
less of other differences ,  they all believe in Israel as a Jewish 
. 
state necessary to solve the Jewish problem. No member o f  the: elite 
could ever take a stand against that . Also, with the exception of 
Eban, none of the top Israeli leadership favors real conciliation 
with the Arabs. They may make gestures designed to create a more 
peaceful and ' secure situation , but are not really committed to 
building friendships with the Arab people .  Most follow Ben-Gurion , 
Meir, Dayan, Begin, Peres, and Allon in emphasizing strength and 
coercion in conducting foreign policy. 26 The common personal traits 
among Israel ' s  leadership are decisiveness, rigidity , and sometimes 
extremisrn. 27 Such traits are the result of their obsession with 
the heroic fight for statehood and contribute to the aggressiveness 
and intransigence of the state ' s  foreign policy . 
The basic principles of Zionism are adhered to by all members 
of the elite. This is reflected in the country ' s  policy consistency 
over the years . Despite stated differences over territorial 
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concessions and over taking a moderate or hard line approach toward 
the Arabs ,  policies have not differed much. Regardless of who has 
been Prime Minister or which party has been in control , foreign 
policy actions have been quite similar. Since 1967 , no action has 
been taken to indicate a willingness to give up the West Bank or 
Gaza,  and both Labor and Likud governments have allowed extensive 
Israeli settlements there . Israel has always followed an aggressive 
military policy, both toward perceived threats from Arab states and 
Palestinian terrorism. Israel has not hesitated to use force or to 
invade the territory of other countries to achieve policy goals re­
gardless of who has been in power.  This is shown by military action 
in the 1955 Sinai invasion, the 1967 war, and the recent incursions 
into Lebanon . 
The historical development of Israel, the strong influence of 
Zionist ideology over state action, overriding concern with security 
matters, the superior status of Western Jews aver other groups in 
the country , the centralized and party-dominated political system, 
the role and functions of political parties,  proportional repre­
sentation elections , the lack of vehicles for effectively communi­
cating public opinion, and limited access to important information 
are all factors in the creation of an elitist system in Israel . It 
could be argued that in Israel ' s  short history, dominated by conflict 
and war with its neighbors, that it was natural for an elite to 
develop as a · guiding force in creating and maintaining the state, 
and with time and the achievement of stability, wider participation 
in all areas of decision making and more equality in other aspects 
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of society would result. But the present system of distributing 
political power and economic resources is so biased toward the ex­
isting elite that it has become self-perpetuating, restricting the 
opportunities for general public participation in and access to 
decision making centers , regardless of external and internal con­
ditions. Also, the rigid views of the elite and its present con­
trol over all major institutions is working against the achievement 
of stable conditions that might allow an opening of the system. The 
existence of a Western elite in control of all important aspects of 
the society with a system working to perpetuate that control makes 
it very likely that past policies will continue . 
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSION: THE EFFECT OF ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS ON THE MIDDLE EAST 
CONFLICT 
French statesman Jean Monnet once said that, 
Peace depends not only on treaties and 
promises. It depends essentially on 
the creation of conditions which, if they 
do not change the nature of men, at least 
guide their behavior toward each other in 
a peaceful direction. l 
Studying the propositions in Chapter 1 has led to the conclusion 
that , despite the successful completion of a peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israe l ,  the creation of a state based on Zionist ideology, 
the translation of that ideology into government policy, and the 
political system of Israel have created conditions that work against 
a complete resolution of the Middle East conflict and drive the 
participants away from peac e.  
One major factor in this situation is the existence of racial 
discrimination throughout Israeli society. Chapter 2 showed that 
racism is a part of Zionism. Several Zionist principles indicate 
racist tendencies. The basic belief that Jews must be set apart or 
liberated from all other people in order to fulfill their individual 
and collective potential implies something negative about non-Jews . 
The statements of individuals instrumental in the development of t�e 
Zionist concept and of those who participated in the political move-
ment express racism more directly. Lack of concern and even contempt 
for other cu�tures, belief in Jewish superiority, and claims of 
greater rights for Jews than for others within Palestine can be seen 
in many of the writings and statements of Zionists . The European 
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origin o f  Zionism contributed to the development of these ideas as 
Zionist leaders adopted the chauvinistic attitudes o f  European nation-
alism. Some factions of the movement abhorred racism and sought to 
rejuvenate Jewish culture by adherence to high moral standards. How-
ever, as described in Chapter 3 ,  the state and the society built by 
the Zionists exhibits a great deal of discrimination , much of which 
appears purposely designed into the system. Evidence presented indi-
cates that discriminatory treatmen t is not limited to non-Jews,  but 
is practiced against Jews of African and Asian descent as wel l .  In 
areas of citizenship , inc0me and occupational distribution , immi-
gration, education, politics , and culture , the position of and 
opportunities for individuals is heavily _
influenced by race . Euro-
pean Jews have achieved and maintained superior status in Israel 
with the help of government policy. 
Failing to respond to the needs and desires of Arabs and 
Oriental Jews in Israel could threaten the security of Israel from 
within. Yigael Yadin, current Israeli Cabinet member,  said that , 
internal problems are so pressing that if 
they were to be neglected on the pretext that 
we have too much of a defense problem, those 
very internal p rob lems would be so exacerbated 
that they �ould threaten the very security 
of Israe l .  
I n  1949 , Israel ' s  first Presiden t ,  Chaim Weizmann , said , "Our 
security will to a great extent depend not only on the armies and 
navies we can creat e ,  but on the internal moral stability of the 
country, which will in turn influence its external political 
stability . 113 
This s ituation has helped build an atmosphere of distrust , 
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fear, and cultural confrontation in the Middle East. Israers 
history of discrimination against its Arabs and Oriental Jews has 
made it appear as a product of Western imperialism rather than as 
a necessary entity for the protection of the world ' s  Jews . Leaders 
of the Oriental Jewish community have claimed that their relega-
tion to second-class status in Israel diminishes the chances for 
4 rapproachement with the Arabs. The Zionist belief in Jewish 
superiority and disrespect for Middle Eastern culture are emotional 
issues that involve national and racial pride . This is especially 
dangerous in the Middle East where religious and ellX>tional attach-
ments to the land already play such an important role . These con-
ditions lead the parties involved to take rigid stances , reducing 
the potential for compromise and making meaningful communication 
difficult. 
The record of Israel on the issue of land is clear . Zionists 
began a pattern of territorial gains long before the establishment 
of Israel that has continued to the present . Land has been obtained 
through direct and indirect purchase , taking over abandoned land, 
force of violence , and force of law. As shown in Chapter 3 ,  most of 
these actions were sanctioned by the official Zionist organization 
and are still supported by the Israeli government .  Z:i:onis.t:. control 
I 
over land in Palestine was extended during and after the 1947 war 
that created Israel. It has continued within the state ' s  borders 
through expropriation of Arab owned land. More significant , however ,  
is Israel ' s  tendency to enter and confiscate land in neighboring 
countries. This was attempted unsuccessfully in 1955 with the Sinai 
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invasion and successfully in the 1967 war. Israel defended its 1967 
gains from Egypt , Jordan , and Syria in 1973 and has continued a 
policy of solidifying its control over the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank areas through the building of settlements there. In 1979 and 
1980, Israeli military forces entered Lebanon, but its intentions 
there are not yet clear. Expansion of the Jewish state is consistent 
with, even required by, Zionist ideology. To achieve the goals of 
creating a state for all the world ' s  Jews and restoring Jewish con­
trol over Eretz Israe l ,  more land gains are necessary. Returning 
the Sinai peninsula to Egypt does not conflict with Zionism because 
it was not part of what is considered as ancient Israel and holds 
little religious or historical significance for Zionists. 
The Zionist record of expansionism and its j ustification of 
that record through its ideological claims of historic and religious 
rights is a continuing source of hostility in the Middle East . It 
represents a threat to Arab territorial sovereignty and violates many 
international agreements which Israel has been a party to. Accep­
tance of Israe l ' s  legitimacy by the Arab states in unlikely while 
Israel continues to expropriate the land of its Arab citizens, hold 
on to Arab land captured by force , and invade the territory of 
neighboring countries regularly. These actions also block the sat­
isfactton of Palestinian Arab demands without which there can be no 
resolution of the conflict. Zionist ideology and its implementation 
in the form of territorial expansion are obstacles to a peaceful and 
just settlement in the Middle East which would insure stability 
there. 
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The relationship between domestic and foreign policy is complex. 
The discussion so far has emphasized the effect of domestic politics 
on foreign policy actions. But foreign policy can also be used as a 
tool in achieving domestic goals . Israel has pursued an aggressive 
foreign policy throughout its history based on Zionist principles 
and traditions . Besides achieving specific foreign policy objectives , 
this aggressiveness has been an effective way to deal with internal 
strains . Uniting its citizens around an expansionist crusade or in 
response to a perceived threat can divert public attention from 
social and economic problems . The poor state of the Israeli economy 
and conflict between racial groups make actions such as capturing 
the territory of other states particularly valuable . Doing nothing 
would allow frustrations and animosities to grow and tackling do­
mestic issues directly could damage the nation ' s  (and the govern­
ment ' s )  cohesion. Engineering a foreign policy victory has often 
been an easy way to unify the nation and avoid confronting difficult 
domestic problems . Considering the seriousness of Israel ' s  internal 
problems and the availability of Zionism as both a source and a 
justification of action, aggressive foreign policy will likely con­
tinue to be an important part of the country ' s  politic s .  
The dominance of Zionism over Israeli policy decisions 
severely limits the range of choice available to government leaders . 
Any compromise on major issues such as Israel ' s  claim to a historic 
right to settle parts of the West Bank, the return of land to Pal­
estinian Arabs , and the creation of a Palestinian state would not be 
consistent with the Zionist precepts outlined in Chapter 2. Chapter 
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3 indicates that many domestic policy decisions have conformed to 
these precepts . An acknowledgement of legitimate Palestinian 
rights in regard to land or nationality would raise questions 
about the justification of any set of boundaries for Israel and 
about its existence as a Jewish state. Relinquishing occupied land 
would reduce Israe l ' s  ability to accommodate new Jewish immigrants, 
which is the central task of the state . Also, granting equal rights , 
economic opportunities, social status , and political representation 
to non-Jews in Israel would seem to be a weakening of the commit­
ment to Zionism ' s  goal o f  a Jewish state . If non-Jews can reach 
important positions in politics , busine s s ,  communications , or other 
areas , the possibility would exist that part of the Jewish state 
could be controlled by non-Jews . So , to carry out Zionism, Israel 
has worked to eliminate this possibility. Underlying Israel ' s  
domestic and international difficulties is the fundamental Zionist 
teaching that anti-Semitism is inherent and incurable. Israel can­
not make concessions to its Arab neighbors nor work to improve the 
lives of its non-Jewish citizens if it believes them to be natural 
and permanent enemies to Jews and their state. Major options avail­
able to Israel to bring internal justice to the Jewish state and 
peace to the .Middle East are not considered because of the influence 
of Zionist ideology over the decision-making proces s .  A more flex­
ible approach· on the part of Israel is neces sary to resolve the 
major issues· in the Middle East but impossible within the principles 
of Zionism. 
It does not appear likely that Zionist ideology will be ignored 
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or rejected by Israeli leaders in the forseeable future. This paper 
has documented the significance of Zionism as the force that created 
the state and now guides its actions . But Chapters 4 and 5 indi­
cated that more than commitment to ideological principles in involved 
in maintaining the strength of Zionism and the government policies 
resulting from it. Political structure and processes in Israel 
operate in a manner that discourages major modification of Zionist 
ideas and government policy. The historical role and position of 
political parties contributes greatly to this . Most of the major 
Israeli parties originated as part of the Zionist movement to create 
Israel and a.re still loyal to the goals of that movement . Since the 
first election in 1949 , there has been a generally consistent divi­
sion of votes among the major parties and alignments.  Only excep­
tional events like the October war of 1973 and the Labor Party scan­
dals of 1976 have brought significant change in vote distribution. 
Clear and consistent positions on issues by parties is one factor 
in this . Also, the social and financial service functions of the 
parties help them to attract and maintain a base of support. 
Structural features such as the proportional representation 
electoral system; multiple parties ; and the centralized nature of 
parties, government, and the economy are causal. factors in ideo­
logical and policy consistency. This system has led to a series of 
coalition governments in Israel in which no party represents a 
majority of the population. It has also led to a situation in which 
party loyalty is of more importance than public, representation. 
Party leaders are primarily interested in maintaining support and 
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rely on negotiations with other leaders to make policy decisions and 
to maintain power ; The inevitable results of such a system are a 
sluggish and indirect response to public demands and an extremely 
slow process of making any changes in policy direction . The power 
of this policy inertia is illustrated by the similarity in foreign 
policy actions of past Labor governments and the Likud government 
which took control in 197 7 ,  as detailed in Chapter 4 .  The tendency 
toward policy consistency that originated in the commitment to Zion­
ism is reinforced by Israe l ' s  political structure. 
The orientation of these policies is determined not only by 
Zionism but also by the nature of the count;r;:y ' s  leadership. Chapter 
5 discussed the make-up and the characteristics of Israel ' s  leader­
ship and showed it to consist essentially of a small elite of Western 
Jews committed to traditional Zionist principles. The Israeli elite 
was created by the superior position of Western Jews throughout the 
society and the political structure which protects the position of 
existing leaders. Limited access to significant information also 
contributes to elite power .  Ths position of' the elite on major 
issues has remained basically the same throughout Israel ' s  history. 
In fact , Ch�p ter S indicated that the individual members of the elite 
group have not changed much . The existence of this elite and its 
influence over policy decisions is an importaht additional factor in 
the inflexibility of the Israeli system and the intransigence of its 
foreign policy positions . The combination of the elite ' s  commitment 
to conservative Zionism and its Western nature and orientation help 
continue the expansionist and racist policies of the state . The 
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influence of Israel ' s  elite, together with its political structure , 
limit the possibility that Israel will be open to policy change or 
adopt a flexible approach to Middle East issues . 
The most significant of all these issues is the question of the 
Palestinian Arabs . People who were displaced through the various 
aspects of mass Jewish immigration, who exist as second-class citi­
zens within Israe l ,  or who reside in Israeli-occupied territories 
form the crux of the conflict in the Middle East. Zionist and Is­
raeli response to these people has been varied. During early Zionist 
inunigration to Palestine , the existing population was largely ignored. 
Upon recognition of their existence , the Zionist movement proved in­
different to the situation of Palestinian Arabs , regarding their own 
goals as paraioount . The military takeover of Arab land by Israel in 
1967 brought more Arabs under Israeli control and forced the govern­
ment to deal with them in some way. But there has been no compre­
hensive policy on the issue of the Palestinians yet established by 
Israel. Chapter 3 illustrated that Arabs have not been granted full 
citizenship wi�hin Israel. And although Israel has moved to tie the 
West Bank economy to its own and has established Jewish settlements 
there to extend its contro l ,  it has not accepted the idea of making 
the area an official part of Israel . It also refuses to seriously 
discuss the creation of a Palestinian state to satisfy the demands 
of its Arab opponents .  Begin ' s  proposed Palestinian autonomy plan 
would give Arabs minimal administrative responsibilities while re­
taining real control for Israe l .  Israel seems to be extracting the 
economic , territorial, and security benefit of controlling the West 
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Bank without accepting complete responsibility for providing benefits 
to the area or for giving West Bank residents any voice in deter­
mining policy. This is nothing short of colonization. It is con­
sistent with previous Israeli actions and Zionism in that it 
increases the area under Jewish control while refusing to allow 
meaningful participation in the system by non-Jews . 
Flexibility is the essential element necessary to resolve the 
Palestinian problem and all other Middle East issue s .  No treaty can 
be effective in achieving peace and stability without changes in the 
attitudes of all parties involved in the conflict . Since Israel. is 
a part of the Middle Eas t ,  exists on land previously owned by Arabs , 
and was assisted in its creation by much of the international com­
munity, it has a primary responsibility in making the necessary ad­
justments .  It should grant to Palestinians the same rights to 
nationhood that it claimed for Jews , and it should offer to its 
neighbor countries the same respect for territorial sovereignty and 
security as it demands for itself. However ,  commitment to Zionism, 
racist and expansionist government policies ,  a political structure 
that works against the achievement of substantial change , and elite 
control of the government seriously restrict Israel ' s  ability to be 
flexible or to alter its existing policies on major Middle East 
issues.  
The results of such a rigid system could be disastrous for 
Israel and the world. Regardless of any moral responsibility to 
deal j ustly with its own citizens and its fellow nations , it is in 
Israel ' s  own interest to adjust its ideological perspective and 
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change its policie s .  Current domestic policies create internal 
conflict that· could affect Israel ' s  security from within. Those 
same policies reduce the possibility for Israel to become an ac­
cepted member of the Middle East community and have undermined its 
international position. Most dangerous , the present domestic and 
foreign policies of Israel and its inflexible political system 
could contribute to renewed military conflict in the Middle East. 
With the increased political power of Arab nations due to oil , and 
the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel, such a conflict would 
have worldwide consequences with the possibility of leading to a 
big power confrontation. 
The threat of such a confrontation is one factor in convincing 
the United States to take such a major role in seeking a solution 
to Middle East problems . The Camp Dav,i·d Accords reached in Septem­
ber , 1978, would' not have been possible without the participation 
of the U . S .  The same i s  true o f  the Egypt-Israel peace treaty 
signed in March, 1979. The negotiation of an official end to the 
hostility between Egypt and Israel and their agreement on a general 
approach to a comprehensive Middle East peace are obviously signifi­
cant. However, it is not so obvious that they have led to sub­
stantial progress toward an overall settlement . There are basic 
weaknesses in the Accords that make achieving this unlikely. Most 
important , the agreement does not recognize a right of the Pales­
tinian Arabs. to self-determination. In fact , residents of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip were not given independent status in future 
negotiations but were included as potential participants within the 
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delegations of Egypt or Jordan . Camp David did not set any 
obj ective to be worked for in terms o f  the ultimate source of 
authority in the occupied territories . The vagueness of the 
agreement leaves in doubt whether Israel intends to relinquish 
control over the · area to any significant degree . Since the de­
velopment of any plan for Palestinian autonomy was set up to 
occur after the conclusion of the peace treaty, Israel was not 
forced to make any prior commitments on this issue . The real 
meaning of Camp David is that Israel was able to obtain large 
benefits while making only minor concessions . Essentially, Is­
rael agreed to return the Sinai to Egypt and to discuss self­
government for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In return it re­
ceived promise that its security would not be compromised in the 
negotiating proces s ,  that the strongest of its past enemies would 
not attack it, and that economic aid and an adequate oil supply 
would be provided. The Camp David Accords and the subsequent 
peace treaty put Israel in a position from which it could remain 
intransigent on the most crucial Middle East issues while becoming 
safer than it has ever been . 
Thi� intransigence has been a major factor in the criticism of 
Israel by the international community. Israel has been condemned 
many times by the UN ,  IOC>St seriously by ,the 1973 resolution equating 
Zionism with racism. As mentioned previously, many nations and 
organizations have protested violations of human rights and inter­
national agreements in regard to the occupied territories .  Israel 
is most sensitive to criticism from the United States . The U . S .  
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withheld aid from Israel when it refused to halt work on a 
hydroelectric project in the demilitarized zone between Israel and 
Syria. In 1953, when Israeli troops killed a large number of Arabs 
in the village of Qibya, it was the United States that brought the 
matter before the Security Council.  The U . S .  also pressured Israel 
to withdraw from the Sinai in 1955 and voted to condemn it for a 
5 1966 attack on Jordan. Official criticism was also made over Is-
raeli military action in Lebanon in 1979 , particularly regarding 
the use of American supplied weapons there. Presently , the u . s .  
and I srael disagree strenuously over Jewish settlements in the 
occupied territories with the U . S .  condemning them as obstacles to 
peace. 
Some changes have resulted from these external pressures.  
Israel did return the Sinai to Egypt. and is discussing the future 
of the West Bank. Also, its status in the U . S .  is still high as 
most American officials continue to affirm �upport for Israel. 
The Camp David Accords included U . S .  guarantees of economic and 
military aid and an assurance that an adequate oil supply would be 
provided. A major indication of the limits to U . S .  opposition to 
Israeli policies was the resignation of UN Ambassador Andrew Young. 
Young ' s  resignation came after he was' widely condemned for meeting 
with the UN observer representing the Palestine Lib..eration Organiza . .-
tion . Although the meeting was between participants in the UN and 
was not intended as a shift in U . S .  policy toward the P . L . O . , Israel 
and its supporters strongly protested it as a betrayal of the 
official line . The fact that the Carter administration gave in to 
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this criticism and allowed Young to resign indicates the strength of 
Israel ' s  position in the U . S .  Presidential candidate John Connally 
encountered this same strength when he stated that Israeli with­
drawal from the occupied territories and the creation Of some type 
of autonomous entity for Palestinian Arabs would provide a fair 
solution to the Middle East conflict. This approach had been ad­
vocated by others previously and was not far from the agreements 
reached at Camp David. But a Presidential candidate publicly 
expressing such views brought waves of protest and even Connally 
conceded he had lost the Jewish vote . Further complicating rela­
tions between the two countries was the public debate on the Middle 
East conducted between leaders of the American black community . 
The Young incident opened the issue of U . S .  Middle East policy among 
blacks , with Jesse Jackson and Joseph Lowery leading the discus­
sions . This group came out in favor o f  U . S .  recognition of the 
P . L . O .  and traveled to. the Middle East to meet with Palestinian 
leaders. Vernon Jordan of the Urban League responded by criticizing 
Jackson and Lowery and reaffirming the close ties of blacks and Jews 
on civil rights issue s .  These incidents illustrate that the rela­
tionship between America and Israel is a dynamic one involving many 
elements . But U . S .  pressure was the primary force in working out 
the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In­
creased aid makes Israel more. dependent on the U . S . ,  particularly in 
light of the. poor state of the Israeli economy . So despite the 
complexities involved; U . S .  influence has been and will continue to 
be the most sign�f icant factor in producing any change in Israeli 
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foreign policy. 
This does not make progress toward a lasting peace inevitable . 
Commitment to the racist and expansionist goals of Zionism, a rigid 
political structure, and the closed nature of the cowitry ' s  leader­
ship limit the ability of Israel to make the changes in policy 
necessary to bring an end to the conflict. The inertia of past 
policies is continuing,  as illustrated by the periodic expropriation 
of ·more Arab land ,£'or.-· settlements , the fr�quent pronouncements of 
historic and religious rights to the occupied territories , and the 
replacement of a somewhat flexible Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan 
with an ultra-conservative follower of Jabotinsky, Yitzhak Shamir. 
Such actions indicate how slow and difficult the process of resol­
ving the Middle East conflict will b e .  Zionist ideology , its transla­
tion into government policy , the cowitry ' s  political structure, and 
its elitist leadership are to a large degree responsible for th is . 
The dangers of war and its consequences that are a part of this 
situation will insure the continuation of external pressures which 
will b e  helpful in bringing about a more flexible Israeli policy . 
However,  domestic politics in Israel has so far worked against 
peace, stability , and j ustice for all parties in the Middle East 
conflict and changes in the the internal situation of Israel must 
occur before these goals can be achieve d .  
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